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Abstract
This dissertation examines why Congress addresses some problems while ignoring others. Key to this
process are congressional committees, which organize much of Congress’s day-to-day activity but whose
role has been downplayed in recent scholarship on congressional lawmaking. I examine how committees
come to address particular problems with legislation, across three substantive papers. First, I find that
while committee leaders may be more constrained in their agenda-setting powers than in the past, they
can still direct their committee’s attention to issue areas that they prioritize personally. In the second and
third parts of the dissertation, I examine how interest group lobbying influences chairs’ agenda-setting
decisionswith respect to individual bills. In the secondpaper, I develop the concept of interest diversity as
the relative degree of observable variety of social identities, political causes, or industries representedby set
of organizations. Using new data on interest groups’ positions on over 5000 bills introduced during the
109th to 113th Congresses, I develop and validate a measure for interest diversity among groups lobbying
on a bill. I show that the net interest diversity on a bill, the difference in supporters’ and opponents’
interest diversities, varies in ways that are both consistent with general predictions about interest group
activity as well as with well-understood patterns of legislative and interest group behavior. In the
third paper, I examine how bills’ net interest diversity impacts the legislative agendas of congressional
committees. I argue that committee chairs’ incentives to promote viable legislation induce them to favor
bills garnering the support of a diverse array of causes and industries, who are in turn able tomobilize the
sustained support and attention of many legislators. I find that bills with higher net interest diversity are
more likely to be considered in committee. I then show how these associations vary across bill sponsors
and party alignments between Congress and the White House. Taken together, these results suggest
that interest group influence, and what makes interest groups influential, is moderated by legislative




In a society and economy as large and complex as that of the United States, many problems arise which
might be addressed through a change in law. Congress is charged with making and changing laws, and
the legislators who constitute Congress represent every corner of the country, alongwith the constituents
who call their districts and states home. Given the motivation legislators have to maintain the support
of their constituencies, one might expect the country’s highest legislative body to attempt to address
many of the problems its members will be held accountable for solving or not solving. However, of
all the issues and policy problems that Congress might address, it attends to only a fraction. Indeed,
while legislators introduce thousands of bills
1
in each Congress, the vast majority of these never make any
legislative progress. This raises the question: why does Congress attend to some policy problems and
ignore others?
Two of the most popular answers to "why doesn’t Congress do X" are "parties" and "money." Party
leaders, common critiques maintain, dominate the legislative process and use that dominance to pursue
political victories rather than the common good. Concerned with maintaining the party’s collective
reputation and avoiding internal divisions, party leaders circumvent the normal legislative process,
prevent legislators from gaining a nuanced understanding of the bills they vote on, and routinely bypass
those legislators who are most likely to be experts on a particular policy area – i.e., the members and
leaders of each chamber’s substantive committees. The result is that many legislators are denied an
opportunity to meaningfully participate in the legislative process, and so their priorities – and those
1
To say nothing of the practically innumerable social, economic, and policy problems that could be addressed through
federal legislation but cannot find a legislative champion in Congress.
1
of their constituents – never make it onto the congressional agenda. On the other hand, blaming
bad politics or policy outcomes on wealthy interest groups is a classic pastime among observers and
participants of Congress. This is reflected in scholarly examinations interest group behavior; the
preponderance of studies of interest group influence attempt to understand how groups’ resources –
e.g., their campaign contributions and lobby expenditures – influence individual legislators’ behavior as
well as policy changes. The normative implication of such studies, insofar as they identify a connection
between resources and influence, is that groups (or coalitions) able to marshal more resources have
more influence. As the members and benefactors of such groups would disproportionately hail from
higher resource (i.e., wealthier) individuals, the natural implication is that organized interests exacerbate
the overrepresentation of the wealthy in the legislative process. Critiques focused on either parties or
interest group resources are an indictment, sometimes quite a searing one, of the functioning ofAmerican
democracy.
This dissertation suggests that both types of accounts are incomplete. To do so, it focuses on the role
of congressional committees in the legislative process. Committee activities – oversight hearings,markups
on draft legislation, and votes to report bills to the floor – provide legislators with opportunities not only
to learn about legislative issues most directly relevant to their constituents, but to ensure that the issues
most important to their districts receive other legislators’ attention. Moreover, committee-approved bills
are still more likely to pass their parent chamber than other bills, suggesting that committees serve a vital
function in vetting legislative proposals. A potential answer to the question of why Congress attends to
some policy problems and ignores others, then, lies in understanding which problems gain the attention
of congressional committees.
To examine the influences on congressional committee agendas, this dissertation proceeds with three
substantive articles. First, I argue that committee leaders have more power to set congressional priorities
than current accounts often ascribe to them. I show that committee chairs can steer their committee’s
issue agendas toward their personal priority issues. To do so, I examine the issue priorities of committees
in years where the chair of the committee changed due to exogenous shock: the previous chair had died or
resigned in scandal. I find that, during such exogenous transitions, levels of committee attention across
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issues are positively associated with levels of committee chair bill sponsorship and previous committee
activity across issues. Importantly, the priorities of majority party leaders and majority party members
are not consistently associated with committees’ issue agendas. This suggests that even though they are
constrained in determining the content of their bills, chairs exercise substantial discretion in which issues
their committees address.
Second, I conceptualize and measure interest diversity in lobbying coalitions. I define interest
diversity as the relative degree of observable variety of subconstituencies – groups of citizens sharing a
social identity, political cause, or industry – represented by set of organizations. Interest diversity can be
influential because it allows legislators to assess which segments of their voters might reward or punish
them for their behavior on a bill. I create a measure of interest diversity using an established taxonomy
of interests. I then apply this measure to a dataset of 13,000 organizations lobbying on over 5000 bills
introduced during the 109th to 113th Congresses. In particular, I focus on the extent to which the interest
groups supporting a bill aremore diverse than the interest groups opposing the bill – a difference I refer to
asNet InterestDiversity. I validate thismeasure ofNet InterestDiversity by exploring how it corresponds
to well-understood patterns in how legislators and interest groups build support for legislation.
In the third paper, I examine how interest diversity among organizations lobbying on a bill impacts
the legislative agendas of congressional committees. I argue that committee chairs’ incentives to promote
viable legislation induce them to favor bills garnering the support of a diverse array of causes and
industries. I find that bills with higher Net Interest Diversity are more likely to be considered in
committee, while interest groups’ PAC contributions are not consistently associated with committee
consideration. I then show how these associations vary across majority- and minority-party sponsors
and across different partisan alignments between the House, Senate, andWhite House. Taken together,
these results show that lobbyingmatters for which bills get on to Congress’s agenda, and that institutions
moderate the influence of lobbying on committee agendas. In addition, they provide a potential
alternative to lobby expenditures and campaign contributions as a source of influence.
Together, these papers make several contributions to knowledge. In showing that committee leaders
exercise powers of problem selection, they rehabilitate committee chairs’ role in the legislative process,
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which prior accounts of legislative organization have either ignored or treated as constrained to the point
of triviality. In addition, by showing that chairs’ personal priorities populate the committee agenda, these
articles begin to expand the literature on congressional information processing and problem solving by
providing answers to not just how problems are selected, but which are selected and, most importantly,
whose problems take precedence. These articles also connect interest group lobbying to the fate of bills in
Congress. They complement existing studies that show that lobbying is associated with which bills move
through the first and most perilous winnowing point of the legislative process – gaining consideration
in committee. However, in addition to showing that lobbying is associated with legislative advancement,
this article provides a unique explanation for why interest groups are influential. By serving as proxies for
important district subconstituencies, interest groups help lawmakers connect their legislative activities
to the policy problems that are important to their voters back home. The dissertation develops the
concept of interest diversity to capture whatmakes this proxying influence legislative outcomes, validates
a measure that tracks which bills should be supported by a wide range of legislators and which are more
likely to be opposed, and provides and tests the implications of a logic by which interest diversity should
impact the decision to grant a bill consideration. In doing so, these articles examine the influence of
organized interests across a wide range of issue areas, suggesting that their findings are more likely to
generalize. It also captures interest group activity over legislation introduced over a range of years, 2005 to
2014, that containmany different alignments of the chambers of Congress and theWhiteHouse between
the parties.
These articles also point toward potentially fruitful avenues for future research. First, they suggest
that scholars of Congress should study not just what bills are allowed onto the legislative agenda, but
what problems are selected for those bills to address and, hence, what bills are available for the legislative
agenda to contain. Second, it develops a new attribute of interest group influence – interest diversity –
thatmight continue to impact the fate of legislation beyond its first committee, or thatmight help interest
groups change the provisions of particular bills or help them obtain or prevent policy change regardless
of legislative vehicle. In addition, by showing that aspects of lobbying other than interest groups’
resources impact their legislative influence, these articles encourage future scholarship’s attempts to keep
4
looking beyond resources for explanations of interest group influence. Indeed, how, and indeedwhether,
lobbying should be reformed depends strongly on what attributes of lobbying make it influential as well
as what that influence changes in legislation.
5
Chapter 2
Legislator Priorities and Problem Selection in Congressional Committees
Bills in Congress that rise to national public salience deal with major issues and attempt to solve seemingly
intractable problems that impact the lives of many. Or they reflect campaign promises that swept a party into
power. Or they respond to some emergent crisis. However, many bills that are salient to members of Congress
cannot be described in any of these ways. Some are about making sure the employers in one’s district are
getting the workforce they need. For example, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), whose district includes parts
of tech-centered Austin, sponsored and shepherded through committee the Green Energy Education Act
of 2007: which authorized the Department of Energy to move funds to the National Science Foundation
so that the latter could use them to support clean energy engineering training programs. This reflects the
specific employment needs of the tech industry in his district. On the other hand, less salient bills sometimes
include matters of personal interest to lawmakers. Transportation committee chairman Rep. Bill Shuster
(R-PA), spurred by a Federal Aviation Administration review of an expiring regulation, filed and granted
committee consideration to the Prohibiting In-Flight Voice Communications on Mobile Wireless Devices
Act of 2013, which would have put into statute the expiring regulatory prohibition on making voice calls
during commercial flights. Arguing in favor of the bill, Shuster claimed that it would allow air passengers
to avoid being forced to listen to conversations that were "too loud, too close, or too personal."1 Given that
these sorts of bills often avoid a large public outcry, and rarely respond to emergencies or partisan debates,
why do these less-salient issues get onto the agenda in the first place?
Of all the issues it might address, Congress attends to only a fraction. This might be normatively
1
Shuster, Bill. "Cellphones on Planes? Tap, don’t talk." The Hill, February 10th, 2014. http://thehill.com/
opinion/op-ed/197962-cellphones-on-planes-tap-dont-talk, accessedMarch 19th, 2017.
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acceptable if the selection of issues was based on public demand for policy action, or on some other
indicator of national need. The movement of issues from the systemic agenda, the issues considered
worthy of discussion by political elites, to the institutional agenda, those receiving formal attention in
policymaking institutions, is neither random nor automatically responsive to public or national needs.
(c.f. Cobb and Elder 1972) Indeed, the ability to direct such movement, "the ability to decide what to
decide on", is a significant form of political power, and a prerequisite for policy change. (Bauer, Pool and
Dexter 1964; Bachrach and Baratz 1962)
However, surprisingly little is known about why Congress addresses the specific issues that it does.
It is not due to lack of information: congressional and executive agencies, interest groups, think tanks,
academics, and ordinary citizens constantly "educate" and "raise awareness" amongmembers of Congress.
(Hall 1996) Rather, this information glut causes Congress to delay responding to problems and to
overcompensate when it does change policy. (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005)
While this describes the process bywhich Congress becomes aware of and solves problems, it does not tell
us which problems Congress chooses to solve. In explaining which problems get addressed, theories of
legislative organization ascribe agenda-setting power - the power toblock or advance proposals - to specific
pivotal legislators (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Krehbiel 1998) or to groups of actors with intense
shared preferences. (Mayhew 1974; Aldrich and Rohde 2001) However, such models do not explain why
these proposals are there to be blocked or permitted in the first place. Nor do they explain why solutions
to a particular problem are blocked or permitted, but not to some other problem. In short, these models
tend to consider which policy proposals may beat the status quo in a given problem; they do not tell us
why that problem is being addressed in the first place. Thus, we knowmuch about the process by which
Congress solves problems, as well as which "solutions" are likely to carry the day; we know markedly less
about why Congress tries to solve some problems and not others.
One consequence of the relative inattention to problem selection vis-a-vis agenda control is that
committee leaders’ powers have been largely dismissed. Indeed, despite their nominal control over their
committee’s agenda, committee chairs are unmentioned in much of the literature on agenda-setting in
Congress. What literature does exist on committee leadership emphasizes how they are constrained, either
7
by informational shortcomings, (Krutz 2005) internal committee politics, (Manley 1969; Evans 2001) or
the extent to which institutional reforms of the 1970s and 1990s brought committee chairs under the
control of the majority party leadership. (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Owens 1997; Stiglitz and Weingast
2010; Sinclair 1998;Deering andWahlbeck 2006;Cann2008;Bendix 2016)Thus, existing research suggests
that committee activities are dominated by the needs of the majority party. By contrast, this study argues
that, despite being constrained in the bills they can force onto or off of the agenda, chairs influence
congressional problem selection as well. Chairs, like all legislators, seek opportunities to pursue their
electoral, political, and policy objectives. For a given legislator, some issue topics may be more useful in
this respect thanothers. (Shepsle 1978;Hall 1996; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005;Woon2009;Mayhew 1974) In
this article, I argue that, unlike many other legislators, committee chairs have institutional prerogatives
– namely, the ability to schedule committee hearings – that allow them to generate valuable political
opportunities for themselves. To the extent this is true, they should be expected to use that power
to provide themselves with opportunities to position-take and credit-claim on issues that benefit them
personally. In shaping the issue content of committee activities, chairs shape the agenda of Congress in a
way consistent with having positive agenda power.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I argue that committees drive problem selection in the House,
and that committee chairs’ institutional prerogatives allow them to create opportunities for themselves
by taking advantage of this discretion in problem selection. Based on this argument, I propose that the
attention paid to different issue areas in committee agendas should be a function of committee chairs’
personal priorities, independently of the priorities of the majority party’s leadership or rank-and-file. I
test this argument by examining the issue topics ofHouse committee hearings in committee-years during
the post-reform Congress in which the chair changed for exogenous reasons; these include the death or
resignation in non-political scandal of the previous chair. Using this exogenous shock as a source of causal
identification, I find that committee agenda decisions are drivenby committee chairs’ individual priorities
and a committee’s ongoing responsibilities. However, I fail to find a consistent association between
committee agendas and the contemporaneous issue priorities of majority party leaders, majority party
members, or all members of the House. Together, these findings suggest that the relationship between
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majority party leaders and committee leaders may be more complicated than previous accounts suggest,
and that problem selection is an important antecedent of agenda control in shaping legislative outcomes
in Congress.
2.1 the political benefits of committee activities
Legislators, including committee chairs, face an ongoing resource allocation problem. A given legislator
has scarce personal and staff time with which to pursue her goals (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981; Hall 1996)
and must make choices (e.g. committee assignment requests, bill sponsorships, etc.) that necessarily
make them more active in some issue areas than others. Such choices may help or hinder legislators’
efforts to pursue electoral, policy, and political goals. (Hall 1996; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle
1978) In particular, choices of issue effort allocation have significant implications for legislators’ electoral
prospects, as constituencies expect their representatives to work on the issues they care about most. (Hall
1996; Sulkin 2005; Woon 2009) Thus, individual legislators should be expected to take advantage of
opportunities in committee to pursue their goals by strategically allocating their effort across issue areas.
Hearings are committees’ primary formal activity and serve as one mechanism of issue effort
allocation. In committee hearings, members hear witness testimony and discuss a topic related to
the committee’s issue jurisdiction. Many hearings are on oversight or investigatory matters, in which
the committee hears witness statements about a topic. However, according to Policy Agendas Project
data, about forty percent of committee hearings in the postwar era have been referral hearings, in
which the topic of the hearing is a specific piece of legislation. The committee may or may not report
legislation, based in whole or in part on bills considered in a referral hearing, to the Rules Committee
for consideration on the floor. (Oleszek 2011; Deering and Smith 1997) Both of these types of hearings
provide opportunities for legislators to work in the policy areas they prioritize.
Legislators’ ability to use committee activities to pursue personal objectives is facilitated by two
features of committee hearings. The first feature arises from the fact that most committee hearings are
public. While committees vary somewhat in their procedures,most allow time for committeemembers to
ask questions of witnesses or tomake statements about whatever matter is under consideration. (Oleszek
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2011; Deering and Smith 1997; Sinclair 1986) Because committee hearings often receive news coverage -
and members self-promote their behavior in committees in their personal websites, press releases, etc. -
such statements and questions amount to, if nothing else, acts of public position-taking. Position-taking
helps legislators seek reelection by raising their public profile and attracting the positive attention (and
support) of interest groups and other highly-attentive constituencies. (Mayhew 1974) Thus, even if no
legislation results from a committee hearing, committee chairs and other legislators may derive some
political benefits from participating in them.
The second feature of committee activities pertains to policy-making. While it is frequently argued
that full committees have become less powerful relative to party leaders and individualmembers since the
1970s, (Sinclair 1998; Deering and Smith 1997; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 1993; Bendix 2016) it remains
the case that legislators use their committee activities to engage in costly development of policy expertise.
This has implications for legislative outcomes; a bill that is reported from a committee is much more
likely to pass the House floor. In fact, according to Congressional Bills Project data presented in Table
2.1, while the raw number of bills passing the House since 1995 (the post-Gingrich Revolution era where
parties are presumed to dominate committees) have been equally comprised of bills that did or did not
get reported from a committee, nearly 75 percent of committee-reported bills passed the House while
only four percent of non-reported bills did so. Notably, the advantage of a committee report maintains
for subsamples considering onlymajority party bills, "leadership" issues (defined as the first ten numbered
House bills, per House practice), and bills filed personally by majority party leaders. This advantage in
floor success complicates the narrative that committees no longer matter for policymaking. Thus, if a bill
canbe reported fromthe committee, then the committee’s reportedbill ismuchmore likely topass the full
chamber, which suggests that committees have some degree of influence on the results of deliberations
on the floor. (Fleisher and Bond 1983) Because committee activities are consequential, the ability to direct
them is valuable.
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Table 2.1: Counts (and row percentage) of House bills by committee report status and chamber passage
status, 1995-2012.
(a) All House Bills
Not Passed by the House Passed by the House
Not Reported from Committee 83,503 (95.77) 3,669 (4.23)
Reported from Committee 1,419 (26.48) 3,939 (73.52)
(b) All Majority Party Sponsored House Bills
Not Passed by the House Passed by the House
Not Reported from Committee 46,755 (94.49) 2,725 (5.51)
Reported from Committee 1,176 (26.79) 3,213 (73.21)
(c) All House "Leadership" Bills
Not Passed by the House Passed by the House
Not Reported from Committee 121 (79.08) 32 (20.92)
Reported from Committee 3 (7.14) 39 (92.86)
(d) All House Bills Introduced byMajority Party Leaders
Not Passed by the House Passed by the House
Not Reported from Committee 113 (83.09) 23 (16.91)
Reported from Committee 1 (3.85) 25 (96.15)
2.2 legislator issue emphasis and committee topic allocation
The opportunity-creation powers afforded to committees are nominally wielded by the committee chair.
Committee chairs have scheduling and witness selection powers (see House Rule XI.2.g.(3)(A) as well
as Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995; Oleszek 2011; Deering and Smith 1997) These allow the chair,
respectively, to determine the issue content of hearings and, by way of strategically selecting witnesses, to
highlight certain aspects of a problem and emphasize advantageous issue frames. (Jones andBaumgartner
2005; DeGregorio 1997; Evans 2001; Kollman 1997) Chairs also control which bills are scheduled for
hearing as well as which amendments to those bills are considered in committee; these allow a chair to
grant the committee’s floor success advantage to bills selectively. (Krutz 2005) Because of these powers,
the committee chair can create position-taking and policymaking opportunities for issue areas of their
choosing, and is largely unconstrained in doing so if the topic of a hearing is within the committee’s issue
jurisdiction.
2
Given control of their committee hearing’s issue topics and incentives to pursue district
2
It should be noted, however, that for investigatory and oversight hearings, House Rules are generally far more lenient
about confining committee hearings to the topics within a committee’s issue jurisdiction. Indeed, this leniency allows
committees tomake claims on issue areas outside of their current jurisdiction. (Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995) Thus, in
the realm of non-referral hearings, the chair is less constrained in directing their committee’s attention to the issues they care
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and personal priority issues whenever possible, committee chairs should be expected to direct committee
hearings toward their own priority issues. To the extent they do so, they create optimal position-taking
and policymaking opportunities for themselves. As a result of such efforts, the committee’s agenda is
more likely to reflect the issue priorities of its chair.
While this may seem intuitive, it goes against much recent literature on the power and independence
of committee chairs in the post-reform Congress. Reforms Congress undertook in the 1970s and again
in the 1990s shifted floor agenda power from committee chairs to the majority party, and in the House
have allowed the majority party leadership to constrain committee chairs through specific tools; these
include more aggressive use of "leadership bills", partisan election of committee chairs, and the advent
of the Rules Committee with an effective ex post veto on committee-reported legislation. (Cox and
McCubbins 1993, 2005; Sinclair 1998; Owens 1997; Stiglitz and Weingast 2010; Deering and Smith 1997;
Aldrich and Rohde 2001) Indeed, what little scholarship exists on the role of committees and committee
chairs in the post-reformCongress generally portrays them as acting according to the policy preferences of
their co-partisans. (Evans 2001; Krutz 2005) To the extent that congressional reforms had their intended
effect, committee chairs do not have much independent power in the post-reform Congress. Performing
this party-serving function may preclude a committee chair from pursuing her personal issue priorities,
particularly if an issue area’s policy status quo(s) are broadly favored by the majority party and active
oversight is discouraged. However, it should be noted that all of these empirical patterns are consistent
with theproposition that committee chairs select bills fromauthorswith similar preferences, (Krutz 2005)
which members of their party will be more likely to have. This would suggest that committee chairs
are acting in a relatively unconstrained fashion, and are simply more likely to favor their copartisans’
bills. Moreover, studies of majority party power and the theories underpinning them typically relate to
preferences within an issue area, rather than priorities across issue areas. Thus, even in the post-reform
Congress, chairs may operate in relatively unconstrained fashion when setting their committees’ issue
priorities.
Proposition 1: among issues within a committee chair’s committee’s jurisdiction, the more important
about.
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an issue is to the committee chair, the more likely she is to direct the committee’s attention to that issue.
Though this article is primarily concerned with ascertaining the causal effect of committee chair issue
priorities on committee agendas, there are alternative explanations of committees’ issue priorities that
imply empirical propositions.
Committee agendas may reflect the priorities of the majority party. There are two mechanisms by
which it may do so. First, a committee chair might privilege the needs of majority party legislators over
those of minority party legislators. If this is the case, committee agendas would be expected to reflect the
relative priority majority party legislators
3
place among the issue areas in a committee’s remit.
Proposition 2: as an issue area within a committee’s issue jurisdiction becomes more important to
majority party legislators, the committee chair is more likely to direct the committee’s attention to that
issue.
The second potential mechanism of majority party influence over committee issue activity is the
majority party leadership. In the Gingrich era, committees were handed majority party "leadership bills"
that were expected to be reported regardless of committee members’ preferences. (Deering and Smith
1997) This intensified a long-standing practice of House leaders designating some issues as "leadership
issues": namely, those that the party wished to highlight, presumably for the sake of partisan advantage.
(Oleszek 2011) Given that majority party leaders have strong influence over party caucus elections for
committee chairmanships, it is quite possible that committee chairs are incentivized to pay heed to party
leader demands and be more active in areas where party leaders have designated "leadership bills": since
these bills always include those with the first ten bill numbers, "H.R. 1" through "H.R. 10", these serve as
a reasonable proxy for the issue priorities of leadership bills.
Proposition 3: as an issue area with a committee’s issue jurisdiction becomes more frequent among the
"First Ten" bills of Congress, the committee chair is more likely to direct the committee’s attention to that
issue.
Additionally, there remains the possibility that committee agendas are instead reflective of the
3
Of course, majority party legislators may be themselves responding to perceived electoral needs, a co-partisan President,
or the needs party campaign contributors or some other actor. While this is probably the case (and indeed may hold for
committee chairs as well), for the sake of parsimony I treat the motivations behind legislators’ priorities as exogenous and
leave discussion of the factors underlying legislators’ priorities for the conclusion.
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systemic agenda (c.f. Cobb andElder 1972) as it pertains to issueswithin the committee’s issue jurisdiction.
To the extent that is the case, committee chairs create little to no bias in problem selection through
their committee scheduling, and committee agendas would reflect the levels of demand among House
members for legislation across issue areas.
Proposition 4: as an issue area with a committee’s issue jurisdiction becomes more frequent among
bills filed in the House during that Congress, the committee chair is more likely to direct the committee’s
attention to that issue.
Finally, the collective problem-solving framework of Adler and Wilkerson (2012) argues that
committee activities are set by reauthorization periods that create opportunities for readdressing public
problems in the future; the legislators of the past want to ensure that an issue remains "on the table" even
after it is settled by passing legislation. To the extent their bill-level analysis applies at the issue level as
well, it can be expected that issue areas where a committee has been legislatively active in the recent past
(i.e. where it has previously reported bills) are more likely to continue to be the focus of that committee’s
future activities.
Proposition 5: as an issue area with a committee’s issue jurisdiction becomes more frequent among bills
reported by that committee in prior Congresses, the committee chair is more likely to direct the committee’s
attention to that issue.
2.3 research design
To investigate the role of committee chairs’ priorities in shaping committee agendas, I examine
across-issue differences in committee activity as a function of the sponsorship activity of various sets of
legislative actors, including committee chairs, majority party members, majority party leaders, and the
House as a whole. The main threat to establishing this as a causal claim is the endogeneity of changes in
chairs’ priorities to legislative and party politics that also impact committee behavior. Thus, to identify a
causal effect of changes in committee chair priorities on changes in committee agendas, it is necessary to
leverage a sample of expressed committee chair priorities that are exogenous to the legislative, electoral,
and party politics that regularly affect committee behavior.
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This study leverages two such "plausibly exogenous" causes of committee chair priority change. These
causes are the death or scandal-induced resignation of a sitting committee chair and their replacement
with a new chair. Between 1974, when the modern era of powerful congressional parties began, and
2012, there were 164 chairs of the House’s standing committees. Of these, 14 instances of chair turnover
resulted from the death, scandal-induced resignation, or executive appointment of the sitting chair of an
authorizing committee.
4
Of these, there are 10 cases where both the previous chair and the new chair
held that office for at least a full Congress, permitting them time to shape their committee’s priorities if
indeed they are able to do so. These ten cases include instances of committee turnover in seven House
committees
5
with jurisdiction including a wide variety of substantive topics. The cases of turnover
occurred in eight different Congresses between the 93rd (1973-74) and 108th (2003-2004) Congresses, and
form the basis of the data used to test propositions about committee chairs’ and other actors’ committee
agenda-setting power in the post-reform Congress.
In addition to confining the analysis to plausibly exogenous chair transitions, limiting the dataset in
this way has at least two consequences for interpreting the results of the models specified below. First,
restricting the sample size renders the empirical tests of all propositions more conservative. Taking a full
sample of all instances of committee chair change would increase the sample size from 10 committee chair
changes to over 150. A larger sample wouldmake hypothesis tests muchmore likely to detect small effects
that might, in turn, be of little substantive interest. In and of itself, this is an acceptable limitation of the
empirical tests. Second, the small number of committee chair changes meeting the exogeneity criteria
may induce unknown biases into the estimates, reducing generalizability, if the committees or issues
included were unrepresentative in someway. In addition to the criteria themselves being unconnected to
legislative and party politics, there are two reasons to be confident of generalizability: the committee chair
changes in the dataset occur across many different House committees with very different policy remits,
and occur at many different time points within post-1970 period of strong House parties. Because of
4
The specific cases and their justification as plausibly exogenous are described in the Appendix. Changes in the Rules,
Budget, and Appropriations committees were excluded from the analysis because those committees do not generally conduct
hearings considering authorizing legislation.
5
These are the House committees on: Agriculture; Armed Services; Education and the Workforce; Financial Services;
Natural Resources; Transportation; andWays &Means.
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this variety across both committees and time, there is reason for some confidence that the sample, while
small, is representative of committee chair changes in general. Moreover, the full sample of committee
chair transitions would include cases where chair turnover was endogenous to committee agendas; for
example, changes in party control (which account for a large fraction of the 150 cases of chair turnover)
would almost certainly cause changes in committee agendas aswell as thepriorities of the committee chair,
majority party membership, and majority party leadership, all of which would represent members of the
new majority party - entirely different sets of legislators. This would almost certainly bias upward the
coefficients on chair priorities, majority party members’ priorities, and leadership priorities. Therefore,
while a small sample of committee chair changes, the increase in causal credibility gained by selecting for
exogenous committee chair changes compensates for the modest potential harm to generalizability and
increased probability of Type II error.
Empirical Models
The linear portions of the models reported below take the following form:
CommitteeActivityc,i,t+1 = β1 +β2CommitteeReportsc,i,t +β3CommitteeReportsc,i,t−1 +
β4ChairSponsoredBillsc,i,t+1 + β5ChairSponsoredBillsc,i,t + β6MajorityPartyBillsi,t+1 +
β7FirstTenBillsi,t+1 + β8HouseBillsi,t+1 + β9Congresst + β10Committeec + ζi,j
where, c designates a committee, i is an issue subtopic, and t is a Congress (period). In
all cases, t is the last Congress prior to the change in committee chairs, t + 1 is the first
Congress after the change in committee chair, and t − 1 is the second-to-last Congress before the
change in committee chairs. CommitteeActivityc,i,t+1 is the level of c’s agenda space granted
to in i in t + 1. CommitteeReportsc,i,t and CommitteeReportsc,i,t−1 is the frequency of
committee-reported bills in the Congress before the change in committee chairs, and the Congress before
that, respectively. These correspond to Proposition 5, and their coefficients are expected to be positive.
ChairSponsoredBillsc,i,t+1 and ChairSponsoredBillsc,i,t are the frequency of the chair’s bills
referred to their committee, c, in each issue area i in the indicated Congress. Note that by construction,
the chair of a committee at time t and the chair of the same committee at time t + 1 are different
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people. ChairSponsoredBillsc,i,t+1 corresponds to Proposition 1, and is expected to be positive.
MajorityPartyBillsi,t+1 is the incidence of i among bills sponsored bymembers of themajority party
in Congress t+ 1. It corresponds to Proposition 2 and is expected to be positive. FirstTenBillsi,t+1 is
the incidence of issues i among leadership bills (H.R.s 1 to 10) introduced inCongress t+1. It corresponds
to Proposition 3 and is expected to be positive. HouseBillsi,t+1 is the incidence of bills in i across
all House members in Congress t + 1. It corresponds to Proposition 4 and is expected to be positive,
particularly if Proposition 1 does not hold. Congresst is the Congress number of Congress t and serves
as a time trend. Committeec is a committee fixed effect. ζi,j is the error term, comprised of an issue-code
random intercept (the variance of which is reported as ψ, below) and an observation-level residual error
term (reported as ε).
Data on Legislators’ and Committee’s Issue Priorities
The data comprise 947 observations at the committee-congress-subtopic level. Committee-congresses
are selected based on the sampling procedure described above. To identify the potential issue topics
prioritized by committees or legislators, I used the Policy Agendas Project subtopic codes as assigned
to congressional committee hearings in the Policy Agendas Project
6
dataset and to individual bills in the
Congressional Bills Project dataset.
7
To determine which subtopics belong to a committee’s jurisdiction,
I followed the procedure outlined byKing (1997) in his study of committee jurisdictions. King and others
(e.g. Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995) argue that, though committees’ formal jurisdictions are listed
with some specificity, a committee chair will often try to ensure that bills on topics marginally relevant
to her committee’s jurisdiction should be referred to her committee. Over time, such marginal referrals
work to expand the committee’s issue jurisdiction and, thus, its power relative to other committees. Thus,
rather thanusing a committee’s formally-designated jurisdiction, Kingmeasures its "de facto" jurisdiction,
the set of issue areas included in bills referred to the committee. Following a similar procedure, I
6
The data used here were originally collected by FrankR. Baumgartner and BryanD. Jones, with the support of National
Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government
at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis
reported here.
7
E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: (2005-2014), NSF 00880066 and 00880061. The views
expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation.
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demarcated each committee-congress’s de facto jurisdiction by examining the subtopics of bills referred
to that committee. Specifically, a subtopic was considered within the issue jurisdiction of a committee at
the time of the committee’s exogenous turnover if at least one bill with that subtopic code was referred to
that committee at any congress up to two before or after that in which the committee chair turned over.
Thus, each case of committee chair transition comprises many observations in the dataset, one for each
subtopic code determined to be in the committee’s jurisdiction according to this procedure.
Dependent Variables: Measuring Committee Activity
Here, I measure two ways in which a committee chair may manipulate the issue agendas of their
committees. Issue Prioritization refers to the level of attention granted to an issue relative to other issues.
If activities in some issue areas aremore helpful in pursuing a committee chair’s personal goals thanothers,
then the activities of the committee will be more beneficial for the chair to the extent they are directed
towards those issue areas and not others. On the other hand, Issue Emphasis refers to the absolute level
of committee attention in an issue area. More committee activity in an issue area increases its prevalence
in the policy agenda and allows the committee to shape which attributes of an issue area are the subject
of proposals on the policy agenda. Prioritization and emphasis serve distinct purposes for the committee
chair, but a chair is expected to do both activities in ways that direct committee attention toward their
personal priority issue areas.
Committee attention to an issue area during a particular Congress is measured in four ways: two
variants - proportions and counts - of two indicators of committee attention - all hearings, and referral
hearings. Issue Prioritization models compare the prevalence of subtopic in a committee’s activities
relative to other subtopics, and is measured as the proportion of that committee’s activities in that
Congress that were in that subtopic. Issue Emphasismodels, concernedwith the absolute frequencywith
which a committee addresses different issues, use the raw counts of activities. Thus, each observation in
the Emphasis models is the count of committee hearings in that subtopic in that Congress. In all cases,
the Congress of the dependent variable is the first Congress of the new committee chair after a transition
from a prior committee chair.
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The first indicator of committee issue attention used in analyses reported here is the number of
hearings in a subtopic. This measure includes legislative (i.e. referral) and non-legislative hearings.
To the extent that they provide fora for position taking by members, and members derive different
electoral benefits from position-taking on different issues, the prevalence of a particular issue area among
a committee’s hearings reflects the chair’s intent to provide opportunities for position-taking on those
issues. Among sample cases, in the first year of a new committee chair, subtopics received between 0 and
29 hearings and a given issue area received a mean of 0.856 hearings (sd 2.768). Subtopics as a proportion
of a committee’s hearings ranged from 0 to 0.439, with mean 0.011 (sd 0.034). Again, most issues present
among the bills referred to a committee do not receive any sort of formal attention from that committee.
The second indicator of committee issue attention confines the analysis specifically to referral
hearings. Referral hearings consider specific legislation, and comprise a little over a third of committee
hearings in the sample. Where non-referral hearings are often about other matters, referral hearings
are primarily policymaking activities. Suptoics received a mean 0.313 (sd 1.439) referral hearings; as a
proportion of a committee’s referral hearings, mean 0.011 (sd 0.052). And so, once more, committees
neglect most of the subtopics under their jurisdiction in setting bills for hearing.
Independent Variable and Controls: Measuring Legislative Actors’ Issue Priorities
Bill introductions form the basis ofmost of themodel’s right-hand-side variables. Here, bill introductions
are taken as an expression of a legislator’s personal issue priorities. (see Sulkin 2005) In all models, an
actor’s issue priorities are measured as the actor’s allocation of bill introductions across subtopics in
the case committee-Congress’s jurisdiction. In Issue Prioritization Models, I use the proportion of bill
introductions across subtopics; in Issue Emphasis models, I use the raw count of bill introductions in
each subtopic.
Each proposition specifies an actor whose priorities are expected to drive committee agendas.
Proposition 1 holds that committee chair issue priorities dictate committee agendas; I measure the former
as allocation (in proportional or absolute terms) of the chair’s introduced bills by subtopic. The models
also include a one-Congress lagged version of this variable to control for the possibility that being the
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chairman of a particular committee induces a legislator to introduce bills in certain policy areas; by
design, the bills included in these variables were sponsored by the previous chair of that committee.
For Proposition 2, in which committee agendas reflect the needs of the majority party as a whole, I
measure prevalence of subtopics among bills introduced by members of the majority party during the
first Congress of the new committee chair. For Proposition 3, in which majority party leadership sets
committee issue priorities, I use the prevalence of subtopics among the "First Ten" reserved leadership
bills in the same Congress. For Proposition 4, that committee agendas are reflections of the chamber
as a whole, I measure the chamber’s priorities as the prevalence of the committee’s subtopics among all
bills introduced in the House. For Proposition 5, I measure committee’s ongoing legislative duties with
the prevalence of subtopics in the committee’s reported legislation in the previous two Congresses; given
biennial schedule of many program expirations, this measure is a reasonable proxy for the issue areas
the committee must attend to on a regular basis. Also, Kypriotis (2013) and others have argued that more
recentCongresses have featured centralizedpolicymaking authority controlled byparties at the expense of
committees, while incentivizing committees to conduct more oversight and investigative hearings. Thus,
across all issue areas, I expect fewer referral hearings in more recent Congresses and include a time trend -
the number of the Congress at the year before or after the chair transition - in the Issue Emphasis models
to accommodate this. This coefficient is expected to be negative in the Issue Emphasis models.
Multilevel Models of Committee Issue Prioritization and Emphasis
The data feature two types of clustering. The first is that bills with nearly all the subtopic codes (203
subtopic codes out of 210 in the dataset) have been referred to multiple committee-years among those in
the dataset. It is highly likely that some of the subtopic codes indicate bills in issue areas that are likely
to get issue attention due to factors not specifically captured among the right-hand-side variables in the
model. Because there are so many topic codes in the data, and because I wish to make inferences beyond
the committee-years appearing in the sample, I follow the advice of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, p
159) as well as Clark and Linzer (2015) and estimate models with subtopic code random effects. Because
different committees have lower or higher levels of legislative activities not explicitly modeled, I include
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committee fixed effects in all the models reported here.
For models of Issue Prioritization, for which the dependent variable is the proportion of all bills
reported by the committee in a given period that had a particular topic code, I use linear mixed models.
For models of Issue Emphasis, for which the dependent variable is the (overdispersed) count of bills
reported in a period, I usemixed effects negative binomial models. Huber-White standard errors are used
in all models, with the acknowledgement that they do not correct the misspecification bias inevitable in
the models reported here (and indeed, virtually all models without experimental control) so much as
render the statistical tests reported here yet more conservative. (King and Roberts 2015)
2.4 results and discussion
Results for the estimated Issue Prioritizationmodels are presented in Table 2.2, while the results for Issue
Emphasis models are presented in Table 2.3.
I argued above that if committee chairmen are able to use committee agendas to advance their own
issue interests, then the prevalence (either proportion or count) of issue areas in their individual bill
introductions should be positively associated with that in their committee’s hearings. In general, the
results provide evidence that committee chairs have the ability to direct committee agendas toward their
own personal priorities. Across the priorities models, the coefficient on new (t+1) committee chairs’
sponsorships is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, at the margins, the committee chair
can direct committee attention toward her priorities and does so to facilitate optimal proposal-making
and position-taking opportunities. In terms of committees’ issue priorities, a one-standard deviation
(0.047) difference in a committee chair’s proportion of bills in a subtopic area is associated with an
approximately one percent (0.011 proportion) increase in a committee’s hearings (both in general and
in referral hearings specifically) in that area, which is roughly equal to themean proportion of committee
hearings across subtopics. Thus, adding a chair sponsored bill in an issue area nearly doubles the expected
proportion of hearings in a given issue area.
The estimatedmarginal effect of a single additional chair-sponsored bill is slightlymore complex in its
calculation. An increase in the proportion of bills introduced by the chair in one subtopic also represents
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All Hearings Referral Hearings
Proportion of Reports, t 0.192*** 0.213*
(0.0424) (0.0905)
Proportion of Reports, t - 1 0.106 0.124
(0.0768) (0.085)
Proportion of Chair-Sponsored Bills, t + 1 0.239** 0.181*
(0.0737) (0.0886)
Proportion of Chair-Sponsored Bills, t -0.00142 -0.019
(0.102) (0.126)
Proportion of Majority-Party Members’ Bills, t + 1 -0.343 -1.137
(0.407) (0.947)
Proportion of Majority Party "First Ten" Bills, t + 1 -0.00982 -0.00993
(0.00654) (0.0129)
Proportion of All House Bills, t+1 0.34 1.345
(0.453) (1.042)






Var(ε ) 0.0006437 0.00134
(0.000201) (0.000408 )
Nsubtopic−committee−Congress = 899. All variables expressed as proportions of bills across subtopics in a
committee-Congress. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include committee fixed effects. t is the last year
of the previous committee chair. t+1 is the first Congress under the new committee chair.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
some increase in the proportions of majority member bills andHouse bills in that issue area. Specifically,
one additional bill would represent a proportional increase of 0.05 for the average committee chair’s
sponsorships (mean 20.2 chair sponsorships per case), of 0.0003 for the average majority party members’
sponsorships (mean 3597.4 majority party sponsorships per case), and of 0.0002 for the average House
(mean 5494.7House bills per case). Taking the estimated coefficients for Proportion of Chair-Sponsored
bills (0.227), Proportion of Majority Party Members’ bills (0.445), and Proportion of all House bills
(-0.649), the more appropriate point estimates of the marginal effect of a chair adding an additional bill
are as follows:
∆HearingsProportion+1ChairBill = 0.239∗0.05−0.343∗0.0003 + 0.340∗0.0002 = 0.0119
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∆ReferralHearingsProportion+1ChairBill = 0.181∗0.05−1.137∗0.0003+1.345∗0.0002 =
0.0091
Thus, even a small increase in frequency among a chair’s other bills can make a given issue area more
prominent among a committee’s hearings. Committee chairs, therefore, can make some adjustments
to the priorities of their committee to direct its attention to their own personal priority issue areas.
The generally positive association between chair priorities and committee outcomes is consistent with
Proposition 1. The only other statistically significant predictors of committee prioritization among the
variables included in these models is the one-Congress lagged committee reports variable. This suggests
that committee activities are fairly stable from year to year, and (especially given that actors other than
the committee chair do not appear to be able to consistently shift committee priorities) that committees
function to facilitate ongoing collective problem-solving. This is consistent with Proposition 5. The
priorities models fail to find an association between committees’ issue priorities and those of other
categories of actors, including majority-party leaders, members-at-large, and the House as a whole.
Models of committee emphasis yield similar results. The number of chair-sponsored bills in an issue
area is positively and statistically-significantly associated with the number of hearings in general, and
referral hearings specifically, the committee was expected to make in that issue area. As indicated by
the corresponding estimates of incidence rate ratios, this association is also substantively significant: the
count of each dependent variable is expected to nearly (or, in the case of hearings, more than) double for
each bill a chair sponsored in a given issue area. Thus, issues a chair personally prioritizes are expected to
increasingly be the focus of her committee’s work.
To make appropriate marginal effects estimates, the independent variables in the models above
are related to one another in a way relevant to the hypothesis tests reported here. An additional
chair-sponsored bill is also an additional majority party-sponsored bill and a House-sponsored bill.
However, given the incidence rate ratios reported in Table 2.3, accounting for this non-independence
across independent variables is trivial - it is the product of the coefficients on Chair-Sponsored bills,
Majority Party bills, and House bills. For the three different committee activities the multiplicative
marginal effect of an additional bill in an issue area is estimated as:
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All Hearings Referral Hearings
Coefficients IRR Coefficients IRR
Number of Reports, t 0.371*** 1.449*** 0.263 1.301
(0.101) (0.146) (0.142) (0.184)
Number of Reports, t - 1 -0.195 0.823 -0.0876 0.916
(0.129) (0.107) (0.159) (0.146)
Number of Chair-Sponsored Bills, t + 1 0.829*** 2.291*** 0.675* 1.964*
(0.206) (0.473) (0.275) (0.54)
Number of Chair-Sponsored Bills, t 0.449*** 1.567*** 0.299** 1.348**
(0.119) (0.187) (0.111) (0.149)
Number of Majority-Party Members’ Bills, t + 1 0.00392 1.004 -0.00537 0.995
(0.0112) (0.011) (0.0178) (0.018)
Number of Majority Party "First Ten" Bills, t + 1 0.232 1.262 -0.154 0.857
(0.353) (0.445) (0.454) (0.389)
Number of All House Bills, t+1 -0.00454 0.995 0.00349 1.003
(0.00742) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Congress (number), t + 1 -0.0104 0.99 -0.159** 0.853**







Nsubtopic−committee−Congress = 947. All variables expressed as counts across subtopics. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. All models include committee fixed effects. t is the last year of the previous committee chair. t+1 is the first
Congress under the new committee chair.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Qchairsponsor,hearings = 2.291 ∗ 1.004 ∗ 0.995 = 2.287
Qchairsponsor,referralhearings = 1.964 ∗ 0.995 ∗ 1.003 = 1.960
Thus, a single additional chair-sponsored bill is associated with a near- or more-than- doubling of the
number of committee activities in that issue area.
However, other factors are also found to be associated with committee activity in an issue area. There
is a statistically significant negative time trend (represented by the Congress in which a chair changed)
in referral hearings, confirming that there have been fewer referral hearings in more recent Congresses,
regardless of issue area. The results of the committee activity models also suggest that committee
attention tends toward the same issues over time. Coefficients on prior-year bill reports are positive
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and statistically significant for the models of hearings though, interestingly, not referral hearings. Two
explanations for this suggest themselves: reauthorization bills often recur in cycles of only a few years,
suggesting that bills passed in earlier Congresses are likely to come up again in subsequent Congresses;
(see Adler and Wilkerson 2012) also, that members and leaders of committees to some extent self-select
onto those committees with jurisdictions that allow them to pursue their personal priority issues. If this
is true, then those committees exist, and their jurisdictions are fairly stable, because the members want
to take positions on those particular sets of issues, and that desire maintains over time. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient on the prior committee chair’s number of introduced bills suggests that
committee leaders appear to have an influence on their committee’s issue emphasis that outlasts their
tenure as chair; it may also indicate that committee chairs are responsible for certain recurring aspects
of programs in their committee’s jurisdiction. This might be explained by self-selection into candidacy
for the chair of particular committees - a prospective chair of a particular committee wants to be chair of
that committee because of their interest in the committee’s core issues. It might also reflect the desire to
defend jurisdictional gains won by previous chairs. (King 1997) On the other hand, once again the Issue
Emphasis models fail to find an association between committees’ issue priorities and those of majority
party leaders, rank-and-file members, or the House as a whole.
2.5 conclusion
This study demonstrates that new committee chairs can shift, in both an absolute and relative sense, the
issues considered by their committees to focus on those issues the new chair prefers. To do so, it relies
on a sample of chair transitions spurred by the death or scandal-induced resignation of a previous chair
and replacement by a new chair of the same party. Given the success of committee-approved bills on the
floor, this suggests that committee chairs have influence over problem selection in Congress. Committees
also have recurring responsiblities in some issue areas, and as such tend to consider the same issues from
Congress toCongress. All analyses in this article fail to find evidence of an association between committee
agendas and those of majority party members and leaders, nor with the priorities of House members as a
whole.
25
One particular way in which external validity may be compromised by this research design is the
time period of the set of cases examined here. While all of the cases (see the Appendix) come from the
post-1970 era of strongHouse parties, most (7 out of 10) of the "first years of new chairs" occurred prior to
1995, when Speaker Newt Gingrich centralized legislative decision-making within party leadership, and
instituted reforms tomake committee chairmanshipsmore contingent on prospective chairs’ support for
leadership goals. (Deering and Smith 1997; Cann 2008; Deering and Wahlbeck 2006) As a prediction of
the effect of committee chair prioritization on contemporary or future committee activity, the coefficients
on committee chair sponsorships presented here may be biased upward. However, there are two reasons
that such issue are unlikely to lead to false inferences. The first is the finding that chairs’ bills remain
advantaged in the post-Gingrich House, as noted above. The second is that while Gingrich compelled
committee chairs to grant agenda space to the so-called "Contract with America" legislation, there is less
evidence that he actively used his new clout to censor entire issue areas. (Deering and Smith 1997) Once
the party’s immediate needs were met, committees would have been free to consider other topics. More
likely, however, is that in the models reported here the coefficients on the "Top Ten" bills, representing
leadership issues, are biased toward zero. Thus, the particularities of the time period considered here are
unlikely to create dramatic biases in the coefficient on committee chairs’ issue priorities.
Indeed, while the case that backbenchers might be less influential is fairly intuitive, an inability of
majority party leaders to dictate committee issue agendas would be considerably less so. The most likely
explanation of this article’s non-statistically-significant results with respect to majority party leadership
priorities is that the research design was intended to allow for the identification of a causal effect of
committee chairs’ priorities on committee agendas. It was not intended to test whether, or how much,
party leaders’ priorities influenced committee agendas. On the other hand, it is possible that the
result suggests an actual absence (or inconsistent influence) of party leader priorities on issue agendas.
One potential explanation of this is that, due to the multitude of potential issues (c.f. Jones and
Baumgartner 2005), the majority party confines its attention, and by extension its control, to the floor.
(see Crombez, Groseclose and Krehbiel 2006) However, this possibility is qualified somewhat by the
finding ofVolden andWiseman (2014) thatmajority party legislators’ advantage in legislative effectiveness
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is most prominent at the committee stage of the legislative process. Alternatively, it could be the case that
party leaders are for themost part focused on the policy preferences expressed in legislation rather than the
issue priorities expressed therein; this suggests that problem selection is a power that committee leaders
maintain in the post-reform era. The results reported here cannot clarify which of these explanations
hold, and so leaves it to future work to specifically investigate whether party leaders’ powers in agenda
control result in powers of problem selection such as those wielded by committee chairs.
This study has implications for research in at least two areas beyond the relationship between
individual and collective priorities in Congress. This study suggests an avenue of research on policy
entrepreneurship and lobbying. Because so much influence over committee priorities and activities is
wielded by identifiable individuals (in this case, committee leaders
8
), actors with the ability to influence
a chair of a committee relevant to their interests stand to leverage agenda power as well. Under what
conditions can lobbyists or other legislators co-opt committee chairs’ agenda power?
Finally, this study has implications for howpolitical scientists think about agenda setting inCongress.
Inmuch researchonAmericanpolitics, agenda-setting is conceptualized in spatial terms: given the relative
positionof themajority partymedian, the chamber pivots, the legislative status quo, and an agenda-setter,
which proposals can beat the status quo depends in part on the location of the agenda-setter. However,
Kingdon (1995) places this sort of decision calculus into the category of alternative specification: which
policy outcomes are politically feasible is an important part of knowing when an "idea’s time has come".
Rather less attention has been paid to agenda-setting as Kingdon defines it: the movement of particular
issues toward formal attention from government. The work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2005) is an
exception, but their focus onproblem selection is systemic -what is the overall distributionof government
attention - rather than directed at predicting the agenda status of individual issues. Thus, the rise and fall
of individual issues onto the governmental agenda, and the ability of particular actors to induce such
change, remains an area needing additional research.
8
This is as opposed to, say, the chamber or majority party median, the identities of whomwould vary by vote and would
be estimated with some uncertainty.
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Table 2.4: Cases of Plausibly Exogenous Committee Chair Transition, post-reformHouse
Congress Committee Old Chair New Chair Cause of Transition
94 Financial Services Wright Patman Henry Reuss Death
95 Ways &Means Wilbur Mills Al Ullman Resignation
99 Armed Services Charles Melvin Price Les Aspin Imminent Death
99 Education andWorkforce Carl D. Perkins Gus Hawkins Death
101 Transportation James J. Howard GlennM. Anderson Death
102 Natural Resources Mo Udall George Miller Resignation
103 Armed Services Les Aspin Ron Dellums Resignation
107 Armed Services Floyd Spence Robert Strump Death
107 Transportation Bud Shuster Don Young Resignation
108 Agriculture Larry Combest Bob Goodlatte Resignation
The "Congress" reported here is the first Congress in which the new committee chair served (t+1 in models frommain text).
2.6 appendix: cases of plausibly exogenous committee chair
transition
The empirical models in this study leverage plausibly exogenous transitions in chair priorities to make
causal claims about the relationship between committee chair priorities and those of their committees.
Among House authorizing committees in the post-reform House (i.e. 1970 to the present), there have
been ten such transitions, across 7 committees, where both the prior chair and the new chair held the
position for at least one full Congress. These are summarized in Table 2.4.
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Chapter 3
Interest Diversity in Lobbying Coalitions: an Exploratory Analysis
On a cold morning in early March 2017, House Republicans had promised to reveal their long-awaited bill
to repeal and replace the Aordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA had been the most significant overhaul
of the American healthcare system in decades, and Republicans running for offices at all levels across
the country had been running on a promise to "repeal and replace" it for years. Making good on this
promise was a top priority for the new Republican unified government, and so party leaders in Congress –
particularly, House Speaker Paul Ryan – wanted to move a bill as quickly as possible. The replacement
bill, the American Health Care Act (AHCA), was drafted by majority party leadership sta without
input from aected interests, or even other members of the House Republican caucus. Instead, it would first
be revealed to House Republican members of the committees that would be charged with moving it to the
floor. This reveal took place in a room whose location was a closely guarded secret. As House Democrats,
Senators of both parties, and journalists scrambled to find the secret room, Republican committee members
were given a briefing and then allowed to read the bill, but not to leave the room with it.1 This approach
reflected the desire of Republican leaders to move the AHCA quickly through the House and over to the
Senate, where any ACA replacement would face the hurdle of a potential Democratic filibuster; debate
over the larger goals as well as the legislative minutiae would be, at this stage, pointless.
However, the approach backfired. The bill garnered vocal opposition from both sides of the aisle, as well
as from major healthcare trade and professional organizations.2 A few weeks after the bill was divulged to
1
Kliff, Sarah, ""We cannot find the bill": inside the frantic hunt for the GOP Obamacare replacement", Vox.com, March
2nd, 2017. http://www.vox.com/2017/3/2/14792196/gop-obamacare-bill-search, last accessed March 16,
2017.
2
DeBonis, Mike, "Ryan: Health care plan must change to pass the House,"
Washington Post, March 15th, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/
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House Republicans, it was withdrawn in the face of this overwhelming opposition.
Just a few months before, Republicans successfully overhauled medical research and drug approval with
the 21st Century Cures (CURES) Act, a years-in-development pet project of House Energy and Commerce
Committee chairman Fred Upton (R-MI). Upton proposed to change the Food & Drug Administration’s
(FDA) drug approval process, particularly with respect to the types of evidence that the FDA could take
into consideration when making drug approval decisions. The provisions to do so were strongly opposed by
consumer groups,3 and were treated warily by the FDA itself,4 but were favored by the pharmaceutical
industry as a way to reduce research and development costs. Upton, who had pharmaceutical companies in
his district and had previously sponsored legislation they favored (e.g. the Asthma Inhalers Relief Act of
2012), wanted to help this important subconstituency within his district. In the face of this mixed reception,
the original version of the CURES Act languished in Upton’s committee for years.
However, in the last Congress of the Obama Administration, Upton changed tactics. Upton bargained
with committee Democrats to package his FDA reforms into a bill that included many proposals favored
by members on both sides of the aisle: funding programs to address the opioid addiction crisis, improving
how the government responds to mental and behavioral health problems, and making large investments
in medical research, including the so-called "Cancer Moonshot" championed by Democratic Vice President
Joseph Biden. The combined bill won broad support from both Democrats and Republicans, as well as from
university medical centers and health advocacy groups. The CURES Act ultimately passed both chambers
with large majorities, and President Obama signed it into law in the waning days of his administration.
The initial versionof theAHCAand theCURESActwere both controversial and substantial changes
to American healthcare, and both were prioritized by the congressional majority party leadership. Their
different legislative fates present a puzzle. Given the powers of the House majority party leadership,
particularly on highly salient issues such as ACA repeal, the leadership-championed AHCA should have
progressed smoothly. TheCURESAct, while supported byRepublican party leadership, wasmuchmore
speaker-paul-ryan-doubles-down-on-gop-health-care-plan-amid-opposition/2017/03/15/
872c4f3c-0974-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html, accessedMarch 16th, 2017.
3
Kaplan, Sheila, "Winners and losers of the 21st Century Cures Act", STAT, December 5, 2016 https://www.
statnews.com/2016/12/05/21st-century-cures-act-winners-losers/, last access March 16, 2017
4
Sherman, Anderson, Dal Pan, Gray, Gross, Hunter, LaVange, Marinac-Dabic, Marks, Robb, Shuren, Temple,
Woodcock, Yue and Califf (2016).
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the product of Upton and his Democratic committee colleagues and dealt with a relatively obscure issue.
Moreover, while the CURES Act was passed during a period of divided government, the AHCA was
initiated and scrubbed under a period of unified Republican government. If anything, given extant
conditions, the CURES Act should have proven less likely to pass than the AHCA. However, the two
bills differed markedly in how they approached potential objections and conflict. The AHCA, at least
initially, was the product of House leadership and closed to outside input. It was opposed by virtually
every major healthcare interest group, even after revisions were made to make the bill more viable.
5
The
CURESAct bundled togethermany different proposals frommembers on both sides of the aisle aswell as
from awide array of interests affected by its numerous provisions. Howmight this difference in openness
to outside interests have contributed to the bills’ differing legislative outcomes?
Openness to input from affected interests creates opportunities to garner support from those
interests. Indeed, organized interest groups lobby on many bills in virtually every policy area in which
Congress can make law. (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech 2009; LaPira, Thomas and
Baumgartner 2014; Grossmann and Pyle 2013) The vastmajority of the existing research on interest group
influence focuses on the question of whether interest groups’ lobbying resources, such as more or better
lobbyists or higher levels of campaign contributions, make themmore influential on legislation. Indeed,
one difference between the AHCA and the CURES Act is that, for the former, campaign contributions
made by interest groups opposed to the bill vastly outstripped those made by groups supporting the bill,
while for the CURES Act the opposite was the case – campaign contributions from supporting interests
were double those of opposing interests.
6
This would suggest, perhaps, that campaign contributions
and similar flexing of interest groups’ political clout might explain the difference in outcomes between
the AHCA and the CURESAct. However, scholarly research on the influence of interest group financial
resources has producedmixed evidence of their role in interest groups’ legislative influence. (Baumgartner
et al. 2009; McKay 2012a; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015; Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry and
5
Abelson, Reed and Katie Thomas."In Rare Unity, Hospitals, Doctors and Insurers
Criticize Health Bill", the New York Times, page A20, May 5th, 2017. Accessible at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/health/health-care-bill-criticisms.html, last accessedMay 6th, 2017.
6
See Maplight.org’s analysis of the CURES Act in its final form: http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/
114-hr-34/11823228/total-contributions, accessedMay 5th, 2017.
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Leech 2012; Wawro 2001) Perhaps the difference in outcomes between the AHCA and the CURES Act
represents one case in which money did buy policy. However, if prior research is a guide, it is at least as
likely that something other than financial advantage is generating interest groups’ legislative influence.
One reason that resource advantages inconsistently convert into influence is that interest groups
often collaborate to pool resources. Interest groups frequently form coalitions, both formally (e.g. with
dedicated staff) and informally (with regular meetings of individual groups’ lobbyists). (Hula 1999;
Hojnacki 1997;Heaney 2006)There aremanyways inwhich coalition-building efforts increase individual
groups’ policy influence. Coalitions aggregate groups’ resources, (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015) help
them recruit allies, (Baumgartner et al. 2009) and give them more advantageous positions in policy
networks. (Heaney and Lorenz 2013) In addition, coalitions allow groups to partner with organizations
that differ from them. For example, they may differ in their organizational forms and favored tactics, or
in the issues they normally focus on, or in their ideology or partisan identity. In each of these ways and
others, a coalition (or other set) of interest groups can be said to be diverse.(Crosson and Heaney 2016;
Phinney 2017)This diversity provides a signal to policymakers about the quality of legislation, particularly
because, compared to homogeneous coalitions, more diverse coalitions are costlier to maintain andmore
difficult to find common ground within. Tactical, issue, and ideological diversity have been found to
result from interest groups’ response to the features of individual issues. (Crosson and Heaney 2016;
Phinney 2017) But they are not the only kinds of diversity that a set of organizations may exhibit.
This article examines another type of diversity as a possible source of interest group influence. This
source depends on the connections between organized interest groups and subpopulationswithin a given
legislator’s district. Any legislators’ district includes many different businesses, social groups, and people
who care about particular issues. Appealing to these distinct subpopulations, which Bishin (2009) refers
to as "subconstituencies", allows a legislator to more efficiently build support for their own continued
reelection than would be the case if they tried to identify and appeal to their district’s median voter.
Appealing to subconstituencies requires legislators to be able to take positions and claim credit (c.f.
Mayhew 1974) on legislative issues those subconstituencies care about. However, identifying the optimal
set of issues to work on in order to appeal to a subconstituency is difficult. Interest groups help legislative
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overcome this difficulty, but can only do so to the extent that the legislator takes the interest group
as a proxy for the subconstituencies to which the legislator wishes to appeal. Aware of this, groups
often portray themselves as the proxy of various subconstituencies in society. Legislators often treat
them as such, preferentially granting access to groups representing interests important to their district.
(Grossmann 2012b; Hansen 1991) This relationship between subconstituencies and interest groups is
important for determining which interest groups have the ear of which legislators, but does not in and
of itself translate into influence over legislation. In order to judge the merits of legislation, lawmakers
need to understand which subconstituencies would reward them for supporting a bill, and which would
punish them. To change this calculus, interest groups must lobby together.
This paper develops the concept, and a proposedmeasure, of interest diversity in a coalition (or other
set) of lobbying organizations. First, I define the concept of interest diversity as the relative degree of
observable variety of subconstituencies represented by a coalition (or other set) of organizations. After
developing this concept, I propose a measure of interest diversity based on the unique industries, issue
causes, and other interest categories that lobby for or against a bill. Using data on interest groups’
positions on over 5000 bills introduced between 2005 and 2014, I explore the variation in this measure,
finding that it conforms to general expectations about differences in lobbying activity across bills. Among
several variations of this measure, the difference in diversity between supporters and opponents – what
I term "Net Interest Diversity" – is the most likely to impact legislators’ decisions. Thus, I focus
measurement validation on it. To do so, I examine how Net Interest Diversity varies across types of
bills that existing theory would lead us to believe should covary with broad or diverse lobbying (either in
support or opposition). These analyses demonstrate the validity of the measure as well as its limitations.
In the conclusion, I discuss both in context of testing interest group influence on legislative progress and
outcomes.
3.1 conceptualizing interest diversity among lobbyingorganizations
Interest groups often form coalitions in order to collaborate on shared policy objectives. Doing so helps
groups pool resources, synergize tactics, and signal to lawmakers that there exists consensus among a
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set of interests. (Hula 1999; Hojnacki 1997; Baumgartner et al. 2009) While individual groups have
attributes – the issues they care about, the lobbyists they employ, their campaign contributions, or their
existing connections among policymakers – those group-level attributes have been repeatedly shown
to provide, at best, conditional influence on policy outcomes in Congress. (Baumgartner et al. 2009;
Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015) Instead, it is the attributes of interest group coalitions – their size,
their aggregated resources, their shaping of lobbyist networks – that more consistently result in policy
influence. (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015; Gilens and Page 2014; Heaney and Lorenz 2013) Thus,
examining the attributes of interest group coalitions can help us better understand the conditions that
allow organized interests to shape public policy outcomes.
This study elaborates the concept of interest diversity in lobbying coalitions. For this purpose, interest
diversity is defined as the relative degree of observable variety of subconstituencies represented by set of
organizations. This definition has several components. First, diversity is relative. A set of interest groups
is only diverse when compared to a different set of interest groups. While a given set of interests may
appear to be diverse in some sense, the implication of such an observation is that they are diverse by
some standard. Given that no default diversity level exists in this context, I contend that one can only
meaningfully assess diversity in sets of interest groups if that set is compared to another set. Second,
diversity is observable. While many organizations may work incidentally or narrowly on a given issue,
a set of interest groups is only diverse (by this definition) insofar as other actors are aware of those
organizations’ activity. Third, diversity denotes variety. Diversity concerns the differences among and
between individuals. Unlike lobbyist hours, campaign contributions, or other resources, diversity arises
not through aggregation of some individual-level attribute. Instead, it emerges fromdistinctions between
organizations that exist only when those organizations are considered together (e.g. as groups lobbying
on the same bill). In this conceptualization, therefore, no individual organization is diverse.
7
Fourth, the key distinctions that allow interest diversity to emerge are in subconstituencies. A
subconstituency is a subset of a legislator’s district’s population. Subconstituencies are delineated by a
7
I recognize that in other contexts, individuals can be "diverse" insofar as they add some sort of diversity to a group
that would not have that diversity in the individual’s absence. The above discussion is not intended to invalidate that
conceptualization of diversity so much as to distinguish how I am using the term from other ways in which it is used.
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shared, salient identity – such as membership in a particular ethnic or racial community, participation
in an industry, or attachment to a social cause – that is relevant to their policy preferences, issue
priorities, or political participation. Subconstituencies help legislators solve several difficulties in
representing the interests of their constituents and securing reelection. These difficulties arise because
a legislator’s relationship with her constituents is at once fraught with uncertainty about the latter’s
preferences, complicated by representatives’ differing relationships with their personal supporters and
their constituents at large, and impeded by varying attention and knowledge across both voters and issue
areas. (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990) To overcome these difficulties, legislators appeal
to subconstituencies within their district. (Bishin 2009; Mayhew 1974) Such appeals involve publicly
taking positions and working on issues known to be important those subconstituencies’ members.
Working on issues important to a given subconstituency solves all three representation problems: the
subconstituency’s preferences on such issues are usually clear; because such issues are relevant only to a
subset of their district, legislators may avoid conflicts between their personal supporters and their district
at large; and, finally, because subconstituencies by definition care about specific priorities, they will be
more likely to be aware of and reward their representatives’ attention to their priority issues. If successful,
subconstituency appeals can be combined to form a supporting coalition of voters who will sustain a
member’s reelection.
The fifth aspect of the present conceptualization of interest diversity is that subconstituencies
are represented in the legislative process by interest groups.
8
Even if legislators intend to appeal
to important district subconstituencies, they may still fail to assess the subconstituency-relevance of
particular legislative choices. Interest groups perform this assessment on behalf of legislators and
communicate to them that a particular issue or bill is relevant to the group’s members and that those
members share a set of policy goals on that issue or bill. This works, in part, because legislators
use organizations as proxies for subconstituencies. (Grossmann 2012b) For example, legislators often
consider the National Rifle Association (NRA) to be a proxy for American gun owners or the AARP
9
8
This is not to say that subconstituencies cannot also be represented in other ways – e.g. through social movements and
similar grassroots organizations.
9
Which used to be an acronym for the American Association of Retired Persons but, officially, no longer is.
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as a proxy for the interests of the elderly. Such proxy-taking is not exact. Individual members of a
subconstituency do not necessarily agree with the stances of the organization taken as their proxy: many
gun owners disagree with NRA stances, as do many elderly persons disagree with the AARP on some
issues. Moreover, different organizations can represent what is essentially the same subconstituency at
once. For example, both theNRAandGunOwners ofAmerica (GOA)purport to represent the interests
of gunowners. Most of the time, they agree onpolicy direction (e.g. morepermissive gun control laws and
both stronger protection of and broader application of Second Amendment rights) even if they disagree,
sometimes quite vocally, on particular policy provisions. For present purposes, they occupy the same
subconstituency even though they view the preferences of that subconstituency in slightly different ways.
Because there is a distinction between organizations and subconstituencies in this definition, interest
diversity among a set (e.g. a coalition) of organizations is distinct from the size of that set. A set of
organizations can be large in size, including many individual organizations, but not interest diverse, if
organizations in the coalition all represent the same subconstituency. For example, while the American
Medical Association (AMA) represents medical doctors generally, there are several other organizations
that represent subcategories based on emphasis – e.g. the American College of Physicians – or based on
ideological inclination – e.g. the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. A coalition of those
three organizations, though larger than a coalition of two organizations, is not particularly diverse in the
interests its members represent. By comparison, if the AMA formed a coalition with America’s Health
Insurance Plans (AHIP) and PhRMA (which represents the pharmaceutical industry), that coalition
would be equal in size to the first coalition butmore diverse in the interests its members represent. This is
not to say that the two concepts – size and interest diversity– are unrelated; a coalition’s potential diversity
grows as the number of organizations in the coalition increases. However, because of its connection to
the critical process of how lawmakers understand and appeal to different parts of their constituencies,
I maintain that the distinction between coalition size and coalition interest diversity deserves separate
consideration.
On the other hand, interest diversity can be a lens through which to assess political conflicts among
organized interests. Schattschneider (1975) famously argued that the most important element of any
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political strategy is how it impacts the scope and dimensions of the conflict on which an issue is decided.
Moving a conflict from private (concerned with only a few actors) to public (in which many actors
get involved) is done, according to Schattschneider, to ensure that "the power ratio among the private
interests most immediately involved [in the conflict] shall not prevail." (p 37) Thus, political conflicts
in Schattschneider’s view are defined by the relative power of actors on each side of the conflict, with
actors on each side attempting to reframe issues to recruit allies. The question, then, is how to assess
the "power ratio" of interests on different sides of a conflict. In much research on lobbying, the primary
form of interest group power that has been assessed is some variation on lobbying resources, whichmight
include campaign contributions as well as lobby expenditures. (Hojnacki et al. 2012; Baumgartner et al.
2009) However, prior studies have mixed findings on the relationship between interest group resources
and policy change. (though see alsoMahoney and Baumgartner 2015) The concept of interest diversity in
a lobbying coalition provides an alternative to financial resources (or resources derived through financial
advantages, such as hiring more or better lobbyists) as a source of interest group power. If groups on
one side of a bill are more diverse than those on the other side, perhaps the more diverse side can gain
influence by appearing (to legislators) to represent the interests of a larger set of subconstituencies.
Where group resources have long been studied as a source of group influence, diversity among
organizations has only been studied recently. Owing to its relative novelty, the concept of diversitywithin
lobbying coalitions has given rise to several, somewhat overlapping, sub-types of diversity.
10
Phinney
(2017), in themost exhaustive treatment of diversity between organizations within lobbying coalitions to
date, describes three ways inwhich interest groupswithin a coalition can represent diverse interests. First,
"professional" diversity maps most closely onto differences in organizational type, suggesting that groups
representing an industry or profession might have access to different kinds of information and advocacy
strategies than a citizen group or research organization. (see Phinney 2017, Table 3.1, p 117) Interest
10
In addition to the types of across-organization diversity discussed here, diversity can also arise within organizations
in ways that have political consequences. Strolovitch (2006) examines intersectionality within interest groups representing
disadvantaged populations and finds that such groups, within their own organizations, often replicate structures of power and
privilege that underrepresent the interests of intersectionally marginalized subgroups within the populations they represent;
e.g. women’s rights groups have historically overrepresented the interests of white women vis-a-vis those of women of color.
These maintained power structures shape organizational culture and advocacy strategies and thus may condition interest
groups’ influence as well.
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diversity, as I have conceptualized it, ignores organizational type and focuses more on the potential
populations of voters that groups represent. Thus, the two concepts are distinct.
"Policy domain" diversity, which Phinney defines as coalition members that are generally concerned
with different issue areas (e.g. healthcare vs. green energy), is also distinct from the concept of interest
diversity I have elaborated here. Individual organizations may tend to focus their lobbying in some
issues more than others, but I argue that such differences in focus result from the priorities of the
subconstituencies that those groups represent. For example, teacher’s unions purport to represent a
subconstituency common in many legislative districts – public school teachers. As such, they often
become involved in education policy. However, teachers’ unions have also lobbied extensively on issues
such as family leave, health care benefits, anti-union legislation, public budgets, minimum wage, and
other issues less directly related to education.
11
Thus, while organizations may have a general issue
orientation, they end up lobbying on awide range of issues, according to bills that impact theirmembers’
interests. In this sense the two concepts are distinct; though, policy domain diversity may result from
interest diversity within a coalition.
Third, Phinney argues that coalitions can represent different interests through their members’
diverging partisan and ideological affiliation. Ideological diversity can also result from, but is not the same
thing as, interest diversity. Subconstituencies may have interests that lead them to prefer a general policy
direction relative to the status quo. This may lead to differing ideological tendencies across industries.
(see Bonica 2014) If interests that happen to be ideologically varied can find common ground on an issue,
a coalition may result that is both ideologically diverse and interest diverse. However, there is plenty of
within-industry ideological heterogeneity as well. (again, see Bonica 2014) Thus, a bill that garners the
opposition of an entire industry may in doing so garner the opposition of non-interest-diverse actors
with a wide range of general policy preferences. Hence, ideological diversity is once again distinct from
interest diversity.
In addition to the types of diversity described by Phinney, a study by Crosson and Heaney (2016)
11
Teachers’ union lobbying can be examined on the Maplight website: http://maplight.org/us-congress/
interest/L1300/bills, accessedMay 3, 2017.
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offers a fourth type of diversity.
12
Using a survey of coalition leaders, Crosson and Heaney examine
how different issue characteristics incentivize coalition leaders to seek diverse partners. They focus on
what they call issue diversity, which is when a coalition’s members emphasize different issue areas. (p.
6) This would seem to suggest that issue diversity is equivalent to Phinney’s concept of policy domain
diversity. However, in assessing coalition leaders’ emphasis on issue diversity, they ask coalition leaders to
report how important they believe it is to seek new coalition members that "represent... DIFFERENT
concerns, issues, and/or interests than other coalition members." (p 15, emphasis original) This reflects a
conceptualization very similar to interest diversity as elaborated here, insofar as differences in "concerns,
issues, and/or interests" are very likely driven by differences in subconstituencies a group represents.
However, the concepts are slightly different in emphasis: "issue diversity", like policy domain diversity,
emphasizes the differences in issue priorities between groups, even though the question Crosson and
Heaney use to assess its importance is somewhat more expansive than that, while "interest diversity"
emphasizes the subconstituency interests that connect groups to legislators.
3.2 measuring interest diversity
With the concept of interest diversity in mind, we turn to identifying indicators of interest diversity
among lobbying organizations. Measuring interest diversity requires us to identify a coherent and
meaningful set of interest groups, then to assess the subconstituencies represented by those groups.
Before turning to available data sources, it is important to determine what types of "sets of interest
groups" are substantively interesting. Scholars have generally examined interest group activity either
across issue areas (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira and Semanko 2005; Baumgartner, Larsen-Price, Leech
and Rutledge 2011; LaPira, Thomas and Baumgartner 2014) or across or within the context of individual
bills or policy initiatives. (for a review, see Hojnacki et al. 2012; Baumgartner and Leech 1998) Examining
interest group activity across issue areas is important for understanding the government’s issue agenda
and its congruence with the priorities of interest groups versus those of the broader public. Given the
12
Crosson and Heaney also discuss what they call "ideological diversity", which is when a coalition includes members
with divergent general policy preferences. This is functionally identical to Phinney’s conceptualization of ideological/partisan
diversity, and is distinct frommy conceptualization of interest diversity in the same ways.
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importance of assessing such congruence, assessing interest diversity within broad issue areas may be
useful; this can be done by assessing interest group activity across individual bills, then aggregating those
to their general issue area. At the same time, understanding the role of lobbying on particular bills is
important for assessing the viability or effectiveness of individual lobbying tactics (Victor 2007; Heaney
andLorenz 2013) aswell as for assessing conditions underwhich interest groups can influence legislative or
policy outcomes. (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Grossmann and Pyle 2013) However, attempts to do so must
keep in mind that, of course, not all groups lobbying on a bill are lobbying for the bill; that is, lobbying
on a bill can be divided (albeit somewhat roughly) into groups lobbying in support of the bill and those
lobbying against the bill (and, by extension, in favor of the status quo). It has been repeatedly shown
that lobbying success, and the tactics that help secure it, vary according to which "lobbying side" a group
is on. (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay 2012b) Given the importance of studying lobbying influence
on legislation, and the importance of distinguishing bill supporters from bill opponents when doing so,
we focus on measuring interest diversity across bills, and, in particular, across sides (supporters versus
opponents) of bills.
13
The data used tomeasure interest diversity at the bill- and bill-side-levels come from the transparency
organization Maplight. Maplight collects public statements of organizations’ positions on specific bills.
The data used here come from 2005 to 2014 (the 109th to 113th congresses), and are derived from over
76,000 positions taken by over 13,000 unique organizations across 5390 bills covering a comprehensive
array of issues during this period. For each bill-group-position, Maplight includes the bill number, the
name of the group, its position (supporting/opposing) on the bill, as well as a designation of the industry
or cause (or other subconstituency) the group represents. These last designations come from a taxonomy
of "interest group category codes" developed by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). These data
have previously been used to study interest group activity on individual issues, such as trade (Broz 2014),
exchange rate politics (Galantucci 2015), and, at the state level, tobacco initiatives. (Laposata, Kennedy
13
Onemight also wish to examine interest diversity within formal or informal coalitions of interest groups, as do Crosson
and Heaney (2016), or on the distinct "policy ideas" (c.f. Wilkerson, Smith and Stramp 2015) within bills, as does (Phinney
2017). These are ideal for assessing the antecedents of interest diversity, and doing so is the primary objective of both Phinney’s
as well as Crosson & Heaney’s studies. However, because legislative progress is decided at the level of the individual bill in
its entirety (amendments notwithstanding), analyzing lobbying at the bill (and bill side) level remains preferable for present
purposes.
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and Glantz 2014) These examples show that the data tell us much about the interests at stake within and
across bills. This study is the first examination of the entire dataset at once.
I treat these CRP interest group category codes as indicators of subconstituencies represented by
groups to which they are assigned. CRP has identified over 400 distinct social causes, identity groups,
or businesses a firm might be engaged in, and given each a unique category code.
14
These codes
allow for nuanced distinctions between the interests represented by different organizations, including
between: food stores and food wholesalers; teacher’s unions and trade unions; and groups that are
formed on opposite sides of contentious issues, such as pro-choice and anti-abortion. They are then
aggregated to 100 "industries" (e.g. dairy vs. livestock or telephone vs. telecomm), and these are further
aggregated to 13 "sectors" (e.g. agribusiness, healthcare, or construction)While theymay not capture every
distinct cause, group, or business, the category-level codes represent classes of organizations that likely
share both priorities across policy issue areas and are likely to have similar policy preferences on most
bills. Furthermore, local organizations, social groups, or firms within these categories might not lobby
Congress, but may have their interests represented by another organization that does lobby and would
be placed in the same category. Thus, the category-level CRP interest group codes, as assigned to specific
organizations in the Maplight bill positions dataset, are good proxies for individual subconstituencies.
There aremany potential ways tomeasure interest diversity as a function of these category codes. As a
source of influence, interest diversity relies on connections between the subconstituencies in a legislator’s
district and those represented by organizations lobbying on particular bills. Thus, an ideal measure of
interest diversity would account for the connections between the subconstituencies (and, hence, category
codes) represented by a set of organizations and those important to specific legislators. For example, if
examining the groups lobbying on each side of a bill, a measure of interest diversity might operate at the
level of the side-legislator dyad, capturing the extent to which each legislator’s district subconstituencies
mappedonto theorganizations on each side of a bill. Assumingone could reliably identify each legislator’s
important district interest categories, this would then, presumably, be used to predict each legislator’s
14
A more detailed description of how individual organizations are assigned to the 400 categories and their parent
industries and sectors can be found at the website of the Center for Responsive Politics: https://www.opensecrets.
org/industries/slist.php , last accessedMay 4th, 2017.
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position on a bill or the intensity of their support or opposition for it. These could then be aggregated
to investigate the extent to which the organizations lobbying on a bill can, through the subconstituencies
for which they proxy, mobilize enough support, and avoid enough opposition, for the bill (or provisions
thereof) to make legislative progress. Such a measure would precisely capture the specific dynamics that
make interest diversity a potential source of influence on individual legislators. However, it would also
require the researcher to refine the concept of important district subconstituencies at the district level at a
higher level of conceptual detail than I have done here, then validate an additional measure of important
subconstituencies at the level of the year-district-interest category, for each of the several hundred unique
members of Congress who served between the 109th and 113th Congresses. Instead of undertaking an
additional measurement validation task, I assume for present purposes that a set of interest groups
representing a larger number of subconstituencies is more likely to include those that are important to
a given individual legislator, all else equal. Thus, the more subconstituencies represented among a set of
interest groups, themore legislators whowill bemobilized towork on issues and take positions according
with those of that set.
With this additional assumption in place, I use the number of interest group category codes to
measure the interest diversity of organizations lobbying for and against particular bills. To distinguish
the interest diversity of groups from simply the number of them, we examine a set of interest groups and
identify each unique CRP category codes among them: the number of these is taken as the diversity of
that set of groups. Thus, for each side of a bill – supporters versus opponents – we calculate its interest
diversity as the number of unique "interest group codes" among organizations taking that side on that
bill. Supporter Interest Diversity is thus the number of unique categories among the bill’s supporting
organizations, while Opponent Interest Diversity is the number of unique categories among the bill’s
opposing organizations. To calculate each bill’s total Interest Diversity, we sum its Supporter Interest
Diversity and Opponent Interest Diversity scores. Finally, because the impact of interest diversity is
likely to result from differences between the diversity on each side, we measure Net Interest Diversity
by subtracting each bill’s Opponent Interest Diversity from its Supporter Interest Diversity. Thus, to the
extent that the supporters are more diverse than the opponents, Net Interest Diversity will be larger and
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positive; inversely, to the extent that the opponents are more diverse than the supporters, it will be larger
and negative.
As an example, consider the organizations lobbying on Rep. Marsha Blackburn’s (R-TN) Horse
Protection Amendments Act (HPAA) of 2013. Figure 3.1 displays the interests and organizations that
lobbied for and against HPAA. The HPAAwas supported by two organizations, the TennesseeWalking
Horse Breeders’ and Exhibitors’ Association and the Walking Horse Trainers’ Association (left side of
the figure). Maplight classifies both of these under the same category: horse breeders. Thus, while the
number of organizations lobbying in support for the HPAA was 2, the diversity of those supporters is
1. On the other hand, four organizations lobbied in opposition to HPAA: the American Association of
Equine Practitioners, the American Veterinary Medical Association, the Animal Welfare Institute, and
the U.S. Humane Society (right side of the figure). The former two are both categorized as veterinarians
groups, while the latter two are both categorized as animal rights organizations. Thus, the four opposing
groups together represent two distinct categories – veterinarians and animal rights groups; and therefore,
the number of opponents is 4 and the diversity of those opponents is 2. The total interest diversity on the
bill itself is the sumof the interest diversity scores of the individual sides: 1 (supporters) + 2 (opponents) =
3. Finally,HPAA’sNet InterestDiversity of is the result of subtracting the diversity of the bill’s opponents
from thediversity of thebill’s supporters; thus, -1. Illustrating the impact ofNet InterestDiversity onbills’
legislative fate, the HPAA never received so much as a committee hearing during the 113th Congress.
15
A reader might reasonably point out that diversity in general is often assessed using more
sophisticatedmeasures than the number of unique types of individuals or the sum or differences thereof.
Indeed, political scientists have relied on various iterations of the Herfindahl Index and Shannon’s
H score (and other measures) to measure diversity in issue attention as well as in firms’ access to
opportunities to influence policymaking. (Boydstun, Bevan and Thomas 2014; Ehrlich 2011) Given these
measures’ explicit design to study diversity and long-validated tenure as measures, one might reasonably
argue that they are better measurements of a general construct of "diversity". Indeed, these measures
are absolutely appropriate in the substantive contexts in which they were developed: to measure the
15
Not to naysay the horse-breeders’ legislative influence in general.
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Figure 3.1: Groups and Interests in the Horse Protection Amendments Act of 2013
113 H.R. 4098
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concentration of individual organisms in a biome across species and tomeasure the concentration of firms
in different industries. However, by focusing on relative concentration rather than variety, the measures
underweight precisely whatmakes interest diversity important: the ability to connect legislation tomany
subconstituencies back home. For that purpose, it is irrelevant whether, say, a bill was supported by five
pharmaceutical companies and one hospital association; what matters is that a legislator can claim credit
with both pharmaceutical companies and hospitals based in their district. Thus, the measure of interest
diversity I have put forward here benefits from not only being very simple, but also in capturing precisely
what makes this type of diversity relevant to legislative politics.
3.3 general trends in lobbying activity and interest diversity among
maplight bills
As described above, the Maplight data used to measure interest diversity captures 5,390 bills introduced
between the 109th and 113th Congresses, 2005 to 2014. This represents a little less than 9 percent of
all normal bills ("H.R." or "S") filed during that period, according to Congressional Bills Project (CBP)
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data. Before validating the measure itself, it is important to understand Maplight’s bill selection process
and how it may impact an assessment of interest group activity on a bill. Maplight research focuses
on "newsworthy" bills. In practice, this causes them to virtually ignore commemorative legislation (e.g.
renaming post-offices) and over-sample bills that get the attention of actors outside Congress. Among
other differences betweenMaplight data and CBP data, Maplight oversamples several categories of bills:
those sponsored bymajority partymembers in their chamber (74 percent ofMaplight bills, 60 percent of
CBPbills); bills sponsoredbymembers of their towhich the bill was referred (59 percent ofMaplight bills,
42 percent of CBP bills); and that made non-zero legislative progress (22 percent of Maplight bills were
reported from a committee in their origin chamber, compared to 9 percent of CBP). These differences
suggest that analyses using Maplight data may only generalize to bills that are similarly "newsworthy";
though, in this respect, it resembles and even expands upon other samples of bills that are identified as
substantive or significant through news coverage.
16
With these caveats in mind, we proceed to examine
how lobbying activity and interest diversity vary across bills in the Maplight dataset.
Interest diversity varies widely across bills. Figure 3.2 displays a histogram of total interest diversity
across Maplight bills. In this case, the value of interest diversity corresponds to the sum of each bill’s
Supporter Interest Diversity and Opponent Interest Diversity. The figure and data exhibit several clear
patterns. First, they are heavily right-skewed, withmany bills having very low levels interest diversity, but
a few bills having extreme value. Indeed, over 36 percent of maplight bills have have an interest diversity
of 1, indicating that they garnered either a single category of supporter or a single category of opponent
(but not both at once). This is fairly intuitive. Most bills are not salient, getting the attention of only a few
interest groups. (see Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson 2014) The example
used above, the Horse Protection Amendments Act, is thus fairly typical in its limited scope (indeed,
HPAA is of higher total interest diversity than 62% of other bills.).
Even among bills that gain traction with a broader array of interests, most still remain small in scope.
Fully 90percent ofMaplight bills have a total interest diversity score of 15 or less. These bills are usually less
16
Examples of studies taking newsworthiness as a basis for legislative significance include: Binder (1999); Jones and
Baumgartner (2005); Mayhew (1991); Maltzman and Shipan (2008); Howell, Adler, Cameron and Riemann (2000); Clinton
and Lapinski (2006); Volden andWiseman (2014).
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salient, but end up appealing to diverse interests nonetheless. Many of these bills deal with less broadly
salient issues that are intensely important to certain groups. This can happen if social and economic
interests happen to coincide, with little organized opposition, on w bill, as was the case of the Synthetic
Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (112-S-3187, interest diversity 15), or if it reauthorizes a relatively small
federal program, such as the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 (113-S-1086, interest
diversity 12) or if it authorizes a new, smaller program that addresses a non-controversial issue, as in the
Melanie Blocker Stokes Mom’s Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research, and Support for
Postpartum Depression Act (111-HR-20, interest diversity 12). Bills at about this range represent very
typical legislative efforts that interest groups engage in.
On the other hand, some bills gain the attention of a wildly diverse array of interests. These are
often very publicly salient and usually quite controversial. For example, three of the most interest
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diverse bills in the data are the Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA, aka 112-HR-3261, interest diversity
129), a precursor (113-S-1900, interest diversity 106) to the bill that ultimately granted President Obama
fast-track trade authority to negotiate theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), andDemocrats’ last attempt at
comprehensive immigration reformbefore losing control ofCongress in 2014 elections (113-S-744, interest
diversity 106). Because these bills are highly salient, they are also often championed by individually
powerful members; indeed SOPA and the TPP bill were sponsored by prominent committee chairmen,
while the immigration reform bill was sponsored by now Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer
(D-NY). The fact that these bills are already very much "on the agenda" means that interest groups’ key
means of influence - bringing and subsidizing lawmakers’ attention to particular proposals for dealing
with public policy problems (Kingdon 1995; Austen-Smith 1993; Hall and Deardorff 2006) - may be
rendered moot for such bills. In these cases, interest group lobbying by individual interests may focus
on changing individual bill provisions.
The two bill sides also exhibit distinct features. Figure 3.3 compares the distributions of Supporter
Interest Diversity and Opponent Interest Diversity. The distributions are both similar to that of total
interest diversity, with strong right skewness and, concomitantly, clustering at zero; 45 percent of the
bills have at most 1 Supporter Interest Diversity, while fully 81 percent of bills have at most 1 Opponent
Interest Diversity. However, their variances are quite different, with supporters (std. dev. 8.89) much
more likely to reach larger values than opponents (std. dev. 4.26). This results in distributions of different
means: supporters have an average of 4.6 types, while opponents have an average of 1.4.
17
As a result,
though thedistributions look similar, supporter interest diversity andopponent interest diversity are only
moderately correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.17, p < 0.0001 or, among bills having at least one supporter
and one opponent, ρ = 0.28, p < 0.0001). Thus, bills that garner diverse support also regularly attract
diverse opposition, but this is not always the case.
Examining interests by bill side also allows us to cursorily assess the reliability ofMaplight’s assessment
of interest groups’ positions on bills. Many bills in the data have identical or nearly-identical titles (for
17
Interestingly, the ratio of these (approximately 3.3 supporters per opponent) coincides with other studies at the lobbying
side level and find that supporters are much more common, and much less successful, than opponents. (McKay 2012b;
Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009)
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example, updating the year in a bill name that includes the year in which it is introduced), indicating that
they are likely to be identical or very similar in content. Indeed, while there are 5390 bills in the dataset,
there are only 4775 unique bill titles.
18
We would generally expect that, across different iterations of
identical or nearly identical bills, interest diversity should remain the same (because the same interests are
affected by its provisions) or increase over time (because one or both sides have successfully expanded the
conflict (c.f. Schattschneider 1975)). This appears to be case. As one example, 112-S-1223 and 113-S-2171were
bothbills filedby SenatorAl Franken (D-MN) entitled "TheLocationPrivacyProtectionAct" of 2012 and
2014, respectively.
19
TheLocationPrivacy ProtectionActwas a priority of Frankenwhile hewas chairman
18
Bill titles are taken from the current (March 2017) version of the CBP dataset. They are the bills’ longer titles, which
tend to be more descriptive and also are less likely to include information such as the year of the bill’s introduction that would
change with each iteration. Interested readers should note that, at the very least, the main results from the third paper are
robust to using a random effect for or clustering standard errors on bill titles.
19
The longer title, "A bill to address voluntary location tracking of electronic communications devices, and for other
purposes", is identical between the two bills.
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of the Senate Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and Law. While the specific organizationsMaplight
reported having lobbied on the bill changed slightly, the interests at play remained similar (consumer
groups supporting and chambers of commerce opposed); most importantly for present purposes, the
bill’s supporter diversity remained steady (at 2) while opponent diversity increased by only one (from
1 to 2) between the two iterations.
20
That different versions of the bill, filed more than a year apart,
maintain very similar levels of interest diversity across both sides is some (albeit preliminary) evidence
that Maplight’s data, and my measure derived from it, are reliable.
In addition to measuring interests reliably across identical bills, the measure also captures differences
between different versions of the same bill that are introduced concurrently. As an example, the two
chambers were controlled by different parties (Republicans in the House and Democrats in the Senate)
in 2012 when the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) came up for reauthorization (or, in the absence
thereof, expiration). The parties produced competing versions of the reauthorization bill: 112-S-1925,
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT); and 112-HR-4970, introduced by Congresswoman Sandy
Adams (R-FL). As both bills reauthorized the VAWA’s enhanced prosecutorial and investigational tools
to combat domestic violence, one might expect that, all else equal, interest groups lobbying on VAWA
reauthorization would be indifferent between the bills. However, ceteris non paribus. The two versions
of the 2012VAWAreauthorizationdiffered in that theDemocratic version included additional protections
for certain populations – native Americans, undocumented immigrants, and members of the LGBT
community – that were (and are) especially vulnerable to domestic violence. The Republican version
of the bill lacked these provisions.
21
Consequently, groups representing liberal interests – particularly,
women’s rights groups, various labor unions, minority rights activists, immigrants rights activists, and
nativeAmerican rights groups, among others – favored theDemocratic version and publicly opposed the
Republican version. This difference is reflected in the Maplight data: the Republican (House) bill had
one supporting interest and twenty-three opposing interests, while the Democratic bill was supported
20
Suggestive of the interest diversity’s importance for legislative outcomes, Franken managed to get the 2012 (112th
Congress) version of the Act reported from the full Senate Judiciary Committee, but not the 2014 version. When control
of the Senate reverted to Republicans with the 114th Congress, Franken introduced the bill again (as 114-S-2270), where it
continued to be neglected by the Republican-controlled Judiciary Committee.
21
Cohen, Tom. "House passes Violence AgainstWomenAct after GOP version defeated",CNN.com, Feb 28, 2013: http:
//www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/politics/violence-against-women/, accessedMay 7, 2017.
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by 29 interests and opposed by only two.
22
Ultimately, under pressure from President Obama and the
many interest groups mobilized on the issue, the Republican-controlled House relented and passed the
Senate Democrats’ version of the bill by a wide margin. That the version favored by an diverse coalition
of interests passed over that opposed by the same diverse coalitios evinces the importance of comparing
diversity across sides when investigating interest diversity’s potential legislative influence.
As measured by Net Interest Diversity, the difference between Supporter Interest Diversity and
Opponent InterestDiversity, interest group conflicts surrounding legislation vary dramatically. Figure 3.4
is a histogramofNet InterestDiversity acrossMaplight bills, and Figure 3.5 breaks this downbyCongress.
Three features are clear. First, a significant proportion of bills fall near zero Net Interest Diversity,
indicating that supporters and opponents ofmost bills are evenly or nearly-evenlymatched. As suggested
22
Indeed, Maplight reports that many of the specific organizations that supported the Democratic version opposed the
Republican version.
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from the examination of bills’ total and side-specific interest diversities, a large part of this is due tomany
bills having one supporter and zero opponents. Indeed, the median and modal bills have a Net Interest
Diversity score of 1, and for the most part (1141 of 1729 bills with 1 Net Interest Diversity) such bills had
a single organization (and, hence, subconstituency) supporting them and none oppose. That many bills
have only a single supporter suggests that interest groups lobbying by themselves are either attempting
to achieve something other than bill passage in the short run, that they are assume that they have access
to some other source of influence, or that they might stand to gain if they partnered with organizations
representing different subconstituencies. The second feature is that the tails of the distribution of Net
Interest Diversity are both long and thin, reflecting the right-skewness of the side-specific diversities. Net
Interest Diversity’s range runs from -54 to 97, but fully 95 percent of the observations fall in the range of
-14 to 16.
23
This indicates that theremay be relatively rare aspects of a bill or the issues it addresses that can
cause it to garner overwhelming support or opposition. If these aspects can be influenced by a legislator
sponsoring a bill, or their opponents, it suggests a powerful means of influencing or circumventing
the interest group conflict on that bill. Finally, while there are extreme (less than -14 or greater than
20) values of Net Interest Diversity in each Congress in the data, most observations with extreme Net
InterestDiversity are found in the laterCongresses. Thismaybe reflective ofMaplight’s changing research
capacity over time, or that the 112th and 113th congresses (which featured divided government under
President Obama) produced bills that the interests in the data were simply more likely to be united on.
24
It is instructive to consider why bills have different levels of Net Interest Diversity. Some bills gain
relatively high Net Interest Diversity because they amount to a large boon for trade, implying that they
will be favored by many different industries. The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2012 (112-HR-6156, Net Interest Diversity 76) extended normal trade relations treatment to Russia and
Moldova, while also requiring more intense monitoring of Russia’s compliance with its obligations to
23
If one removes all bills with only a single supporter and no other lobbying, 95 percent of remaining observations would
still fall in the range of -15 to 19.
24
Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to theorize about this, onemight imagine that divided government in amore
polarized, partisan era may have incentivized interest groups seeking policy changes to form broader and more bipartisan
coalitions with one another. This would be reflected in Net Interest Diversity scores further from the median in either
direction, which is what 3.5 illustrates.
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the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was opposed by a single union (the International Federation
of Professional & Technical Engineers), but supported by groups representing dozens of industries, as
well as a few minority rights groups. Similarly, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (111-HR-5297, Net
Interest Diversity 22) created the Small Business Lending Fund, increasing credit availability for small
business; it was opposed by credit unions but supported by numerous industries as well as teacher’s
unions and associations focused on supporting businesses owned by racial and ethnicminorities, women,
and LGBT people. Highly interest-diverse bills gain most of their diversity from their ability to combine
broad support within industry with additional support from specific issue groups.
On the other hand, some bills draw diverse opposition because they are salient, controversial, major
reforms that rely on the clout of party leaders, especially under unified government, to pass. The
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archetypal example of this kind of bill is the Affordable Care Act (ACA, 111-HR-3590, Net Interest
Diversity -16), which, while supported by health providers and many traditional Democratic-leaning
interest groups, was opposed by a litany of health insurers, conservative interest groups, financial services
companies, business associations, as well as groups representing many different individual industries.
Though getting health providers and consumers to agree to the bill was critical to its viability, the
scope of opposition interests made it politically costly. It took many side deals with wavering, more
conservative, Democrats to ensure the bill’s passage, and, side-deals besides, that passage did not come
cheap: Democrats lost heavily in the midterm elections later in 2010, and have not held control of the
House since.
To summarize, these analyses show that the interest diversity measure conforms to many general
expectations about interest group activity on bills. Most bills are small in scope, with only a few
interests getting involved, while a small number generate intense lobbying frommany different interests.
Interest groups tend to support bills more often than opposing them, suggesting that groups prefer to
be proactive in their efforts to attain and maintain desired policy outcomes. Bills with similar content
garner similar levels of interest diversity, while competing versions of the same bill garner lobbying
from the similar interests, but those interests take opposite positions on each bill. Finally, bills that
generate lopsided conflicts tend to do so in predictable ways – joining strange bedfellows or generating
multi-industry coalitions – with predictable consequences, e.g. electoral defeat when forcing legislation
over the objection of diverse interests. Collectively, these preliminary observations serve to establish the
face validity of the measure.
3.4 validating the measure: net interest diversity and patterns of
legislative and interest group politics
I have argued that interest diversity is potentially an important source of interest group influence
because it helpsmembers of Congress connect their day-to-day legislative activities with the priorities and
preferences of important segments of their constituencies. I have shown that this concept is distinct from
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a coalition’s size or a bill’s attendant political conflict, as well as from other types of diversity that a set of
interest groupsmight exhibit. I have also proposed ameasure of interest diversity – the number of unique
interest group category codes assigned to individual organizations within a set thereof – and suggested
levels at which interest diversity might be useful to measure; among all the organizations lobbying on a
bill, among groups on either side (supporting or opposed) of a bill, or as a difference between the diversity
of each side. Next, I turn to validating themeasure ofNet InterestDiversity, the level of themeasuremost
likely to be important in assessing interest groups’ influence on legislative outcomes.
Adcock and Collier (2001, particularly p. 538-543) provide a framework for conducting measurement
validation that is useful for validating this Net Interest Diversity measure. They offer three criteria that
can be used to assess the validity of a measure of a given concept, each of which I will apply to my
measure of interest diversity (in particular, Net Interest Diversity) in turn. One of these, convergent
validity, cannot be established with respect to this measure of interest diversity: as interest diversity is a
newer concept, no broadly accepted measures of it exist with which to compare the measure proposed
here. Hence, we rely on the face validity of the measure as the closest available substitute for establishing
convergent validity. As established above, themeasure of interest diversity and, in particular, Net Interest
Diversity, developed here conforms to general patterns of interest group involvement in legislation. The
large plurality of bills in the data are supported or opposed by just a few interests, suggesting that most
legislative conflicts remain small in scope, while a very small number of bills mobilizemany organizations
and, among them, many interests. The measure varies in ways that might be expected - e.g. between
competing versions of the same bill, or as conflict expands on a bill over time. Thus, the measure is at
least face valid.
Of the remaining two criteria, the first is content validity, which focuses on the correspondence
between a concept and a proposed measure of that concept. In particular, the measure must capture
all dimensions of the concept and exclude dimensions which are not part of the concept. On the
former, thismeasure performswell: the interest group category codes capture a large variety of industries,
political causes, and other social groups that correspond tomany different potentially politically-relevant
subpopulations in many different types of districts. Indeed, these categories were designed by the Center
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for Responsive Politics to be as comprehensive as possible, to gain the clearest possible understanding
of the forces supporting (and, potentially, influencing) a given member of Congress. It is possible that
one could further break down these categories while not merely identifying individual organizations;
for example, while pro-abortion rights is a distinct category, all other "women’s issues" are lumped
into a single category, masking meaningful differences in policy emphasis (e.g. in workforce- versus
healthcare-related policies) between women’s rights organizations. However, in capturing a broad array
of subconstituencies, themeasure remains likely to distinguish sets of interest groups that are truly diverse
from those that are not.
At the same time, themeasure excludes most conceptual dimensions that are close to but still distinct
from interest diversity. For example, the measure does not distinguish citizens’ groups, unions, business
firms, or trade organizations from one another as long as they represent the same interest group category.
Similarly, thismeasure of interest diversity does not capture ideological differences, except insofar as there
are theoretical reasons to expect that a group composed ofmanydifferent interestswill havemembers that
have different ideological leanings. Unfortunately, the proposed measure of interest diversity does not in
and of itself adequately exclude coalition size. By this measure, the maximum level of possible diversity
for a given bill is equal to the number of organizations lobbying that bill. Thus, any finding related to
interest diversity could easily be confounded by the number of groups involved.
The most obvious solution for this problem of coincidence between coalition size and net interest
diversity would be to divide interest diversity by the number of organizations whose diversity is
being assessed. This would create a measure of diversity relative to the number of organizations, or,
equivalently, a measure of how diverse the organizations are given how diverse the same number of
organizations could be. However, there are several reasons to not use such a measure for testing theories
of interest group influence and mobilization. First, it treats a bill supported by one organization as
equivalent to a bill supported by an arbitrary number of organizations, so long as those organizations
are all of different types; given the prevalence in the data of bills supported by a single organization, such
a measure would lack face validity that would have a substantial impact on inferences drawn using that
measure. Second, the concept of interest diversity developed here is defined in part by variety, and variety
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requires having a number of individuals sufficient to allow them to vary. Third, while the reasons that
another actor might care about the number of interests helped or harmed is fairly intuitive (e.g. in the
case of legislators, it represents the number of their subconstituencies who might be impacted by a bill),
a situation in which the interest diversity of a coalition relative to its potential interest diversity seems
unlikely to make a difference to other actors. Hence, it seems unlikely that a measure of diversity relative
to organization numbers would be very broadly useful in theory-testing. Thus, a "diversity relative to
numbers" measure would trade one type of content validity for another, andwould imply amodification
to the concept of interest diversity that would not be broadly useful. To address the correlation between
the proposed measure of interest diversity and number of organizations lobbying, it is imperative that
any analysis seeking to test theories involving interest diversity (as either a dependent or independent
variable) adjust for the number of groups involved. Thus, conditional on controlling for the number of
organizations, the content validity of the proposed measure of interest diversity remains intact.
Having established the face validity and content validity of the proposedmeasure of interest diversity,
I turn to the third and final criterion offered by Adcock and Collier (2001): construct validity. Construct
validity requires that a measure reproduce well-established empirical relationships between the construct
it measures and factors that are broadly believed to be causes or consequences of that construct. Thus,
we must replicate established findings about the antecedents and consequences of interest diversity, and
particularlyNet InterestDiversity. To a certain extent, this is impossible to dodirectly, again because there
exist no prior established relationships between interest diversity and other constructs. However, one
can analyze simple associations between this measure of interest diversity and factors that are believed to
covary with things that are conceptually similar to it. I examine several such factors: bills being supported
bypolitical elites in general; bills drawing strong support andopposition; bills impactingmany issue areas;
bills sponsored by members of the two major parties, particularly when those parties are in the majority;
andbills thatmove through the legislativeprocess. Indifferentways and fordifferent reasons, these should
be associated with different levels of interest diversity. In each of the subsections that follows, I examine
the interest diversity of bills across these types of bills and their alternatives in order to establish the
construct validity of this measure. In particular, because Net Interest Diversity is most likely to relevant
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to whether the interests lobbying on a bill impact its legislative fate, I confine most of my comparisons to
that measure.
That the data used here simultaneously exhibit substantial median-clustering, long tails, and right
skew has implications for any analysis based on these data, including the present one. In particular,
no variant on the interest diversity measure (including Net Interest Diversity) is distributed normally.
For the purposes of the simple comparisons of interest diversity across bill types and features, I make
two adjustments for this non-normality. For correlations of interest diversity with another continuous
variable, I use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ).25 When comparing levels of interest diversity
across discrete categories of bills, I use Welsh’s t-tests to account for unequal variances and use cube-root
transformations of the interest diversity measures to achieve a normal distribution (the graphs still plot
the original, untransformed versions of these measures).
26
The particular non-normality in my data
also impacts the categorical comparisons because I rely on box whisker plots to illustrate differences
across categories. First, long, thin tails produce many observations outside of the bounds of the upper
and lower adjacent values that define the "whiskers" of a box-whisker plot. Keeping such outside
observations in a box-whisker plot when the tails of the plotted distribution are so large renders the
plot less informative. Thus, outside observations are excluded from all box-whisker plots presented
below. Second, the strong median clustering in the full sample of bills means that most subsamples
themselves exhibit strong clustering around the samemedian. However, this gives us a useful heuristic for
evaluating differences between bill categories: the presence of differentmedians between categories imply
substantive differences in interest diversity between those types of bills. With these caveats in mind, we
proceed to examine how interest diversity replicates established patterns of legislative tactics and interest
group mobilization.
25
Spearman’s ρ assesses howwell the relationship between two variables can be described as amonotonic function; it serves
a similar function as the more common Pearson’s r but does not make the same normality assumptions.
26
Cube-root transformations have the advantage of working well for data that include both zeros and negative values
and that are right-skewed. As all versions of the interest diversity measure have zeros and are right-skewed, and Net Interest
Diversity also has negative values, the cube-root is the most appropriate transformation of those commonly used for this
purpose.
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Broad and Bipartisan Legislative Support
Aspolicy entrepreneurs, legislators face numerous tactical decisions in attempting to pass legislation. One
early set of decisions involves coalition-building. A key skill of successful legislative entrepreneurs is their
ability to build support for their proposals among other legislators. (Volden andWiseman 2014; Wawro
2000; Arnold 1990) One manifestation of such support is legislative cosponsorship. Cosponsorships
represent a public commitment of (at least) passive support for the cosponsored bill. (Fowler 2006;
Koger 2003; Wilson and Young 1997; Campbell 1982) Though large numbers of cosponsorships do little
to ensure the passage of a bill, legislators, especially rank-and-file legislators, still expend significant effort
to recruit them. (Campbell 1982; Straus 2013) Thus, a bill with a relatively large number of cosponsors
has a commitment of at least passive support from a large number of legislators. Such support may arise
because a bill’s content is in some sense naturally non-controversial, or because the sponsor (like Upton
on the CURES Act) has actively sought to build a large coalition of support for the bill among political
elites.
There are two cosponsorship patterns that should coincide with interest diversity. We should expect
bills with larger numbers of cosponsors to also exhibit higher levels of support among interest groups.
Assuming that interest groups are also more likely to support a bill that is broadly agreeable, then bills
with large numbers of cosponsors should also have garnered large numbers of supporters among interest
groups. Insofar as interest diversity among a set of organizations is, inmymeasure, capped by the number
of groups in that set, a larger number of groups supporting a bill (particularly relative to the number
opposing the bill) may also be more diverse. Hence, bills with large numbers of cosponsors should also
have higher relative diversity in their interest group supporters. In addition, rather than simply being
broad, the cosponsors of a bill may also be bipartisan. Harbridge (2015) finds that evenwhen themajority
party exercises strong agenda-setting powers, it has incentives to maintain a reputation for competent
and responsible governance that in turn incentivize majority party leaders to allow onto the agenda bills
with bipartisan appeal. These incentives may allow a legislator to secure legislative progress for their
proposals bypartneringwith legislators of the other party. Indeed, Volden andWiseman (2014) argue that
a common practice of the most effective lawmakers in the U.S. Congress is to routinely seek partnerships
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across party lines. Bills able to appeal to legislators with such varying preferences may also appeal to
interest groups with varying preferences.
To explore these possibilities, we examine how levels of Net Interest Diversity vary across bills with
many or bipartisan cosponsors. Web-scraping of Congress’s official website as well as data from the
Congressional Bills Project dataset were used to determine, for each bill in theMaplight data, the number
of cosponsors it ultimately received, both in total and in each of the twomajor parties. Obtaining the final
number of cosponsors a bill received is straightforward: that information is available in theCongressional
Bills Project dataset. To classify bills as bipartisan, we examine how these cosponsorshipswere distributed
across parties. Replicating the measure of bipartisanship used by Harbridge (2015), we code a bill as
bipartisan if it has at least one cosponsor and at least 20 percent of a bill’s cosponsors came from each
party (30% of bills in the dataset).
Using these measures, we perform simple comparisons of Net Interest Diversity across different
cosponsorship patterns. These comparisons are summarized in Figure 3.6. As demonstrated in the left
panel of Figure 3.6, the correlation between Net Interest Diversity and the total number of cosponsors
a bill received is positive and statistically significant (ρ = 0.16, p < 0.0001). Next, we compare
bills that are bipartisan to those that are not. Similarly, we find that bipartisan bills exhibit statistically
significantly higher levels of (cube-root) Net Interest Diversity (∆95%C.I. = [0.166, 0.295], Welch’s
T3399.12 = 6.961, p < 0.0001). This also represents a substantively significant difference: indeed,
bipartisan bills not only have higher mean Net Interest Diversity, but also higher median diversity. As
discussed above, median changes are particularly substantively meaningful among these data because the
data as a whole, as well as most random subsets of it, are strongly clustered at the median. Thus, as
expected, we find that bills with many or bipartisan cosponsors tend to also have higher levels of Net
Interest Diversity.
Diversity as a Response to Strong Opposition and Controversy
Crosson and Heaney (2016) as well as Phinney (2017) argue that interest groups have incentives to build
diverse coalitions in response to strong opposition from other actors. However, they differ in the "other
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Left is a scatterplot of Net Interest Diversity against each bill’s number of cosponsors: the dots represent each observation; the
dashed line represents the linear fit of the scatterplot, while the light grey area around it represents the 95% confidence interval
around the linear fit. The right panel is a box-whisker plot of Net Interest Diversity by a dichotomous indicator of whether at
least 20 percent of a bill’s cosponsors came from each party. Outside observations are excluded from the right panel.
actors" whose oppositionmay spur the formation of diverse coalitions. Crosson andHeaneymeasure the
impact of controversy surrounding a coalition’s issue priorities on their subjective importance of issue
diverse coalitions (see above) by asking coalition leaders to rate "Howcontroversial is the [coalition’s] issue
in terms of the likelihood that attentive constituencies are to disagree about the issue?" (p 16). Attentive
constituencies may include engaged citizens, but most commonly such attentive constituencies take the
form of organized interest groups or social movements. Thus, Crosson and Heaney find that coalition
leaders find issue diversity important in their coalition-building efforts when the issue the coalitionworks
on draws opposition from other interest groups. Phinney, on the other hand, measures controversy
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Top panels are scatter plots (with linear fit and 95 % confidence interval thereof). Bottom panels are box-whisker plots, with
outside values excluded to ease graphical interpretation.
among both interest groups and policymakers, coding a policy position as having "strong opposition"
to the extent that its opposing side includes many or powerful interest groups or legislators. Though, as
discussed above, the types of interest group coalition diversity conceptualized in both studies are at least
somewhat distinct from interest diversity, both studies are seeking to understand coalition diversity in
general, with each type of diversity being instances of the broader "diversity" construct. Thus, one might
expect that antecedents to the kinds of diversity they study, particularly controversy or opposition, might
also be correlatedwith interest diversity. Thuswe consider how interest diversity covarieswith opposition
from interest groups and powerful legislators.
In contrast to other analyses in this section, which examineNet InterestDiversity, here I examine how
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strong opposition correlates with interest diversity on each side of a bill. Thus, if opposition to a bill is
strong,wewould expect the supporters of thebill to havehigher interest diversity. Equivalently, if support
for a bill is strong, we should expect the opponents of the bill to have higher interest diversity. We take
campaign contributions frompolitical action committees representing the interests on each side of a bill
27
as a rough indicator of the "strength" of the individual interests on that side. Interests generally thought
of as relatively powerful – e.g. real estate companies, investment companies, defense contractors, and
pharmaceutical companies – are also among the largest campaign contributors. Thus, we would expect
that as the campaign contributions from interests on one side increase, there should be higher levels of
interest diversity on the other side. We find this is the case for both sides. As the upper panel on Figure
3.7 demonstrates, Supporter Interest Diversity is positively correlated with bill opposing interests’ PAC
contributions (ρ = 0.144, p < 0.0001), while Opponent Interest Diversity is positively correlated with
bill supporting interests’ PAC contributions ( ρ = 0.090, p < 0.0001). Thus, it appears that bills with
strong interests on one side tend to have interest diverse organizations on the other side.
Identifying powerful legislators supporting a bill is harder. The sponsor of a bill is not necessarily
the legislator putting the most power behind it. However, the majority party leadership is able to
exercise considerable power on behalf of legislation, particularly when the majority party caucus is in
broad agreement on the bill. (Aldrich and Rohde 2001) One manifestation of such leadership power
are instances in which bills bypass deliberation in committee. Such bills are ultimately reported from a
committee, or passed by the parent chamber, without having received a markup - a formal meeting to
consider amendments to a bill. By excluding a committee from deliberating on the bill, party leaders
indicate that they both have settled on a specific policy proposal and that they want to move it through
the legislative process as quickly as possible. (Bendix 2016) Given the power of party leaders, a bill that
27
The specific quantity used here is calculated by identifying the interest group category code of each organization on a
side, finding the total value of all PAC contributions that interest made to federal candidates in that year, summing across
all organizations on that side, then dividing by $2.675 million (the equivalent of maxing out a single organization’s PAC
contribution to every member of Congress). Thus, category codes’ contributions may be double-counted (or more) within a
side. This does not bias the analyses presented here so long as high-contributing interests and low-contributing interests are
equally likely to be represented bymany organizations on a given bill. Theremay be reasonable arguments that this is the case.
However, alternative measures - PAC contributions from individual organizations on a side, or single-counting each interest
category code, leave out potential information that campaign contributions might convey about the intensity of an interests’
preferences on a bill. Faced with imperfect measures regardless, the measure used here is adequate for present purposes.
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has been reported or passed without receiving a markup indicates that that bill is supported by strong
legislators. Thus, such bills should be expected to have diverse opponents, but not diverse supporters.
To examine this, we compare interest diversity among majority-sponsored bills between bills that
bypassed committee deliberations and those that did not. Bendix (2016) identifies bills that bypassed
committee markup using official data on bill statuses from Congress. Using the same indicators, we
identify all bills in the dataset that are recorded as having either been reported from a committee in the
origin chamber or having passed that chamber but that did not also have a recorded markup of the bill.
Of the majority party bills in the dataset, 420 (10.55 percent) did not receive a markup but were reported
from a committee or passed by their parent chamber regardless. The bottompanels of Figure 3.7 illustrate
how interest diversity on each side varies overwhether a bill bypassed committee or not, formajority party
bills only. Differences between supporter interest diversity for committee-bypassing and non-committee
bypassingmajority-party bills run counter to expectations, with committee-bypassing bills exhibiting less
diverse interest group supporters (∆95%C.I. = [−0.181,−0.018], Welch’s T504.644 = 2.413, p < 0.01).
On the opponents’ side, there is a statistically significant difference in interest diversity between bills
that bypassed committee and those that did not, with committee-bypassing bills drawing more diverse
opponents that bills that do not (∆95%C.I. = [0.118, 0.284], Welch’s T504.022 = 4.752, p < 0.0001).
The difference between these differences is also statistically significant (∆95%C.I. = [0.127, 0.522],
Welch’s T5622 = 3.230, p < 0.01), as is the difference in Net Interest Diversity Between committee
non-bypassing and bypassing bills (∆95%C.I. = [0.144, 0.405], Welch’s T506.994 = 4.127, p < 0.0001).
Thus, committee-bypassing bills have less diverse supporters and more diverse opponents, and reduced
Net Interest Diversity.
Omnibus Bills as Vehicles for Many Interests
Wewould expect to findmore diverse lobbying on omnibus bills. Omnibus bills, which covermany issue
areas and containmanydistinct policy proposals, are used topackage controversial proposals amongmore
popular proposals. This helps leaders pass such controversial proposals over the objection, or perhaps
without the understanding, of other legislators as well as the White House. (Curry 2015; Krutz 2000;
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Plot contains only majority-party bills. Dots represent each observation. The dashed line represents the linear fit of the
scatterplot, while the light grey area around it represents the 95% confidence interval around the linear fit.
Sinclair 2011) Because of their issue breadth, omnibuses are more likely than narrower bills to be relevant
to many different subconstituencies at once. To the extent this causes organizations representing those
subconstituencies to lobby on the bill, we would expect a more diverse array of organizations lobbying
on omnibuses than on narrower bills. Thus, we examine the Total Interest Diversity, rather than the Net
Interest Diversity, of omnibus bills.
Indeed, omnibus bills generate more diverse lobbying. Following Krutz (2000), I measure omnibus
bills according to their key distinguishing characteristic: issue breadth. Here, issue breadth is measured
according to the proportion of available Congressional Research Service (CRS) Legislative Subject codes
comprising those assigned to a bill.
28
Because omnibus bills are primarily a tool of the majority party, we
28
The CRS coding system changed in late 2008, drastically reducing the number of possible Legislative Subject Codes.
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compare issue breadth to interest diversity acrossmajority party bills only. As depicted in Figure 3.8, there
is a moderate positive correlation between issue breadth and total Interest Diversity (ρ = 0.220, p <
0.0001). This confirms the expectation that bills relevant to many types of interests draw lobbying from
many types of interests.
Majority Party Power and Asymmetric Partisan Networks
Parties and party power structure lobbying activity. The majority party has significant procedural
advantages in both chambers of Congress, which generally serve to block bills thatmajority legislators (or,
at least, a majority thereof) dislike while facilitating the passage of bills around which the majority party
is unified or that are necessary to pass to preserve the party’s collective reputation. (Aldrich and Rohde
2001; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; Cox and McCubbins 2005) Unsurprisingly, it has been found that
lobbying tends to be directed towards bills sponsored by majority party members. (Grossmann and Pyle
2013) Thus, we would generally expect that majority party bills tend to receive more lobbying in general.
As a function of the data - supporters tend to be more numerous andmore diverse than opponents - one
would expect that this general tendency to lobby majority party bills more frequently would imply that,
by my measure, majority party bills might have higher Net Interest Diversity than minority party bills.
In addition to responding to majority party power, interest groups also interact within the parties
themselves in different ways. While parties are often thought of as formal organizations, instantiated
by the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee, they are better
understood as extended networks of politicians, party organizations, activists, outside interest groups,
and other actors. (Koger, Masket and Noel 2009) These partisan outside interests, while participating in
elections and supporting candidates, also form legislative coalitionswithin their party network in support
of party priorities and across party networks in pursuit of "grand bargains." (Grossmann andDominguez
2009) One key difference between the parties is in the density of their interests’ collaboration. While
both parties have interests that are integral to their networks, Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) find that
Thus, bills from the first two Congresses in the dataset have much larger raw counts of Legislative Subject Codes. To account
for this, we use the proportion of codes available in a given Congress that comprised the codes assigned to a bill as the final
measure of its issue breadth.
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Box-whisker plots of Net Interest Diversity, with outside observations excluded.
Democratic-aligned groups are more likely to collaborate with one another on pushes for legislation,
while Republican-aligned groups tend be both fewer and less likely to collaborate. This finding suggests
that we should expect more diverse groups lobbying in favor of bills sponsored by Democratic Party
members.
We examine these party influences on interest diversity by comparing Net Interest Diversity across
party status and bill sponsor party. Both the party of a bill’s sponsor and the majority or minority
status of that party in the sponsor’s chamber (i.e. the bill’s chamber of origin) are public information
and are included in the Congressional Bills Project dataset. Figure 3.9 summarizes these comparisons.
The proposed measure of Net Interest Diversity is not consistently associated with party status: mean
(cube-root transformed) Net Interest Diversity is slightly higher for majority party bills than minority
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party bills, but this difference is not statistically significant (∆95%C.I. = [−0.095, 0.035], Welch’s
T2931.39 = 0.9103, p = 0.819). Further analysis reveals that while the bills have similar though
statistically-distinguishable means, their distributions are different: majority party bills have higher
standard deviation (9.63 vs. 6.49) and also higher skew (3.49 vs. 3.10), indicating that they are more
likely to exhibit values farther from themean, and the longer tail will favor positive values of Net Interest
Diversity. Thus, even though their central tendencies are not substantively different, majority bills are
more likely to have extreme and positive values of Net Interest Diversity than minority bills.
On theother hand, contrary to expectations,Republicanbills tend tohave slightly higherNet Interest
Diversity thanDemocratic bills. However, when comparing the cube-root transformationofNet Interest
Diversity across parties, this difference is statistically significant, though small on average (∆95%C.I. =
[0.060, 0.192], T3913.54 = 3.749, p < 0.001) Once again, the distinction between raw and transformed
versions of Net Interest Diversity here indicate that one category – in this case, Republican sponsored
bills – has both much higher standard deviation (10.41 vs 7.87) and somewhat higher skew (3.60 vs 3.24).
This difference in results between comparing raw and transformed Net Interest Diversity across party
lines is somewhat abated when only considering bills filed by members of each party when it was the
majority party in the sponsor’s chamber. In this case, while rawNet Interest Diversity is on average about
1.5 points higher for majority-party Republicans than majority-party Democrats, cube-root-transformed
Net Interest Diversity is slightly higher for majority-party Democrats than majority-party Republicans,
though not as consistently as when all bills are considered (∆95%C.I. = [−0.029, 0.151], T1876.28 =
1.325, p = 0.094) This is largely because majority Republicans have much higher standard deviation
than majority Democrats (12.48 vs 8.07), though in this case they have less skew (3.03 vs. 3.44). These
results suggest that Republican bills tend to be more polarizing – that is, likely to result in values of Net
Interest Diversity that are further from the mean – but that more often that not this results in bills that
are supported by a relatively diverse array of interests.
Among the comparisons I have presented in attempting to establish the proposed interest diversity
measure’s construct validity, that between Democrats and Republicans is the only one that indicates an




To review, Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) use data that contain information
about which interest groups were cited by lawmakers when debating a bill or amendment on the floor.
Identifying these citations in the 2001-2002CongressionalRecord, they create a network ofwhich groups
are cited together when a lawmaker is arguing for or against legislation, making the assumption that
co-citation indicates collaborationbetweengroups. They find thatDemocratic-leaning interests aremuch
more likely to be cited together (and hence, the democratic legislative network is more dense), and that
Democratic lawmakers cite many more groups when making floor speeches; one consequence of this is
that Democratic bills appear to have the support of a broader and more diverse array of interest groups
than do Republican bills.
There are at least four potential explanations for the discrepancy between the results of Grossmann
and Hopkins (2016). The first potential explanation for our different findings is that their data come
from a time period (2001-2002) prior (though close) to that fromwhichmy data are derived (2005-2014).
In this case, both our findings may be true, conditional on institutional alignments, structural influences
(such as party polarization) or other factors that vary over time.
The secondpotential explanation is that the interest group category codesused to generate the interest
diversity score recognize more variations of industry interests than they do of unions or issue groups.
Insofar as the former tend to favorRepublicanpositions and the latter tend to favorDemocratic positions,
the measure could be systematically biased to detect more diverse support from the kinds of bills that
tend to be sponsored by Republicans. This argument is supported by my finding that Republican bills
not only exhibit higher mean Net Interest Diversity, but also higher variance and (generally) positive
skew. Such an argument would, of course, depend on one’s prior beliefs; because those are precisely
what we are considering here, an argument saying these are wrong because they different from previous
findings would be non-falsifiable. Nevertheless, this suggests that assessing cross-party differences in
interest diversity may be difficult to do using this measure.
The third potential explanation is that while I am measuring interest diversity, Grossmann and
Hopkins are measuring (in effect) the number of organizations sharing a position. Figure 3.10 replicates
29
The alternative being, of course, to prematurely admit a weakness in construct validity.
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Box-whisker plots (outside observations excluded), by party status (left), party (center), and party for majority party bills only
(right).
the box whisker plots of Figure 3.9, replacing Net Interest Diversity with net numbers of organizations
lobbying for the bill (number of supporters minus the number of opponents) as the y-axis variable.
When analyzing party and party-status at the organizational level (rather than the interest level), my
measure replicates the findings of those of Grossman and Hopkins: Democratic bills garner more (net)
organizations supporting them than do Republican bills.
The final potential explanation is that the data-generating processes for the two sources of interest
group positions are quite different. Grossman and Hopkins use citations by lawmakers of groups’
positions on legislation, while I use the public positions taken by groups themselves. Intuitively,
lawmakers are likely to be strategic about the groups whose agreement they are willing to use to justify
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their positions, citing some groups and failing to mention others. While groups’ public position-taking
is also likely strategic in its initiation,
30
groups have few incentives to hide that they have an interest in
the outcomes of a particular piece of legislation, particularly on bills appearing to be gaining salience
or moving through the legislative process. This is likely to hold among the bills in my data, because
Maplight selects for research bills that gain a measure of salience or that move through the legislative
process (see above). Given each dataset’s generating process, I submit that the Maplight data is generally
a more accurate representation of interest groups’ position-taking on bills. Thus, while my results and
predictions of prior work disagree slightly on the correspondence between bill sponsor party and interest
group activity, these disagreements do not imperil the construct validity of my measure.
Legislative Progress
Differences in interest diversity matter to the extent that they help or hinder groups’ lobbying efforts.
One key goal of interest groups is to secure collective benefits for groupmembers, namely favorable policy
outcomes. (Olson 1965; Baumgartner et al. 2009) If interest diversity helps groups secure favorable policy
outcomes, then it should be the case that there is a positive correlation between Net Interest Diversity
and the movement of bills through the legislative process and into law. Here, we assess the strength of
this correlation.
There is a consistent association between Net Interest Diversity and bills’ legislative progress.
31
Bills’
furthest legislative progress was assessed using an ordinal measure, with increasing values indicating
further progress (0 = bill made no progress, 1 = was reported from committee in its origin chamber, etc.,
and 5 = bill became law). Statistical tests reveal that there is statistically significant differences inmeanNet
Interest Diversity across levels of bill progress (James’s Wald χ2(5d.f.) = 33.29 , p < 0.001, Likelihood
Ratio χ2(5d.f.) = 30.80, p < 0.001), though this does not result in a consistent linear relationship
between Net Interest Diversity across levels of legislative progress (Spearman’s ρ = 0.0193, p = 0.16)
30
One can imagine lobbyists trying to calculatewhether it is preferable tobring attention to abill by taking apublic position
on it.
31
Readers of the third paper of this dissertation project, which is based on analysis in Lorenz (2016), may be interested to
know that that paper’s main results hold when the DV of committee consideration is replaced with the ordinal measure of
legislative progress that is used here (and an mixed effects ordinal logit model is estimated).
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20% random sample, Nbills = 1069. Vertical lines represent individual bills, and the height of each line denotes that bill’s
progress through the legislative process. If viewing on a screen, it is recommended that the reader zoom in to more accurately
see how few of these bills (374) made any legislative progress.
Figure 3.11 depicts this mixed association. It orders a random sample of 20 percent of bills in the data by
Net Interest Diversity,
32
then draws a line upward to a level indicating its level of the ordinal measure of
each bill’s legislative progress. If it were the case that Net Interest Diversity was positively associated with
a bill’s legislative progress, we would expect to observemore lines extending further upward as onemoves
from left to right on the x axis of Figure 3.11.
This is indeed what we observe. The higher end of the x axis, representing bills with higher Net
Interest Diversity, features more bills that make any progress at all (i.e. less white space), and those
32
The values of Net Interest Diversity are modified slightly, by introducing random noise, to allow for each point on the
x axis to represent one and only one bill.
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bills that do make progress tend to make more progress to the extent that they have higher Net Interest
Diversity (more lines reachhigher on the right side of theplot thanon the left). This suggests that at oneor
more stages of the legislative process, Net Interest Diversity is associated with bills progressing further.
33
At the same time, a number of bills make substantial legislative progress despite having low (large but
negative) Net Interest Diversity. As the example of the ACA illustrates, these sorts of bills might reflect
a (soon-to-be electorally punished) use of powerful policymakers’ clout to overcome the objections of
diverse interests.
3.5 conclusion
In this article, I developed the concept of interest diversity as the relative degree of observable variety of
subconstituencies representedby a coalition (or other set) of organizations. After elaborating this concept
and distinguishing it from other features of interest group coalitions, including other types of diversity,
I developed a measure of interest diversity based on the interest category codes assigned to organizations
found to be taking positions for or against bills. I validated this measure by showing that its general
patterns of variation correspond to intuitions and expectations of interest group activity on bills, then
by showing that this measure covaries with other aspects of legislative politics, bill construction, and
legislative progress in ways that correspond to existing theories. This analysis was primarily concerned
with variation inNet Interest Diversity, the difference in interest diversity between a bill’s supporters and
opponents. Having validated the measure, we turn to discussing how to use it: namely, to study interest
group influence on legislation.
I opened this analysis by contrasting the legislative fate of two recent major Republican
healthcare-related bills, the American Health Care Act (AHCA) and the 21st Century Cures (CURES)
Act. Both bills were expansive and controversial, and both were championed by powerful members of
33
One other graphical point bears mentioning. Though Figure 3.11 does not appear to show it, the large majority of bills
in the dataset (3572 out of 5390) made no legislative progress at all. The reason that this does not appear to be the case in
the graph is because, even with additional random noise, there simply is not enough room in the size of the page to clearly
depict all bills, even in the 20 percent random sample: thus, bars overlap to some extent, which artificially inflates the apparent
typical legislative progress of bills in the sample. Smaller subsamples could address this graphical issue, at the risk of becoming
less representative. Experimentation with different-sized subsamples did not change the apparent association between Net
Interest Diversity and Legislative Progress as described above.
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the majority Republican caucus; Speaker Paul Ryan and Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman
Fred Upton, respectively. However, where Ryan attempted to force the initial version of the AHCA
through theHouse andover to the Senate in amatter ofweeks, Upton spent years building consensus and
bundling his favored provisions of theCURESActwith the research priorities of other legislators. Where
the CURESAct ultimately passedwith broad bipartisan support, theAHCAdied unceremoniously, and
attempts to negotiate within the fractured Republican caucus to revive it have not, as of this writing,
generated a more viable alternative.
In addition to their ultimate fate, the two bills differed markedly in the breadth of the support and
opposition each was able to garner from organized interests. According to recent Maplight data, the
CURES Act was supported by 150 organizations representing 26 distinct interests, and opposed by only
7 organizations representing 5 distinct interests, for a Net Interest Diversity of 21. This would
34
place it
in approximately the 96th percentile of the dataset used here. By contrast, the AHCA was supported
by 32 organizations representing 17 subconstituencies and opposed by 82 organizations representing 32
subconstituencies, for a Net Interest Diversity of -15.
35
This would place it below the 1st percentile of
the Maplight data. Clearly, the difference in diversity of interest group support across the two bills
was substantial. The findings of this paper suggest that such differences are neither coincidental nor
inconsequential. Indeed, bills with higher levels of Net Interest Diversity are more likely to progress
further in the legislative process overall. This would suggest that the CURES Act benefitted from the
diverse array of supporters it received, while the AHCA suffered for its failure to secure similar interest
group support.
36
This analysis did uncover two limitations of the measure that any subsequent analysis making use of
34
Both the CURES Act and the AHCAwere introduced in Congresses outside of the coverage of the Maplight data used
here.
35
NB: these come from the original version of the AHCA. As of this writing, a newer version of the bill passed the House
and is awaiting action in the Senate. Interest group positions on this new version are not yet available onMaplight’s website.
36
Lorenz (2016) found that a two-standard deviation increase (a difference of just under 18) in Net Interest Diversity
was associated with a 10 percent increased probability that a bill would receive committee consideration. The difference
between the AHCA and the CURESAct, 36, was just over twice that, implying a 20 to 21 percent difference in the probability
of receiving committee consideration, all else equal. Of course, the impetus of party leaders compelling the AHCA to be
considered meant that the bill was going to be reported from committee regardless, but this example illustrates the potential
degree of difference in legislative progress between bills that differ in Net Interest Diversity to the extent that the AHCA and
CURES Act did.
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it should take into account. First, theMaplight data, and the Center for Responsive Politics taxonomy it
uses to assign interests to bills, allows for many more distinctions between and within industries than it
does within issue groups and other social causes. One manifestation of this choice (appropriate though
it may be for clarifying the influence of industry on individual legislators) is that Republican bills, which
traditionally tend to favor industry more than Democratic bills, appear to be much more diverse in their
support. There is a normative argument to be had around whether that reflects "ground truth", and I
leave it to other research to have that argument. For now, suffice to say that comparisons ofmymeasure of
interest diversity across the twomajor parties are likely to be impacted by design of the interest taxonomy.
Second, my proposed measure of interest diversity is highly correlated with the number of organizations
lobbying on the bill. This could create two issues in hypothesis tests, particularly if interest diversity is
an independent variable. If the number of groups lobbying on the bill is not taken into account, then
they may confound any relationship between interest diversity and some other variable. On the other
hand, if the number of organizations are taken into account, e.g. through covariate adjustment, the
high correlation between number and diversity of organizations will likely introduce collinearity into
the model, which in expectation will artificially inflate the standard errors on both variables’ associated
coefficients. Models should still include both variables, and interpretation of results may need to be
modified to account for this feature of the data.
These issues with the measure of it notwithstanding, as an alternative to other sources of interest
group influence, interest diversity has a normative appeal. Because interest diversity is based on
connections between lawmakers and specific communities in their districts, legislators supporting bills
with diverse support are in all likelihood doing what a large number of their constituents would want
them to do. In this sense, if interest diversity is found to influence legislative outcomes – in a more




Lobbying Coalition Diversity and Interest Group Influence on Congressional
Priorities
What makes lobbying influential in the U.S. Congress? Observers and would-be reformers of Congress
often lament that lawmakers are drawn away from pursuit of the common good by the influence of
lobbyists representing wealthy special interests. This lament is not unfounded; since the latter half of
the twentieth century, lobbying and other forms of political spending have exploded, and lobbyists
themselves are ubiquitous in Washington. For example, in 2015 there were tens of thousands of
registered lobbyists, and lobbying expenditures totaled $3billion; during that election cycle, organizations
contributed nearly half a billion dollars to federal candidates’ campaigns through affiliated political
action committees (PACs). Lobbying’s sustained ubiquity suggests that interest groups and advocacy
organizations believe that their political investment is paying off, presumably in accrued policy influence.
However, evidence of such influence is mixed. Prior work has disagreed about the influence of
interest groups in driving legislative outcomes, as well as the factors that make groups influential.
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Gilens and Page 2014; Grossmann 2012a; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Burstein and
Linton 2002) This mixed record extends to whether differences in lobbying resources - particularly
campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures - lead to more influence on legislators’ behavior or
legislative outcomes. (Wawro 2001; Esterling 2007; Hall and Wayman 1990; Kalla and Broockman 2016;
Hojnacki, Marchetti, Baumgartner, Berry, Kimball and Leech 2015) Thus, the conditions under which
interest groups can influence lawmaking remain unclear. There are at least three conceptual reasons for
this lack of clarity. First, while lobbying manifests as communications between lobbyists and individual
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legislators, most individual legislators have little independent influence over the fate of legislation. Thus,
the noted relationships between lobbying strategies - particularly resource-based accounts of lobbying
intensity and campaign contributions - and legislative behavior may hold but have little impact on
congressional lawmaking. Second, while lobbyists want to change legislative outcomes, what they do
is attempt to facilitate or inhibit the movement of policy proposals through the the legislative process;
this process is marked by discrete stages in which different legislators, with different lobbying-relevant
attributes (e.g. expertise or campaign resources), hold power. Few recent studies have examined what
lobbying factors help or hinder bills’ progress through individual stages of the legislative process. Finally,
while understandable, the focus on resources (or near proxies thereof) as a source of influence has
hampered scholars’ ability to identify alternative sources of influence.
1
Can lower-resource groups "win"
inWashington? If so, how?
One potential alternative source of influence is diversity within lobbying coalitions. Such coalitions
form when several organizations coordinate their efforts on an issue for which they share a position.
Some coalitions are diverse - the organizations comprising them vary meaningfully in their general
policy preferences, their organizational styles, or the industries and social causes for which they advocate.
Phinney (2017), in the most in-depth treatment of coalition diversity to date, emphasizes how diverse
coalitions that formed around the various issues within the welfare reform initiative of the 1990s were
a product of issue-level dynamics; the competitiveness, salience, and policy uncertainty surrounding an
issue. Crosson and Heaney (2016), working across multiple policy areas, finds that lobbying coalition
leaders believe diversity is important in recruitingnewcoalitionmembers, particularlywhen the issue they
areworking on is competitive, when the coalition is relatively new, orwhen trying to ensure a bill’s passage
through the legislative process. This research is important for understanding howdiverse coalitions come
about, but cannot directly answer the question of whether diversity makes one side of a legislative debate
more likely to succeed.
This study demonstrates that the diversity among groups lobbying on a bill impacts that bill’s
1
The notable exception to this focus on resource-based arguments is the growing body of work on the role of interest
groups’ positions in networks of information transmission and policy collaboration. (McKay 2012a; Carpenter, Esterling and
Lazer 1998, 2003, 2004; Heaney 2006; Heaney and Lorenz 2013)
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consideration in committee. We develop a theory of indirect lobbying influence on chairs’ committee
agenda-setting decisions. According to this theory, committee chairs, in selecting bills for consideration
before their committee, balance their perception of bills’ electoral and policy value to them with their
predictions of those bills’ ability to move further in the legislative process. Lobbying influences the latter
prediction by changing the intensity of rank-and-file legislators’ support or opposition to a bill. To the
extent that one side of a bill (i.e. its supporters or opponents) is comprised of organizations representing a
relatively diverse array of industries, social causes, and other subconstituencies - a side attributewe refer to
as "interest diversity" - it will be more effective at mobilizing rank-and-file legislators. Observing interest
diversity, therefore, allows the chair to assess each side’s ability tomobilize other legislators and changes her
incentives to include the bill in her committee’s agenda in the first place. To test empirical expectations
arising from this argument, we analyze new data on over 13,000 organizations’ positions on over 5000
bills introduced in Congress between the 109th and 113th Congresses (2005 through 2014). We find that
the relative interest diversity of the lobbying coalitions supporting or opposing a bill is associated with
differences in the probability that that bill will receive consideration in committee. We further show that
these differences increase substantially among bills introduced bymajority partymembers during periods
of non-unified government, and argue that this indicates that it is indeed interest diversity’s impact on
bills’ legislative viability that makes it influential on committee agenda-setting decisions. We conclude by
discussing the implications of these findings for coalition leaders as well as for collective understanding
of the relationship between lawmaking and interest group influence.
4.1 locating lobbying’s legislative influence
Lobbying efforts influence legislators’ priorities more than their positions or votes. Indeed, legislators’
floor votes are dominated by party coordination, legislators’ personal ideology, and constituency
demands. (Fleck and Kilby 2002; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Snyder, Ansolabehere and Stewart 2001)
Because of this, votes are difficult to change through lobbying. Lobbyists appear to recognize this.
Among others, Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) have noted that legislators tend to direct lobbying toward
their existing allies. Meanwhile, Wawro, (2001) finds that PAC contributions do not cause members of
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Congress to vote in ways discordant with their policy preferences; instead, contributions go to legislators
already likely to support the group’s positions. This suggests that legislators’ floor votes are highly
constrained, and thus lobbying legislators to change their floor votes is unlikely to be a productive
lobbying strategy. However, legislators have substantiallymore discretion in how they allocate their time,
effort, and staff resources across issues. (Hall 1996; Fenno 1973; Sulkin 2005) This discretion, in turn,
makes legislators’ issue priorities muchmore amenable to lobbying than their votes. (Austen-Smith 1993;
Hall and Wayman 1990; Esterling 2007; Hall and Deardorff 2006) Thus, it is the intensity of individual
legislators’ preferences, rather than the preferences themselves, that lobbying can influence. However,
while lobbying activity is associated with the movement of bills through the legislative process and
with policy change, (Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Dusso 2010; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and
Baumgartner 2015) most individual legislators have neither the ability to move their own bills through
the legislative process, (Volden and Wiseman 2014) are not able to set the agendas of committees or the
floor, (Oleszek 2011) and do not occupy pivotal voting positions (c.f. Krehbiel 1998) they might leverage
to gain attention to their issues. Thus, while we know that lobbyists can influence legislators’ personal
priorities, it is not clear how how this influence at the individual level is converted to influence on the fate
of legislation.
One potential site of lobbying’s influence on lawmaking is at the committee stage. Congressional
committees are targeted for and responsive to interest group pressure. Most lobbying efforts occur at
the committee stage and target relevant committee members. (Drutman 2010; Hojnacki and Kimball
1998, 1999) In the aggregate, it has been shown repeatedly that lobbyists respond to the policy agendas
of congressional committees, such that issue areas on which lobbyists are active are much more likely
be those of congressional committees than the issue areas associated economic activity, federal outlays,
public salience, and the President’s policy priorities. (Leech et al. 2005; Baumgartner et al. 2011; LaPira,
Thomas and Baumgartner 2014) This lobbying focus on committees not onlymakes individual lobbying
efforts more successful, (Evans 1996) but also facilitates mututal reputation-building between lobbyists
and legislators that leads to long-term partnerships. (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Ainsworth 1997;
DeGregorio 1997) Once these relationships are established, committees come to rely on signals from
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regulated interests - in particular, a lack of conflict between them - as an indication to consider policy
changes. (Price 1978)Given the close relationships between interest groups and the committees that cover
the areas important to their interests, lobbyist influence is most likely to occur at the committee stage.
However, while existing work importantly demonstrates an association between government activity
and lobbying, these studies do not suggest a mechanism for this association. Thus, committees are where
interest groups’ lobbying efforts aremost likely be influential, but at this point it is unclear what lobbying
influences in committee, or what factors make lobbying more likely to succeed in doing so.
One part of committee deliberations that may be amenable to lobbying are committees’ legislative
agendas. The committee stage remains a critical winnowing point in the legislative process, with many
bills’ ultimate fate being neglect by the committee to which they were referred. (Adler and Wilkerson
2012; Krutz 2005) Key to committee agenda-setting processes are committee chairmen. Granted power
over their committee’s schedule and the contents of hearings, (Oleszek 2011) committee chairs have
the nominal ability to determine which bills are considered in their committee and which are ignored.
However, existing research on committee agenda-setting itself focuses on the informational and political
constraints committee chairs face inmaking agenda-setting decisions. Krutz (2005) argues that committee
agenda-setting serves to winnow the immense set of bills referred to a committee down to just the few
that will move through the legislative process. Given the enormity of such a task, the primary obstacle to
effective committee agenda-setting is informational - i.e. how to identifywhich bills are best for advancing
one’s policy goals. Under such constraints, chairs employ heuristics - a co-partisan sponsor, signs of costly
effort, and cosponsorships - to identify which bills to allow onto the agenda. Evans (2001), rather than
examining how committee chairs identify their preferred bills, examines the constraints on chairs’ ability
to promote them. The primary such constraint is political: when committee members’ preferences on an
issue are heterogeneous and intense, it is more difficult for committee leaders tomove legislation through
the committee. This suggests that the ability to find consensus among committee members is a key skill
for effective committee leadership.
2
Elsewhere (Lorenz 2015), we demonstrate that new committee chairs
2
Fleisher and Bond (1983) find that consensus among committee members is key to committees’ ability to prevent floor
amendments to committee-approved bills. This suggests that committee leaders capable of finding consensus in committee,
or who face committees with relatively homogenous or non-intense preferences, aremore likely to be able to protect their bills
on the floor.
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have some discretion to redirect the priorities of their committees towards the issue areas they prioritize.
Together, these studies suggest that chairs are active participants in setting their committee’s agenda,
but are also constrained by limited information and the need to anticipate the policy preferences of
downstream legislative actors. To the extent that it can affect chairs’ efforts to overcome these constraints,
lobbying can influence committee chairs’ agenda-setting decisions.
However, lobbying committee chairs is unlikely to succeed. Existing theories of lobbying and
persuasion find that lobbyists gain influence by helping legislators overcome a limitation in one of
several respects: campaign resources, (Denzau andMunger 1986;Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder
2003) information about ongoing policy debates, (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Schnakenberg 2017;
Hansen 1991) or capacity to work on different legislative issues. (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Bauer, Pool
and Dexter 1964; Milbrath 1963) However, in each of these respects, committee chairs are significantly
advantaged over other legislators. Indeed, compared to other legislators, chairs generally accrue higher
levels of campaign contributions, (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Esterling 2007; Fouirnaies 2017)
have higher levels of expertise, activity, and interest in their committees’ issue areas, (Volden andWiseman
2014) and have separate, additional staff dedicated specifically to chair’s needs in committee. (Deering
and Smith 1997) Because of these advantages, existing theories of lobbyist influence would generally
predict that chairs, compared to other legislators, should be less influenced by individual attempts at
lobbying the chair herself. This leaves two possibilities. Perhaps lobbying does not influence committee
agenda-setting, and interest groups influence some other aspect of the policy or legislative process. On
the other hand, interest group influence on committee agenda-setting may arise from groups’ ability to
mobilize individual rank-and-file legislators. The question remains, how?
4.2 committee agenda-setting and the lobbying of rank-and-file
legislators
Building from several assumptions about committee agendas and lobbying, we describe a theory that
connects the lobbying of individual legislators to changes in committee agendas. In this theory,
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policy-motivated committee chairs infer the value and legislative viability of different proposals before
their committee by learning the interests at stake on a given bill. This learning is possible because
organizations representing these interests actively lobby legislators on the bill. This lobbying affects
how legislators allocate their attention, and thus whether they provide a bill with sustained support as
it moves through the legislative process. By appealing to a broad set of legislators, lobbying can build or
undermine this supportive coalition and thus affect the likelihood that a bill willmake legislative progress.
Anticipating this coalition-building, chairs adapt their agenda-setting decisions according to the lobbying
taking place on a bill.
Assumptions
Wemake several important assumptions.
3
First, Committee chairs have substantial discretion over some
portion of their committee’s scarce agenda space. While party leaders do tend to get involved in highly
salient issues where the parties diverge, for other issues (and even for technical details of salient or partisan
issues) chairs retain substantial control over their committee’s agenda.
4
(Maltzman 1997; Aldrich and
Rohde 2001; Berry and Fowler 2015; Adler andWilkerson 2012; Lorenz 2015; Walker 1977)
Second, legislators, including committee chairs, are policy motivated, especially in the issue areas of
their committees’ jurisdiction. (Kingdon 1989) Legislators strategically engage in costly work that serves
to promote legislation. (Hall 1996; Wawro 2000) Moving legislation through the legislative process not
only serves any policy goals a legislator might have, but also allows them to more credibly claim credit
with their constituents (Hall 1996) and to develop a reputation for legislative effectiveness that can be a
source influence within their chamber. (Fenno 1973; Volden andWiseman 2014)
Third, once a chair allocates consideration to a bill, the bill only becomes law if several key legislators
3
In addition to the common assumption that all actors are rational and thereby intend tomake decisions that further their
personal objectives, given their incentives and the information they possess. We also assume that lobbying is costly and that
chairs canobservewhich groups are lobbying on abill prior tomaking a decision aboutwhether to grant that bill consideration.
4
Readers familiar with the recent research on Congress might argue that chairs are highly constrained agents of the
majority party. Indeed, chairs are now selected primarily for their party loyalty and fundraising ability, (Jenkins and Stewart
2016; Deering and Wahlbeck 2006; Cann 2008, though see also Kellermann and Shepsle 2009) and are rewarded with
bill-writing authority to the extent they support party positions. (Bendix 2016) While these may be the case, they do not
necessarily imply that committee chairs have nodiscretion - just that theymaybe expected tohelp the collective party enterprise
and not create problems that would demand the party leadership’s attention.
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in both chambers all approve it, as well as the President. To be reported (i.e. passed) from committee
to the chamber floor, a bill must secure the approval of a simple majority of committee members (in
addition to the committee chair). This can be difficult if the committee is polarized or intensely interested
in the bill’s issue area. (Evans 2001) In both chambers, the majority party shapes the floor agenda to its’
members’ benefit. (Cox andMcCubbins 2005; Den Hartog andMonroe 2011; Aldrich and Rohde 2001)
On the chamber floor, for most bills, pivotal voters’ preferences determine whether a bill can lead to a
lasting policy change. (Krehbiel 1998) Then the equivalents of all these actors must be satisfied in the
other chamber, and the bill must avoid the president’s veto. Any one of these actors can unilaterally kill
a bill by voting against it at the appropriate stage of the legislative process.
Fourth, committee chairs and other legislators estimate the legislative viability of bills with
uncertainty. (Kingdon 1995, 1989; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Krehbiel 1991; Arnold 1990) Legislators
are constantly inundated with information about different public problems and policy alternatives for
addressing them. Prioritizing under these conditions is challenging. (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) Even
once priorities are set, choosing policy alternatives is difficult for two reasons. First is the disconnect
between the language chosen for a bill and the consequences - both material and electoral - of that bill.
Second, because legislators generally take positions on legislation they are not directly involved with only
after that legislation has been initially put on the legislative agenda, a committee chairman evaluating a
bill’s prospects for passage must predict the positions and potential opposition among legislators to a bill
without being able to observe that opposition prior to granting the bill consideration.
Finally, lobbying may affect the activities of rank-and-file legislators who share the preferences of
the interest group or whose reelection depends on satisfying the interests represented by the group.
(Esterling 2007; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Austen-Smith 1993; Hall and Deardorff
2006; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hansen 1991; Wright 1990; Kollman 1998) Lobbying manifests as
an interaction between lobbyists and the individual legislators they seek to influence. That influence
may involve granting the interest group access to the legislator (Hansen 1991; Hall and Lorenz 2015; Kalla
and Broockman 2016) or increasing involvement in the group’s issues. (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall
and Wayman 1990; Esterling 2007) The most relevant implication of this is that lobbying can, under
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sharedpreferences and issuepriorities,mobilize legislators sharing the group’s preferences tomore actively
support or oppose a bill.
The Committee Chair’s Calculus
Given the foregoing assumptions, we can characterize the committee chair C’s decision-making as the
allocation of scarce agenda space among bills referred to her
5
committee. In doing so, she is free
to allocate agenda space in order to maximize her own utility. Specifically, C seeks to allocate her
committee’s agenda across bills b ∈ B (where B is the set of bills referred to C’s committee) such that
she maximizes the utility she expects to gain from her committee’s agenda subject to her committee’s
consideration budget constraint. Thus, she is trying to find max
∑
b∈B(EUC(b|Consideration),
where EUC(b|Consideration) is the expected utility to the chair from a bill b given that it is granted
consideration.
Chairs evaluate bills referred to their committee in order to optimally allocate a budget of committee
consideration in a given period. Because the chair, like other legislators, is incentivized to pass valuable
legislation and has some discretion over her committee’s agenda, she will preferentially allocate the
committee’s agenda to proposals likely to remit benefits to her directly. However, because the chair’s
utility is derived from policy changes and policy changes require the assent of pivotal legislators at various
stages, a chair’s valuation of a bill will be conditioned by her assessment of the likelihood that it will pass.
Thus, for each b ∈ B, C thus has expected utility: EUC(b) = VC(b) × Prb(Pass|Consideration),
where VC(b) is the value of b toC andPrb(Pass|Consideration) is the probability that bwill pass the
chamber, given thatC grants it consideration.
Given this utility calculus, the chair’s revealed priorities (i.e. her committee’s agenda) will be ordered
as follows:
1. Bills where VC(b) is high and Prb(Pass|Consideration) is High.
5
For clarity in the prose, we refer to committee chairmen with feminine pronouns, lobbyists with male pronouns, and
other legislators with the singular or plural "they" and related pronouns.
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2. Bills where VC(b) is high but Prb(Pass|Consideration) is Low OR Bill where
Prb(Pass|Consideration) is high and VC(b) is positive but low.
3. Bills where Prb(Pass|Consideration) and VC(b) are positive but low.6
A chair’s agenda-setting decisions depend upon her perception of bills’ value (VC(b)) and prospects
(Prb(Pass|Consideration)) with respect to potential topics of committee consideration. Forces
that influence VC(b) and Prb(Pass|Consideration) thus influence committee chairs’ agenda-setting
decisions.
Interest group lobbying may help a committee chair overcome a critical challenge. This challenge is
that the chair has incomplete information about bills’ legislative viability. The chair, seeking to improve
her inferences about the effectiveness of her agenda-setting decisions, will look for cues in the political
environment. (Krutz 2005; Simon 1985) Lobbying provides such cues because of how groups select into
lobbying. To the extent that lobbying is costly, groups lobby only on issues where they have interests
at stake. Groups represent defined (if not necessarily narrow) sets of interests, industries, social groups,
and other sub-constituencies. Thus the set of groups lobbying on a bill can be informative about the
interests at stake in the bill. The chair has the opportunity to observe lobbying prior to granting a bill
consideration, and thus can benefit from this information in doing so.
Lobbying can affect the chair’s perception of the probability that a bill willmake substantial legislative
progress. Lobbying does so by modifying the direction and intensity of rank-and-file legislators’ policy
preferences. This feeds directly into a bill’s legislative viability. Tomake legislative progress and ultimately
pass, a bill needs many individual legislators’ sustained efforts and support. In particular, each additional
stage of legislative progress requires satisfying at least as broad a range of actors as were required to get
to and pass the previous stages.
7
Because of this, ultimately passing a bill requires a potentially very wide
range of legislators’ simultaneous active support. Lobbying can affect a legislator’s intensity of support
6
We assume that the chair will exert her agenda power block legislation where VC(b) is ultimately negative or where
Prb(Pass|Consideration) equals zero.
7
This is because at each legislative stage the additional agenda-setter or pivotal voter is either more extreme in their policy
preferences than those from previous stages or not. If they are more extreme, it broadens the range of legislators whomust be
simultaneously satisfied in order to get to andmove on from that stage. If the pivotal voter at the latest stage is as or less extreme
than others, then getting to and passing that stage requires the same breadth of legislative appeal as did getting through the
previous stages.
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for legislation to the extent that a lobbyist and target legislator share policy preferences or issue priorities.
(Hall and Deardorff 2006; Austen-Smith andWright 1994; Kingdon 1989) The ability to mobilize many
legislators toward one position on a bill affects whether that bill has the broad appeal necessary to pass.
Because a chair is incentivized to grant consideration to legislatively viable bills, the influence of lobbyists
on the breadth of a bill’s appeal affects the chair’s calculus in granting that bill initial consideration. Thus,
the factors that allow the groups on one side of a bill to appeal to many legislators make those groups
more influential over committee chairs’ agenda-setting decisions.
8
Lobbying Side Attributes and Inferring Legislative Viability
Interest group influence does not happen in isolation. In most cases, more than one group is lobbying
on a bill at any given time. Groups often clash on particular issues, (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay
2012b) thus formingwhat Baumgartner et al. (2009) refer to as two lobbying "sides"- supporters of a policy
proposal ("status quo challengers") and opponents of that proposal ("status quo defenders"). Within a
side, interest groups routinely lobby as part of formal or informal coalitions with one another. (Hula
1999; Hojnacki 1997; Phinney 2017) These distinctions between sides are important; recent scholarship
has found that interest group policy influence is a function of the attributes of coalitions and sides rather
than of individual groups. (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Heaney 2006; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Mahoney and
Baumgartner 2015; Nelson and Yackee 2012) This analysis focuses on three such side attributes. The first
two attributes - side size and campaign contribution levels - come from prior accounts of how lobbying
influences committee action. In contrast to these, the theory developed here contends that chairs benefit
from having a reputation for promoting successful legislation. As we describe below, the diversity of the
industries and causes favoring (or opposing) a bill can indicate its legislative viability, and thus inform
chairs’ choices to promote committee agenda-setting. To the extent that each of these attributes weighs
on chairs’ agenda-setting decisions, their balance across interest group sides is expected to condition a bill’s
8
While they do not ask specifically about legislative viability, Baumgartner et al. (2009) do find that roughly eleven percent
of their lobbyist respondents included assessments of the bill’s support or opposition among other constituencies or other
members of Congress in their arguments in support or opposition to a bill. While not necessary for this study’s theory to
hold, the fact that lobbyists do use such arguments with some regularity suggests that they believe legislators may be swayed
by them.
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probability of committee consideration.
Side Attributes: Size
General alignment of interest groups across lobbying sides can have a substantial impact on whether
a policy change is adopted. Gilens and Page (2014) find that the balance of interest group alignments
between those supporting and those opposing a policy change is an important predictor of policy
adoption, even when controlling for the preferences of middle-income citizens and economic elites. This
might be because legislators tend to know which individual organizations tend to agree with them on
matters of policy, and may follow signals from these groups. (Kingdon 1989) Having a large number of
organizations on one side might indicate that side’s collective clout or ability to persuade legislators to
their cause. Thus, larger sides may be more likely to prevail.
Expectation 1: To the extent that the set of interest groups supporting a bill is larger (i.e. has more
groups) than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted consideration
However, there are two reasons to doubt that it is sheer numbers that makes a lobbying side effective.
First, this assumes that the ability to mobilize a given legislator is equal and/or randomly distributed
across group-legislator pairs. This is unlikely to be the case because lobbyists tend to get more access
to their allies. (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998) Second, coordinated coalition
work has been shown to be quite costly for individual coalition members. (Hojnacki 1997) It would be
counterproductive to engage in coalitionwork among groups on a side unless that coordination provided
benefits beyond what the members could accomplish on their own. Thus, we turn to considering how
the composition of a side may inform committee agenda-setting decisions regardless of its raw size.
Side Attributes: Campaign Contributions
One of the most common concerns about the role of organized interests in policymaking is their
ability to direct tremendous amounts of money to legislators’ campaigns. Campaign contributions can
incentivize individual legislators to get involved in issues, (Esterling 2007; Hall and Wayman 1990) to
grant access, (Kalla and Broockman 2016) to introduce legislation, (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999)
86
and, in committee if not on the floor, to win the votes of undecided legislators. (Denzau and Munger
1986; Grier and Munger 1993; Wawro 2001; Witko 2006) Unsurprisingly, they are also coordinated with
groups’ lobbying activities. (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Ansolabehere, Jr and Tripathi 2002) While the
relationship between resources and policy success has appeared inconsistent, (Hojnacki et al. 2012) recent
evidence suggests that that is because its effects occur at the side-level rather than at the individual level.
(McKay 2012a; Baumgartner et al. 2009;Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015) That is, rather than examining
the resources of individual groups lobbying on a bill, legislators are believed to compare the campaign
resources (among other types of lobbying resources) amassed by interests across both sides of the bill and
act according to the balance of these resources.
Expectation 2: To the extent the set of interest groups supporting a bill has higher levels of campaign
contributions than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted consideration.
Side Attributes: Interest Diversity
Legislators respond to organizations based not just on the characteristics of the organization itself, but
on the interests it represents. Each organized interest group represents a subconstituency based around
some shared political interest, be it an industry, a demographic group, a local organization, or social cause.
Legislators rely on a coalition of subconstituencies in their district to ensure their reelection. (Fenno 1978)
Legislators are rewarded for working on the issue areas that matter to these subconstituencies, and grant
access to organizations that represent them. (Hansen 1991; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998) However, each
group is individually only able to appeal to a subset of legislators this way: i.e. those whose reelection
prospects rely on the subconstituencies that the group represents. Thus, individual interest groups are
unlikely to influence legislative agendas this way.
A lobbying side can collectively overcome this limitation by having a wide range of subconstituencies
among its members. We define a lobbying side’s "interest diversity" as the number of distinct
sub-constituencies represented among its members. For example, consider two interest group sides of
a hypothetical healthcare bill: one side consists of three pharmaceutical companies; the other consists
of one doctors’ association, one health insurance carrier, and one health consumer advocacy group.
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While the two sides are of equal size - three organizations - the second side is more diverse because
the interests represented by its member groups are more distinct from one another. Focusing on
the policy proposals allowed into welfare reform, Phinney (2017) develops a model wherein interest
diversity
9
provides several benefits to an interest group coalition: First, by fostering synergies between
the various tactical skills and networks possessed by each member organization; Second, by sending a
more heterogeneous, and hence more credible, signal to legislators; Third, because diverse coalitions are
harder to maintain that homogeneous ones, the signal they collectively send is costlier and, hence, more
credible. Thus, bills favored by a diverse set of interests have the appearance of being "better" bills than
those favored by a narrow set, all else equal. Apart from these, the more diverse a lobbying side, the more
likely any individual legislator will be to find members of that side that represent important reelection
sub-constituencies (Hansen 1991) for thempersonally, or thatwill represent a cause or industry that shares
their ideological predilections. (see e.g. Bonica 2014) Thus, through both collective and individual-level
mechanisms, interest diversity on a side ought to allow that side to appeal to a wide range of legislators.
There is evidence that coalition leaders often foster and promote their coalition’s diversity. Both
Phinney (2017) and Crosson andHeaney (2016) find that lobbyists actively promote the interest diversity
of their coalitions to legislators. To the extent they do so, it means that legislators, including committee
chairs, are likely to be made aware of a side’s interest diversity. Because the ability to appeal to a wide
range of legislators is important for shaping a bill’s legislative viability, and interest diversity on a side helps
that side appeal to a wide range of legislators, interest diversity is a useful heuristic for chairs assessing the
legislative viability of bills. Thus, we expect that to the extent that one lobbying side exhibitsmore interest
diversity than the other, it is more likely to get its preferred outcome in committee agenda-setting.
Expectation 3: To the extent that the set of interest groups supporting a bill is higher in interest diversity
than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted committee consideration.
9
The concept of interest diversity discussed here is something of a combination ofwhat Phinney (2017) calls "professional"
diversity and "domain" diversity, and is roughly equivalent to what Crosson and Heaney (2016) refer to as "issue" diversity.
It does not directly capture the ideological diversity of a coalition, though a side comprised of many different interests is
presumably more likely to have variance in policy preferences as well.
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4.3 data and research design
Data Sources
To test these expectations, we model the progress of bills through committee as a function of contextual
factors as well as attributes of the sets of interest groups taking positions either for (supporters) or against
(opponents) it. To capture committee consideration of bills, we use data from the Congressional Bills
Project (CBP) and the legislative tracking website Govtrack (www.govtrack.us). We also use the CBP,
along with information taken from the Policy Agendas Project (PAP), to account for various contextual
factors that are known to impact committee agenda-setting and that interest groups are likely to be aware
of when deciding lobbying activity.
Testing the empirical expectations outlined above requires data on interest groups’ positions, ideally
across many bills. Many lobbying studies rely on data gleaned from reports filed under the Lobby
Disclosure Act (LDA). LDA reports contain information about many groups’ lobbying activities across
issues, and to a certain extent contain information about specific bills lobbied by a reporting group. These
are useful formeasuring the overall level of interest groups’ activity on large numbers of bills (Grossmann
and Pyle 2013) or issue areas. (Baumgartner et al. 2011; LaPira, Thomas and Baumgartner 2014; Leech
et al. 2005) However, LDA reports do not normally contain information about registrants’ positions
on a particular bill, making them unsuitable to testing this study’s empirical expectations. The second
common source of data is to interview or survey lobbyists. (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009; Victor 2007;
Heinz, Laumann,Nelson and Salisbury 1993, amongmany others) These can glean nuanced information
about groups’ positions on bills (or parts of bills), but the high cost of conducting interviews means
that they are often limited to small numbers of issues or bills (c.f. Baumgartner and Leech 1998, for a
discussion) and they are limited by respondent lobbyists’ perspectives and biases. Thus, neither common
source of lobbying data is optimal for present purposes.
We introduce new data on the positions taken by organizations on congressional legislation. The
non-profit, non-partisan organizationMaplight (www.maplight.org) documents the public positions
taken by interest groups, advocacy groups, institutions, and firms on specific bills, beginning in the 109th
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Congress (2005-2006) and continuing through the present. To perform this documentation, Maplight
researchers examine news stories, blogs, websites as well as letters sent by organizations to members
of Congress. To date,
10
Maplight has documented 67,827 positions taken by approximately 13,000
organizations on over 5,390 bills introduced during the 109th to 113th Congresses. Each documented
position includes the bill number, the organization’s name, the organization’s industry or cause
11
, the
disposition of the organization on that bill (supporting, opposing, or other
12
), and the citation by which
Maplight determined the organization’s interest in and position on that bill. We collected these data using
Maplight’s application programming interface (API).
13
Sampling
This analysis includes all 4757 regular
14
House (H.R) and Senate (S.) bills during the 109th to 113th
Congresses for which Maplight has documented at least one interest group position. These comprise
as large a set of "newsworthy"
15
bills as possible rather than a random sample of bills. Maplight data thus
has at least one
16
potential issue. This issue is selection on the dependent variable: this analysis models
10
the data used in this paper were collected fromMaplight in February 2016.
11
These are coded according to an industry/cause taxonomy developed by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP)
12
In the analyses reported in this paper, we treat dispositions of "NA" as neutral, an indication of the attention a bill is
receiving attention without including that group in either the supporting or opposing side
13
Maplight data on individual bills has been used in prior political science research that has been focused on individual
cases. (Broz 2014; Galantucci 2015; Laposata, Kennedy andGlantz 2014;Moore, Powell and Reeves 2013) The present analysis,
as far as we are aware, is the first in political science to use Maplight’s entire dataset.
14
While theMaplight dataset includes a number of bills that are appropriations and reauthorization bills, we exclude them
from these analyses. For both appropriations and reauthorizations, lobbying is likely to consist of asking for amendments
to a planned bill (e.g. a change in a proposed funding level or tweak to an existing program. Thus, while the data include
over 5000 bills, these analyses include only about 4700 of them. Appropriations bills were, per the process undertaken by
Grossmann and Pyle (2013) identified as including in their bill titles any of the following strings: "making appropriations",
"making supplemental appropriations", "emergency supplemental appropriations", "making miscellaneous appropriations",
and "supplemental appropriations". Similarly, reauthorization bills were identified by those including the string "reauthorize"
in their extended titles. The substantive results reported in this paper are robust to including either set of bills, or both, in the
model.
15
Maplight describes its process for selecting bills for research as follows (http://maplight.org/us-congress/
guide/data/support-opposition, retrieved March 28, 2016.): "Our research team has gathered support/opposition
data for thousands of bills to date. We gather this data for newsworthy bills: bills that move forward in Congress or that are
mentioned in the news or blogs. We do not research support/opposition for ceremonial bills (such as naming post offices)."
16
A second concern stems from the fact that the extent of bill coverage in Maplight’s data has changed over time. The
number of bills for which Maplight collected interest groups’ bill positions started very small in the 109th Congress (before
Maplight’s predecessor began focusing resources on collecting data for Congress) and has since stayed at about 9 percent of
bills actually introduced before Congress during this period. This may be due to there simply being more bills garnering
the attention Maplight uses to identify organizations’ positions in later years. More likely is that it may be due to potential
variation in the resources Maplight had available for bill position research at different points in time. Regardless, it is possible
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the progress of bills through committee, but progress through committee is itself one (sufficient but not
necessary) criterion by whichMaplight selects bills for research. Indeed, the CBP reports that while only
7 percent of bills in the 109th to 113th Congresses received consideration in committee in their chamber of
origin, about 21 percent of bills with group positions documented byMaplight over the same time period
were reported from committee. Sample selection procedures correlatedwith the dependent variable tend
to attenuate causal effect estimates. (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) This attenuation suggests, all else
equal, that the true effects of interest group lobbying side composition on committee agenda-settingmay
be larger than those indicated by the results of the analysis presented here.
The Dependent Variable: Committee Consideration
My theory concerns the allocation of consideration to bills in committee. Recent empirical studies of
lawmaking have relied on legislative progress variables included in the Congressional Bills Project (CBP)
dataset. The CBP dataset contains a pair of variables
17
indicating whether the bill was reported by a
committee in each chamber. As a baseline, we collected for each bill whether the CBP indicates that a
committee in the bill’s chamber of origin Reported the bill. However, whether or not a bill is reported
from committee is an imprecise measure of whether it was "considered" by the committee. A committee
having reported the bill indicates that the chair granted the bill a vote, and that a majority of committee
members voted to report thebill favorably. Abill being reported thus indicates that itwas both considered
and approved.
Committee action prior to reporting a bill also indicates that the committee chair has granted the bill
costly agenda space. Prior to reporting, bills may be granted hearings (where witness testimony, usually
from representatives of interest groups and relevant firms) and markups (sessions where amendments
to the bill are considered). We focus on markups, because the act of holding a markup implies that
that someCongresses have better data than others, inways that introduce unpredictable biases into the analyses presented hers.
In order to ensure that the results reported below are robust to such temporal variation in data quality, we reestimated every
model reported below on iterative subsamples, each excluding one Congress (i.e. first rerunning themodels with observations
from the 109th Congress removed, then running the models with observations from the 110th Congress removed, etc.). The
results reported below are robust to these tests.
17
In the June 2015 version of the dataset, these variables are "reporth" and "reports" for whether the bill was reported from
a House committee or a Senate committee, respectively.
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the chair has decided to allow the bill to tentatively move forward. (Evans 2001; Oleszek 2011) It is the
most definitive indication, prior to a report, that a bill is on the committee agenda. To collect which
bills have received markup, we used web scraping to gather records of bills’ legislative progress compiled
by Govtrack. These include, for each committee to which a bill was referred, whether the committee
held markups on or reported the bill. For each bill, if any full committee in the bill’s chamber of origin
marked-up the bill, we recorded the bill as having received a Markup. Similarly, if any full committee
in the bill’s chamber of origin reported the bill, we recorded the bill as having received Reporting from
committee. To capture whether a bill received either form of consideration, we construct a combined
Markup or Reporting variable.18 The four variables that measure committee consideration - Reported
(CBP), Markup (Govtrack), Reporting (Govtrack), andMarkup or Reporting (Govtrack) - are highly but
not perfectly correlated (the minimum correlation between them is r = 0.72). We estimate my primary
model on each of these measures.
Independent Variables: Lobbying Side Attributes
This study, in line with recent work on interest group influence, argues that attributes of the sets
of organizations lobbying for and against a bill are associated with its progress through committee.
These attributes are the side’s size, campaign contributions, and, as predicted from this study’s theory,
interest diversity. For PAC contributions and interest diversity, rather than measuring attributes of the
specific organizations themselves, we examine their effects at the "interest" level - that is, not the specific
organization, but the industry or cause it represents. There are 430 industries and causes within the CRP
taxonomy.
19
Descriptive statistics for these variables are depicted in Figure 4.1 and presented in full in
Table 4.3 in the Appendix.
18
In practice, a bill going to markup is highly though not perfectly correlated with it being reported (r = 0.88).
19
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has developed a detailed taxonomy of "interest groups", allocating
organizations to sectors (e.g. Healthcare vs. Agriculture), subsectors (e.g. Building Trade Unions vs. Transportation Unions,
within the "Labor" sector) and finally the specific cause or industry (e.g. Foreign Policy Hawks vs. Foreign Policy Doves,
within the "Foreign&Defense Policy" subsector, within the "Ideology/Single Issue" sector); themost specific of these is coded
as the organization’s "interest group". For more information about these codes and how CRP assigns them to campaign
contributions in particular, we refer the interested reader to CRP’s methodology page (http://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/methodology.php, accessed August 19th, 2016). Maplight applies these codes to the organizations that it
finds positions for, according to the particular organization’s reasons for lobbying a particular bill. More information can be
found on its bill positions API page (http://maplight.org/apis/bill-positions, access August 19th, 2016)
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Figure 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
(a) One-way plots of means of dichotomous variables
(b) Violin plot of continuous variables
Net Supporters’ Side Size. mean 6.234 sd 21.722. This variable is simply the number of organizations
identified as supporting the bill minus the number identified as having opposed it. Expectation 1 holds
that when one side is comprised of more individual organizations than another, the side with more
organizations lobbying is expected to win.
20
20
At the same time, including this variable allows me to disentangle the number of groups lobbying on a bill from the
number of interests lobbying on a bill. There is an obvious relationship between the number of groups on a side and its
diversity. Namely, a side’s interest diversity is also its minimum size: thus, to an extent an interest group side is diverse, it is also
large, but there are large coalitions that are not diverse.
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Net Supporters’ Campaign Contributions - $2,675,000 increments. mean 3.344, sd 14.320. Expectation
2 holds that to the extent that the organizations supporting a bill represent interests with higher levels
of campaign contributions than those of organizations opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to receive
committee consideration. Using the interest group codes assigned by Maplight to each organization in
its bill positions data, we tally the total PAC contributions of each code appearing on a side, from the
election cycle duringwhich the bill in questionwas introduced.
21
Then, tomeasure the relative advantage
of the bill’s supporters over their opponents, we simply net the opponents’ total contributions out of
supporters’ total contributions. Thus, negative values of this variable indicate that the opposing interests
gave more contributions than supporting interests. For ease of presentation, we scale the variable in
increments of $2,675,000. This is the number of voting members of Congress (535) multiplied by the
maximum an individual PAC can give to an individual candidate in a single election cycle ($5000).
22
Thus, a one-unit increase in this variable is equivalent to one additional interest (i.e. industry or cause)
supporting a bill giving the maximum contribution allowable (from a single PAC) to every member of
Congress.
Net Supporters’ Interest Diversity. mean 3.153, sd 8.948. Expectation 3 holds that if a side’s interest
diversity rather than its size that makes it able to appeal to a wide range of legislators. In the Maplight
data, each organization on each side of a bill is given an interest group category code from the CRP
taxonomyof industries and issue causes. Tomeasure the diversity of an interest group side, we identify the
number of unique such codes on a side. Thus, to return to the earlier example a side composed of three
pharmaceutical companies (all ofwhichhave the same "interest group code") has an interest diversity score
of 1, while a side composed of one health insurer, one doctor’s association, and one healthcare consumer
21
Two issues arise with counting this data. The first is that many organizations from the same industry or cause (and
therefore having the same interest group code) might line up on one side of a bill. In these cases, we double count (or triple
count, if the code appears three times on a side, etc.) the contributions from that code. The second issue is that sometimes
members of an industry or cause are split on a particular bill. Because we include that code’s contributions on both sides,
they effectively cancel each other out in the "Net PACContributions" measure. By double-counting potentially unevenly split
interests, we account for the relative weight of that code’s organizations among those lobbying for and against the bill.
22
For additional context, according to the CRP, in the 2013-2014 cycle only four PACs gave $2,675,000 or more to federal
candidates, even including affiliate PACs (e.g. the state affiliates of national organizations) and individual contributions from
employees of the PAC, which are not counted against the PAC’s limit. The four PACs in question were those affiliated with
the National Association of Realtors, the National BeerWholesalers Association, Honeywell International, and the National
Auto Dealers Association.
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advocacy group (all of which have different codes) would have an interest diversity score of 3. To discern
the advantage or disadvantage in interest diversity that a bill’s supporting organizations have relative to
the bill’s opposing organizations, we subtract the latter from the former, producing a net interest diversity
score. Thus, a one-unit increase in this variable means, all else equal, that the supporting organizations
gained one additional industry or cause on their side.
Controlling for Circumstances that Generate Diverse Coalitions
Coalition diversity does not arise randomly across issues. Phinney (2017) finds that interest diversity is
more likely to arise when issues exhibit three characteristics: One, high salience to lawmakers, interest
groups and the general public; Two, uncertainty about the bill’s policy effects and political consequences;
and Three, a highly competitive debate over the issue where there is opposition but the sides are close
enough that a new member on either side might tip the scales. Because these factors are known to be
associated with both policy success and interest diversity, they are potential confounds to any estimated
relationship between them. If these are also correlated with committee advancement, then they may
confound any estimated association between interest diversity and committee agenda-setting. To the
extent possible, we control for them to avoid this potential omitted variable bias.
23
Interest Group Competitiveness: -|# of Supporters - # of Opponents|. mean -9.424, sd 20.54.
Interest groups are more likely to join coalitions working on a proposal when the probability that their
participation will determine the success or failure of the proposal is higher. We capture this dynamic
by determining how close the number of organizations on each side of a bill is to that on the other side.
Specifically, we subtract thenumber of opponents from thenumber of supporters, take the absolute value
of that difference, and then multiply that absolute value by -1. The resulting quantity is a non-positive
23
Readers may notice that, though "political or policy uncertainty" is a factor encouraging interest diversity, we do not
control for it in the models reported below. There is to the best of my knowledge no common way of measuring this across
many different issue areas. In various robustness tests, we used the bill’s number as a rough estimate of this uncertainty: while
some bills introduced in many Congresses have some reason to keep a specific number, many do not. Thus, a lower bill
number, e.g. "H.R. 70" is likely to be a carryover from a previous Congress, while a bill with a high number, e.g. "H.R. 6500" is
more likely to be a new introduction. If onemakes the assumption that bills that have been sponsored over multiple Congress
are more widely understood than new bills, then it is possible to take a bill’s number as an indication of the relative certainty
around that bill. Regardless of the validity of this assumption, when bill number was included in the models presented below
it was, in each case, substantively negligible and statistically insignificant.
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number that captures how closely matched the two sides are: if the supporters or opponents greatly
outnumber the other side, then this number will be very negative; as the number of supporters and
opponents converge, this quantity gets closer to zero. Bills with evenly matched (and thus maximally
competitive) lobbying sides have a value of zero for this variable.
Interest Group Salience: Total # of Groups Lobbying. mean 12.538, sd 25.815. To measure this, we
examine the total number of organizations lobbying on the bill, summing the number of supporters, the
number of opponents, and the number of groups thatMaplight registered as lobbying on a bill but could
not identify a specific position on the bill. Controlling for interest group salience serves several functions
in the analyses presented here. First, the more salient an issue is among interest groups, the more likely
it is to generate lobbying from a wide range of actors. (Phinney 2017) Thus, salience among interest
groups is an important predictor of the diversity of each lobbying side, and thus may confound any
relationship between interest diversity and bill progress. Second, this variable accounts for Grossmann
and Pyle’s (2013) argument that the number of groups lobbying on a bill increases that bill’s probability of
legislative advancement, a possible confound to any association we find between lobbying side attributes
and legislative advancement. Finally, this variable accounts for potential reverse causation
24
in themodel.
Grossmann and Pyle (2013) find that more groups lobby a bill that advances through the legislative
process. Including this variable in mymodel allows me a somewhat larger measure of certainty about the
causal directionof anyobserved associationbetween lobbying side attributes and legislative advancement.
24
There are potential concerns about reverse causality between net interest diversity and committee consideration. Such
concerns would hold that, as a bill moves through the legislative process, not only do more organizations begin actively
lobbying on the bill (which I control for), but that more categories of interests would begin lobbying on the bill, and that new
entering categories would consistently support the bill. If true, this would introduce endogeneity into the models analyzed
here and bias the coefficient estimates on net interest diversity; in turn, this would threaten the validity of inferences drawn
about the causal relationship between net interest diversity and committee consideration. Previous work has shown that bills
that move further in the legislative process attract more organizations lobbying on them, necessitating that I control for the
number of groups lobbying on the bill. However, there is, to date, no evidence that this results in consistently more categories
of groups lobbying on, let alone that late-entry categories of interest groups would consistently favor, bills that move further
through the legislative process. Indeed, assuming that this were the case requires that a bill moving through the legislative
process effectively becomesmore relevant to, and supported by, a wider range of industries and social groups simply because it
is clearing stages of the legislative process and irrespective of the contents of the bill itself. This might hold in some specific cases,
but it is far less clear that it should hold systematically. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that net diversity of the organizations
lobbying on a bill, if not their number, is for the most part constant across the legislative process
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Factors that make a Bill More Likely to Advance
There are common institution- and sponsor- level factors thatmake a billmore likely to receive committee
consideration. As strategic actors and close observers of the legislative process, lobbyists are likely
to understand these factors and direct lobbying toward bills that are more likely to make legislative
progress. Controlling for these is thus necessary for avoiding omitted variable bias. We include an
indicator of whether the sponsor was aMajority Party Member of their chamber, indicators of whether
they were a Committee Member or Committee Chair for the bill’s committee of referral. These are
all factors that are commonly found to be associated with a bill’s advancement, particularly through
committee. (Krutz 2005; Evans 2001; Grossmann and Pyle 2013) We also include a Committee Member
x Majority Party Member interaction effect. A bill’s ability to garner a large Number of Cosponsors,
collected from Govtrack, is also a potential signal of its broad support, and thus is not only a potential
predictor of lobbying on a bill but also a potential confound of any relationship between interest
diversity and committee advancement. (Wilson and Young 1997) We measureUnified Government with
a dichotomous indicator for whether the Congress in question featured control of theHouse, the Senate,
and theWhiteHouse by the same party. A bill’s Issue Area is indicated using the Policy Agendas Project’s
major topic code, and its Congress is a factor variable indicating the Congress in which the bill was
introduced.
Empirical Models
We employ mixed effects logistic regression models to assess the relationship between lobbying side
attributes and committee considerations, accounting for variation at the Congress and Issue Area levels.
Based on modeling advice from Clark and Linzer (2015), Gelman and Hill (2006) and Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal (2012), we present results from amodel that includes fixed effects by Congress and random
effects by Issue Area. Thus, individual bills are nested within issue areas, and we also account for varying
propensities to consider legislation across time.
25
25
We have also estimated the models under a variety of different modeling assumptions; these include single-level logit
models with and without clustered standard errors, probit and mixed probit models, mixed logit models with legislator-level
random effects, and a multilevel logit with bills nested within legislators (i.e. their sponsors), again where bills are nested in
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Figure 4.2: Coefficients of Key Predictor Variables, Across Measurements of Committee Consideration
This graph presents point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals represented by solid lines) from the four models of
committee consideration for the three main coefficients of interest - Net PAC Contributions, Net Side Size, and Net Interest
Diversity. The graph demonstrates that results for the two coefficients of interest are similar across the four models.
4.4 results
The results of themodels appear inTable 4.1 . InTable 4.1, each columnpresents the estimated coefficients
of a mixed effects logistic regression model in which the same set of covariates are estimated as a model
of a dierent measurement of committee consideration, as discussed above. These measurements are:
in Model 1, Markup or Reporting (Govtrack); in Model 2, Markup (Govtrack); in Model 3, Reporting
(Govtrack); and inModel 4, Reported (CBP). Across all tables, logit coefficients are shown with standard
errors. Figure 4.2 shows that, despite using different measures of the dependent variable, the point
both legislators and issue areas, and finally where bills were nested within legislators, issue areas, and congresses. All models
produced substantively similar results. Thus, we maintain the most parsimonious strategy that still explicitly models the
issue-level variation in the data: a mixed logit regression with issue-level random effects and Congress (i.e. year) fixed effects.
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Table 4.1: Lobbying and Committee Consideration of Legislation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Committee Consideration Markup or Report Markup Reporting Reported
Data Source Govtrack Govtrack Govtrack CBP








(0.00868) (0.00852) (0.00872) (0.0111)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00686 0.00368 0.00506 0.0106
($2.675mil increments) (0.00390) (0.00384) (0.00391) (0.00632)








(0.00408) (0.00397) (0.00409) (0.00552)








(0.00398) (0.00373) (0.00371) (0.00391)







(0.00521) (0.00495) (0.00492) (0.00572)
# of Cosponsors -0.000845 0.000166 -0.000877 -0.00203
∗
(0.000738) (0.000729) (0.000748) (0.000879)








(0.196) (0.197) (0.203) (0.234)








(0.172) (0.173) (0.178) (0.209)








(0.164) (0.165) (0.171) (0.196)
Sponsor is Committee Chair 0.112 0.154 0.185 -0.392


















(0.225) (0.226) (0.228) (0.403)









(0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.173)
Congress Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
N 4757 4757 4757 4757
Standard errors in parentheses. Each column (other than the first, which contains variable names) presents the results of a
mixed effects logitmodel withmajor-topic code random effects. The columns differ by their dependent variable and its source.
The dependent variables forColumns 1-3were scraped from the legislative tracking sitegovtrack.us; the dependent variable
for Column 4 is taken from the Congressional Bills Project (CBP). Column 1 is a model of the bill being granted a markup
or being reported. Column 2 is a model of the bill receiving a markup. Column 3 and Column 4 are models of the bill being
reported from a committee in its chamber of origin. The models presented here indicate that: the net number of unique
interests supporting a bill (i.e. their "interest diversity" relative to the bill’s opponents) is consistently and positively associated
with committee consideration of a bill; the relative advantage of PAC contributions (here in $2.675mil increments, since that is
the maximum contribution -$5000- that can be given by a PAC to a member of Congress per cycle, multiplied by the number
of members of Congress - 535) among interests supporting a bill is not strongly associated with committee consideration; and
that the relative size of the side supporting a bill is negatively associated with committee consideration of that bill.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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estimates for the three main coefficients -Net Supporters’ Campaign Contributions,Net Supporters’ Side
Size, and Net Supporters’ Interest Diversity - in each model fall well within the 95% confidence interval
of the other point estimates of that coefficient across models. Thus, we can conclude that the inferences
one can draw from the model, at least about the variables of interest, are likely not to be a product of
measurement of the dependent variable. While subsequent discussion refers to all models (since the
results across them are by and large very similar), the graphical representations presented here will be
based on the results of Model 1.
The inferences these results suggest are in some ways counterintuitive. Contrary to expectations,
the size of a supportive coalition relative to the opposing coalition (Net # of Supporters) is consistently
negatively associated with groups’ ability to move bills out of committee. Across all models,26 the
coefficient of Net Side Size is negative and statistically significant. Figure 4.3 displays the marginal
predicted probability over the range of values ofNet Side Size, forModel 1 of Table 4.1. InModel 1, a shift
in Net Side Size from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean
is associated with a 10.8% decrease in the probability that a bill receives committee consideration (when
all other variables are at theirmeans). These results complicate existing theories that the size of a lobbying
coalition helps it attain its policy preferences, and demonstrate that the noted costs to individual groups
of coalition activities (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999) may have consequences for the coalition’s legislative
success.
Furthermore, contrary to the expectation of much public and elite discourse on money in politics,
the direct impact of campaign contributions on committee agendas appears to be potentially positive, but
both inconsistent and substantively negligible; Figure 4.3 displays the predicted probability of committee
consideration (markup or reporting), in Model 1 of Table 4.1, over the range of values of Net PAC
Contributions. The coefficient on Net PAC Contributions is marginally not statistically significant
(0.05 < p < 0.10) across all models. At the same time, even if the impact of campaign contributions
on committee agenda-setting were more consistent, the results here suggest any effect is very small. The
26
This result is robust to alternative model specifications. It holds not only in the four models presented here, but in
models iteratively excluding one Congress, and models excluding all other lobbying-related variables, and in many alternate
model specifications.
100
coefficient on PAC contributions is by far the smallest lobbying-related coefficient across all models. This
result is particularly surprising given the scale of the Net PAC Contributions variable: each one-unit
increase in this variable represents giving themaximum single-PAC contribution to every single member
of Congress. These results are consistent with the existing literature’s mixed evidence of a relationship
between contributions and legislative outcomes. Indeed, they suggest that the immediate impact of
money in congressional agenda-setting either happens at a different point in the policy process, works
by a different mechanism than informing the chair’s beliefs about legislative viability, or is dependent on
context.
On the other hand, interest diversity is robustly and positively associated with committee
agenda-setting across all models. While prior work has found that interest diversity among a coalition
arises under certain conditions (Phinney 2017), and that leaders of coalitions actively advertise the
diversity of their coalitions to lawmakers (Phinney 2017, Heaney and Crosson 2016), this analysis is the
first to show that, over a wide range of bills, relatively high diversity among a bill’s supporters (compared
to its opponents) is associated with that bill’s legislative advancement. Model 1 estimates that, with other
variables at their means, a shift from one standard deviation below mean Net Interest Diversity to one
standard deviation abovemeanNet InterestDiversity is associatedwith at 9.3% increase in the probability
that the bill will be granted some form of committee consideration. Given that a one-standard deviation
shift in Net Interest Diversity is 8.9 unique industry/cause codes, while a standard deviation shift in
Net Side Size is 21.9 organizations, this suggests that the ability to add diversity to an interest group side
without significantly increasing the number of organizations on that side is a net benefit for the coalition
in question, at least in terms of its ability to gain a bill committee consideration.
We also find that some conditions that lead to interest diversity also have independent associations
with committee consideration. The total Number of Groups Lobbying on a bill is positively and
statistically significantly associatedwith committee consideration. AsGrossmann andPyle (2013) discuss,
this could mean either that there remain unaccounted for attributes of lobbying sides that make them
influential on bills’ legislative advancement, or that bills that gain committee consideration attract more
groups lobbying on them. Except in the model of committee reporting based on the CBP data, Interest
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Figure 4.3: Party Status Differences in Marginal Effects of Lobbying Side Variables
This graph presents themarginal predicted probability of committee consideration across the range of values of Net Side Size,
Net PACContributions, andNet Interest Diversity, using themodel of CommitteeMarkup orReporting presented inModel
1 of Table 4.1. The line represents the average marginal predicted probability at a given level of each independent variable, and
the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval around that estimate.
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Group Competitiveness is found to be positively and statistically significantly associated with committee
consideration. These results complicate the negative coefficients on Net Side Size, since they are both
manipulations of that variable
27
However, if one additional group joined the coalition supporting a
bill, it would still (in expectation) lead to a net decrease in the probability of committee consideration
of that bill, all else equal.
28
Taken together, these results suggest that factors that generate interest
diversity have separate impacts on committee consideration apart from their ability to incentivize interest
diversity; if so, interest diversity would be a partial mediator of the relationship(s) between salience (and
competitiveness) and committee consideration.
Estimated coefficients for other controls largely track with existing models of committee
consideration. # of Cosponsors is statistically non-significant inmostmodels (except receiving a committee
report in the CBP data), varies in sign across them, and is a substantively weak effect regardless.Majority
Party Status, Committee Membership, and the interaction thereof are all positive, large, and statistically
significant associations. If the Sponsor is the Chair of the bill’s committee of referral, it appears to not have
a consistent association with committee consideration. Conditions ofUnified Government also tend to
make bills during those congresses more likely to receive committee consideration.
Taken together, the results suggest that interest groups play an important role in committee
agenda-setting decisions. A very diverse coalition supporting a bill will not overcome majority party
legislators’ and/or committee members’ institutional advantages in getting their bills on the committee’s
agenda. Instead it is more likely that lobbying plays a role in deciding which majority or committee
member bills are likely to be considered. However, though these results are in and of themselves new and
in some ways counterintuitive, they do not yet evince this study’s theory: that the chair’s need to assess
legislative viability generates conditions under which interest groups can be influential on committee
agenda-setting. To assess this, we turn next to the role of institutional alignments and prerogatives in
27
Though it is true that Competitiveness and Number of Groups Lobbying are highly correlated with Net Side Size, the
coefficients onNet Side Size remain negative, statistically significant, and approximately the same size when these variables are
removed.
28
This is a function of summing the coefficients, given how a one-unit change in the number of organizations supporting
a bill would affect each variable. A one-organization increase in bill supporters is a one-unit increase in Net Side Size and the
Total Number of Groups Lobbying the bill, but a one-unit decrease in the measure of Competitiveness. Based on the results
of Model One, the resulting change to the log odds of committee consideration would be approximately -0.012 (= -0.016 +
0.022-0.018).
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conditioning interest group influence.
4.5 anticipated legislative viability as the mechanism
This analysis finds that interest group lobbying influences committee agenda-setting because it informs
the chair about when bills are legislatively viable. However, up to this point we have only tested whether
variation in sides’ size, campaign contributions, and interest diversity are associated with committee
consideration. Here, we test whether the associations between these factors and committee consideration
change with the underlying legislative viability of bills. To the extent that these factors matter more for
bills that have a more uncertain (i.e. neither guaranteed to be considered nor guaranteed to be neglected)
legislative viability, it supports this study’s contention that the chair’s need to anticipate legislative viability
creates conditions for interest group influence.
We focus on two factors that make bills more or less legislatively viable. These are: First, the party
status of the bill’s sponsor; and Second, the partisan alignment between the chambers of Congress and
the White House. In the contemporary Congress, the majority party has very strong agenda-setting
powers in both chambers. (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011) My
initial results confirm that majority-party legislators’ bills are much more likely to be considered in
committee than those minority-party legislators. However, majority-party status alone is not a sufficient
predictor of committee consideration: committee agendas include only a fraction of bills referred to the
committee, even among those bills sponsored by majority party members. In fact, only about a third of
majority-sponsored bills (1455 out of 3930) inmy data received no committee consideration, while a mere
12 percent (147 of 1460) of minority-sponsored bills were considered.
29
Because chairs care about bills’
viability, they will examine majority-party members’ bills for indications that a bill is legislatively viable
relative to other majority party bills. The theory presented above argues that lobbying side attributes can
inform the chair of a bill’s legislative viability. Thus, the association between lobbying side attributes and
committee consideration is likely to be stronger for majority-sponsored bills than minority-sponsored
29
Readers might be interested to know that, among bills sponsored by majority-party legislators who are members of the
bill’s committee, about one-half are granted consideration.
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bills.
We also consider the role of institutional alignments among the chambers of Congress and theWhite
House as amoderator for interest group influence on committee agendas. Divided government generally
makes it harder - though crucially, not impossible - to pass new legislation. (e.g Mayhew 1991; Kelly 1993;
Howell et al. 2000; Maltzman and Shipan 2008; Binder 1999) This is because under divided government
and ideological sorting between the parties, the ideological distance between pivotal voters across the
stages of the legislative process tends to be larger. In such situations, indications that a bill can appeal
to a wide range of legislators including lobbying side attributes, ought to matter more because making
legislative progress is more difficult. However, because the majority party in each chamber will still
prefer their chamber’s majority-party members’ bills, we expect that the effects of unified and divided
government are primarily constrained to majority party members within each chamber.
We test these hypotheses in two ways. First, we plot the marginal predicted probability of
Consideration
30
over the range of values of each independent variable, by whether the sponsor is a
member of the majority or minority party. These plots appear in Figure 4.4. They show a clear
distinction between majority and minority party members, not just in their predicted probability of
consideration, but in the slope of each lobbying side attribute’s associationwith the predicted probability
of consideration. For both Net Side Size and Net Interest Diversity, majority party-sponsored bills have
larger associated marginal change in the predicted probability of consideration. Thus, for majority party
members, increasing interest diversity while minimizing increases in coalition size is especially useful.
For minority-sponsored bills under normal conditions, the association keeps the same sign but loses
statistical significance. Under normal conditions, PAC contributions do not have a stronger association
with committee consideration for either majority- or minority party members.
Second, we reestimate the original model
31
on various subsamples of the data. Each subsample varies
by sponsor party status (Majority, Minority, or Both) and institutional alignment (Unified Government,
Divided Government, or Both). Figure 4.5 summarizes the coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals)
30
Here, we use the results fromModel 1 of Table 4.1, where the dependent variable is Committee Consideration (Markup
or Reporting) as measured by Govtrack.
31
again, Model 1 of Table 4.1
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Figure 4.4: Party Status Differences in Marginal Effects of Lobbying Side Variables
This graph presents the marginal predicted probability of committee consideration for majority party and minority party
members, across the range of values of Net Side Size, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Interest Diversity, using the model
of Committee Markup or Reporting presented in Model 1 of Table 4.1. The line represents the average marginal predicted
probability at a given level of each independent variable, and the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval around
that estimate.
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Figure 4.5: Coefficients ofKey PredictorVariables, with 95%Confidence Intervals, Across Sponsor’s Party
Status and Institutional Alignment. DV: Markup or Reporting (Govtrack).
for the three main lobbying side attributes, across all iterations of this model; Table 4.2 presents the
full results across all eight models. For the most part, these results track with my expectations. The
association between Net Side Size is negative and statistically significant for majority-party bills and bills
under divided government, and majority party bills under divided government; for minority-party bills,
and majority party bills under unified government, the association changes in sign and is, regardless,
not statistically significant. With the exception of minority-sponsored bills under unified government,
the coefficients on Net PAC Contributions and Net Interest Diversity largely maintain their full-sample
direction and statistical significance; once again Net Interest Diversity is associated with committee
consideration for majority party bills, bills introduced during divided government, and the combination
of both conditions.
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The striking and puzzling divergence fromprevious results occurs forminority party bills introduced
under unified government (Model 6 ofTable 4.2). Here, the coefficients for both PACContributions and
Interest Diversity change signs, get much larger, and are statistically significant. This would suggest that
while majority-sponsored bills benefit from the signal of broad appeal that Interest Diversity provides,
minority-sponsored bills benefit from being backed by a narrow band of wealthy interests. There are at
least three possible explanations for this divergence. The first is that the small subsample (140 out of an
original sample of over 4700) that represent minority-party bills introduced in unified government (i.e.
where that party is totally out of power) are unrepresentative of the full sample for reasons other than
their being solely minority party bills introduced under unified government. The second explanation
is related to the first: because the subsample is so small, a mixed effects logit model is inappropriate
(and, over several estimation attempts, failed to converge). Instead, Model 6 uses a logit model with
standard errors clustered onmajor topic code, though this should provide similar results. (Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2012) Finally, it is possible that this result is simply more evidence that the lobbying side
attributes that matter really do depend on institutional alignments. Witko (2006) finds evidence that
PAC contributions influence voting on non-salient and non-ideological issues. Perhaps minority party
legislators, knowing that theywon’t have anopportunity topass ideological and salient bills under unified
government, (Howell et al. 2000) gear their bill introductions toward the non-ideological, non-salient
bills where PAC contributions are most likely to have an impact. However, due to the subsampling and
estimationdifferences betweenModel 6 and the othermodels, it is imprudent todraw strong conclusions.
These analyses generally support the theory that lobbying is influential due to chairs’ uncertainty
surrounding a bill’s legislative viability. Majority party bills are not only more likely to be considered in
general, but the association between lobbying side attributes (specifically, interest diversity and side size)
and committee consideration is substantively larger formajority party bills thanminority party bills. This
suggests that chairs use their observationof lobbyingonbills tohelp themdeterminewhichmajorityparty
bills are more likely to garner broad, sustained support. Similarly, the association between lobbying side
attributes and committee consideration is stronger in periods of divided government. Because the policy
preferences that must be simultaneously satisfied in order for a bill to pass are broader in such periods,
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Table 4.2: Lobbying and Committee Consideration of Legislation, Institutional Variation
Subsample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-Party Status Maj Min Both Both Min Min Maj Maj
-Govt Unified? Both Both Y N N Y N Y









(0.00953) (0.0270) (0.0306) (0.00954) (0.0287) (0.120) (0.0106) (0.0313)
Net PAC contribs. 0.00566 0.00986 0.00263 0.00630 0.00698 0.285
∗∗
0.00521 -0.00304
(0.00410) (0.0130) (0.0175) (0.00405) (0.0149) (0.103) (0.00429) (0.0182)







(0.00452) (0.0119) (0.0203) (0.00427) (0.0122) (0.0617) (0.00479) (0.0208)















(0.00581) (0.0165) (0.0181) (0.00589) (0.0170) (0.0733) (0.00677) (0.0188)
# of Cosponsors -0.000859 0.00113 -0.00124 -0.000820 0.00201 -0.0108 -0.000971 -0.000797












(0.209) (0.590) (0.211) (0.228)















(0.0895) (0.526) (0.175) (0.0999) (0.214)
Chair-Sponsored 0.0828 -0.205 -0.519 0.198 0.173 0.156 -0.407





















(0.178) (0.379) (0.621) (0.236) (0.355) (0.443) (0.186) (0.368)
Random Effects:











(0.143) (0.583) (0.0933) (0.170) (0.622) (0.161) (0.0784)
N 3460 1295 789 3968 1157 140 2811 649
AIC 3933.2 768.3 902.5 3819.3 659.7 113.7 3143.4 793.3
BIC 4019.3 835.4 963.3 3907.3 720.4 137.2 3214.7 842.5
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are mixed effects logit models, exceptModel 6 which is a logit model with standard
errors clustered on major topic code.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
all bills in divided government are (weakly) less viable than they would be if introduced during unified
government. Under divided government, chairs have greater incentives to value legislative viability in
bills they grant consideration. Because lobbying side attributes are more strongly related to committee
consideration during divided government, this suggests that lobbying is informing chairs about which
bills are still viable. Together, these analyses not only show that lobbying is associated with committee
agenda-setting, but it is more strongly associated with committee agenda-setting on bills where legislative
viability is particularly uncertain.
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4.6 conclusion
This paper connects the lobbying of individual legislators to legislative agendas in congressional
committees. Previous scholarship explores the tactical choices lobbyists make, or investigates the
conditions under which interest groups gain access to and attention or other support from individual
legislators. It less often explores the consequences of lobbying for legislative agendas and outcomes,
and has produced mixed results when it has done so. We address this gap by developing and testing a
theory of how the lobbying of individual rank-and-file legislators influences the decisions of strategic,
policy-motivated committee chairs to grant a bill consideration before the committee. Committee
consideration is an important first step for all but the most salient bills. Committee chairs seeking to
optimize their committee’s agenda want to allocate agenda space to bills that are legislatively viable.
Viability can be predicted, we argue, by examining the sets of interest groups lobbying on each side of a
bill - that is, either in support of or opposition to it - and, in particular, their collective attributes. Previous
scholarship on lobbying suggests three such attributes: One, the number of groups on the side; Two, the
campaign contributions by industries and causes represented by that side; and Three, the diversity of the
industries, causes, and other subconstituencies on a side. We expect that to the extent these attributes are
influential on individual legislators, chairs will take the balance of them between a bill’s supporters and
opponents as an indication of a bill’s legislative viability.
To test these expectations, we use new data on the positions of over 13,000 interest groups on over
5000 bills introduced in Congress between 2005 and 2014, and new data on bill’s progress through
committee. We find evidence that relative interest diversity among a bill’s supporting interest groups
is associated with a consistent if modest increase in the probability that a bill will receive committee
consideration. PAC contributions among interests represented on a side are inconsistently associated
with committee consideration, and though positive the substantive impact is likely to be small. Side size,
contrary to expectations, is negatively associated with committee consideration. To test the mechanism
of signaling legislative viability, we perform a series of tests to show that majority party bills, particularly
those introduced during non-unified government, benefit more from positive net interest diversity and
suffer more from increased side size, and provide evidence that minority party bills introduced during
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periods of unified government (that is, when the other party controls the House, Senate, and White
House) benefit from an advantage in PAC contributions. That is, when bills are be default less viable, the
influence of interest group lobbying increases.
This study makes several notable contributions to the study of interest group lobbying. First, it
connects research on interest groups, which has focused on how groups lobby to get what they want,
to research on lawmaking, legislative agendas, and congressional organization, which typically focuses
more on how the needs of legislators affect which issues Congress addresses andwhich it ignores. Second,
it tests several proposed mechanisms of interest group influence - side size, contributions, and coalition
diversity - and finds that interest diversity has the most general, consistent benefit for gaining committee
consideration. Along the same lines, it suggests that what makes a group’s lobbying efforts "influential",
in this theory, is how much their position-taking changes the chair’s beliefs about a bill’s legislative
viability should she grant it consideration. Third, it provides an original analysis of how partisanship
and institutional alignments moderate the influence of these mechanisms on committee consideration.
Furthermore, the number of bills considered in this analysis is among the largest of any study of interest
groups, enhancing its potential external validity. Taken together, this study’s findings suggest that,
even as individual organizations pursue narrow, ideological, and parochial interests, lobbying makes
congressional agendas more bipartisan and more broad-based than would otherwise be the case.
However, this study also has several limitations. It could be that there are other factors that matter,
including the possibility that some third factor effects both lobbying side attributes and committee
decision-making. Manyother potentialmechanisms for apparent interest group influence on stages of the
legislative process remain. One particular absence is that it is likely that chairs personally favor interests
that are important to their re-election constituency. Also, it is of course plausible that different lobbying
attributes matter more at different stages of the legislative process, so it is not valid to conclude based
solely on these results, for example, that campaign contributions do not matter very much for lobbyist
influence on lawmaking. Finally, whilemy theory includes reference to both electoral value and legislative
viability,my empirical focus here has been on the latter. Direct lobbying of the committee chairmay affect
her assessment of bills’ value as well.
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Despite these limitations, this paper raises important questions about the distribution of power and
influence in Congress. Given that many groups lobby the same committees across many bills and many
years, what sorts of relationships do they develop over time? Do groups that happen to have more
experience lobbying in favor a particular legislator’s bills become more influential when that legislator
achieves positions of power? What are the implications of interest groups’ ability to influence committee
agendas for howCongress as an institution understands which issues that aremost important, andwhich
solutions are the best? Answers to these questions will continue to improve our understanding of the
role of organized interests in American politics.
4.7 appendix: summary statistics
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics and data sources for all variables appearing in analyses presented
in this study.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean (or Prop.) Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Dependent Variable: Committee Consideration
Referred or Marked Up 5221 .289 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Marked Up in Committee 5221 .266 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Reported from Committee 5221 .268 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Reported from Committee (CBP) 5221 .219 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Independent Variables: Interest Group Side Attributes
Net Interest Diversity 5221 3.153 8.948 -54 97 ML&CRP
(# of Unique Interests)
Net Contribution Levels 4917 3.344 14.320 -119.630 324.618 ML&CRP
(Same Year PAC contributions, $2.675mil increments)
Control Variables: Bill Context and Sponsor
Side Size 5221 6.234 21.722 -122 262 ML
(# Supporters - # Opponents )
Competitiveness 5221 -9.424 20.54 -262 0 ML
(-|#Supporters - #Opponents|)
Interest Group Salience 5221 12.538 25.815 1 524 ML
(Total # of Groups Lobbying)
Legislator Salience 5221 30.646 50.318 0 380 GT
(# of Cosponsors)
Sponsor is Majority Party Member 5221 .726 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sponsor is Committee Member 5214 .553 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sponsor is Committee Chair 5214 .049 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Unified Government .171 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Congress Fixed Effects CBP
(Congress in which bill was introduced)
Bill’s Issue Area PAP
(PAPMajor Topic Code)
This table presents summary statistics for each of the continuous and count variables included in this paper’s empirical
models. Data sources (and abbreviations) are Maplight.org ("ML"), Govtrack.us ("GT"), Center for Responsive Politics




This dissertation opened with a question – why does Congress attend to some problems and not others?
It provides answers to these questions at both the issue- and bill-levels. In the first paper, "Legislator
Priorities and Problem Selection in Congressional Committees", I examine how the issue priorities of
individual legislators are translated ontoCongress’s issue agenda. I argue that formal powers and informal
advantages should allow committee chairs to direct their committee’s attention to the issues within its’
jurisdiction that the chair cares about most. To identify the causal effect of committee chairs’ issue
priorities on committee agendas, I confine my analysis to committee agendas among committees, and
in years, where a sitting committee chair either died in office or resigned in (non-legislative) scandal, and
was then replaced with a new chair. Using data on committee hearing topics and legislators’ introduced
legislation during these committee-years, I show that committee agendas consistently combine the
committee’s ongoing responsibilities with the priorities of the committee chair. I fail to find a consistent
relationship between committees’ issue priorities and those of majority party members and leaders.
In the second and third papers, I examine how lobbying by organized interest groups influences the
specific bills that are granted consideration in committee. Most accounts of interest group influence
focus on the resources – most frequently, lobby expenditures and campaign contributions – that
lobbyists can bring to bear on policy debates. In "Interest Diversity in Lobbying Coalitions: an
Exploratory Analysis", I conceptualize and validate a measure for a new source of interest group
influence. I call this source "interest diversity", and define it as the relative degree of observable
variety of subconstituencies represented by set of organizations. When coalitions include organizations
representing more subconstituencies, they have the ability to appeal to more legislators. I propose a
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measure of interest diversity based on the differences in interest group categories across the organizations
lobbying on opposite sides of the same bill. I validate this measure in a sample of bills from recent
Congresses by showing it corresponds to well-established patterns of lobbying across bills as well as with
the expectations of existing theories of interest group mobilization and legislative politics.
In the final paper, "Lobbying Coalition Diversity and Interest Group Influence on Congressional
Priorities", I show that committee leaders respond to the interest diversity of groups lobbying for
or against a bill when deciding whether to grant that bill consideration in committee. I argue that
policy-motivated committee chairs have incentives to grant committee consideration to bills likely to
have the sustained, motivated support of other legislators; this in turn should lead them to favor bills
that are supported by organizations representing diverse interests. Using themeasure of interest diversity
developed in "Interest Diversity in Lobbying Coalitions" as well as new data on the progress of bills
through committee, I show that a two-standard deviation increase in net interest diversity is associated
with a 10 percent increase in the probability that a bill is considered in committee. I then show that
bills with more uncertain legislative viability – those introduced by majority party members or those
introduced during periods of divided government – exhibit stronger associations between net interest
diversity and committee consideration. These findings suggest that committee leaders use interest group
lobbying to gauge the viability of bills.
5.1 contributions to knowledge
Across the three papers that make up this dissertation, I make contributions to several areas of research.
First, this dissertation helps to rehabilitate the perceived agenda power of committee leaders, particularly
in the House. Committee leaders have long been either ignored or reduced to trivial roles in theories of
legislative politics. This dissertation finds that committee leaders’ personal priorities matter for which
issue areas are considered by their committees. Because committees’ priorities define much of the floor’s
agenda, this suggests that committee leaders are not only legislatively powerful, but that they can use that
power to their personal benefit.
This dissertation’s rehabilitation of committee leaders serves as a qualification to partisan theories
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of legislative organization. In partisan theories, majority party leaders have significant power to affect
Congress’s agenda, either by compelling Congress to address issues on which the majority party has
achieved consensus or in blocking proposals that the majority of the majority would oppose. Most bills
that are reported from committee are considered on the floor, but I fail to find a consistent association
between the issues prioritized by majority party members and those considered in congressional
committee hearings. This suggests that, for non-salient issues – i.e., the bulk of the congressional agenda
– the majority party is more concerned with blocking caucus-dividing provisions than in setting issue
priorities. To the extent this holds, the vast powers attributed to majority party leadership may be only
narrowly applied.
As an example of this narrow application, take the high water mark of majority party leaders’
dominance of committees – House Republicans’ attempts to implement their "Contract with America"
after sweeping to power after the 1994 congressional elections. Much controversy was made over new
House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s decision at the onset of the 104th Congress to dictate to the new
Republican committee chairs a series of bills aimed at enacting the Contract. However, bills containing
the coreContractwithAmerica legislation numbered only twenty,
1
fewer than the number of substantive
committees in theHouse. Indeed,House committees reported 561 public bills during the 104thCongress.
Even if one assumes that all 561 bills needed to be approved by the Gingrich leadership, the fact that so
many of them did not originate with leadership suggests that committees still play an important role in
designing legislation and setting legislative priorities. My dissertation provides evidence that in exercising
this role, committees’ priorities are influenced by the personal issue priorities of their chairs.
This disconnect between party leaders’ well-evinced dominance in the legislative process and
committee leaders’ discretion suggests that part of lawmaking may be understudied. At least since
Kingdon (1995, first edition 1984), political scientists have understood that there exists a distinction
between selecting which problems to address and deciding on which legislative proposals to consider
in order to address those problems. However, the vast majority of research on legislative outcomes
1
In fact, the core bills of the Contract with America numbered only ten. However, major sections of these bills were
inserted into other bills once Republicans’ ambitious plans proved difficult to advance through the Senate and past President
Clinton’s veto pen.
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focuses on the latter, when the former is just as important in understandingwhyCongress addresses some
problems and ignores others. This dissertation addresses this imbalance of scholarly focus by highlighting
the issue prioritization role of committees as well as the role of interest group lobbying in shaping which
proposals gain the attention of legislators as they select which problems to attend to in committee.
My dissertation also makes contributions to the study of lobbying on lawmaking. Where most
studies of interest groups focus on whether individual groups get what they want – e.g., access to or
mobilization of individual legislators or preference attainment in policy outcomes – I focus on whether
these pursuits result in Congress addressing different legislation than it otherwise might. In finding that
interest group lobbying has an impact on the consideration of bills in committee, I show that lobbying’s
influence is in a sense much more fundamental than most lobbying studies can assess. Not only do
interest groups influence the behavior of individual members and change individual provisions in bills,
but this dissertation finds that they change which legislation progresses and which is ignored. At the
same time, by covering so many bills in such a broad range of issue areas over such a long timeframe, this
is one of the most easily generalizable studies of lobbying that has been conducted to date. Moreover,
by both connecting interest group lobbying to individual bills and covering a time frame spanningmany
congresses and two presidential administrations, this study provides one of the first examinations of how
interest groups’ legislative influence varies under different institutional alignments.
On the other hand, though interest group lobbying’s influence may be broader and more
fundamental than has heretofore been examined, this dissertation suggests that it is also more benign.
In contrast to resource-based accounts of lobbyist influence, my dissertation finds that interest group
lobbying strengthens connections between legislators and their districts. By highlighting what individual
legislators need (identification of the legislative issues thatmatter to the distinct groups thatmake up their
districts) and how lobbyists accomplish it (by serving as proxies for those groups in Congress), interest
diversity depicts lobbying as an aid to representation. In that sense, while still singing with an upper-class
accent, the chorus may not be so un-heavenly after all.
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5.2 directions for future work
Finally, this dissertation has highlighted several potentially fruitful areas for future research. First, I
have identified a disconnect in the literature between recent depictions of committee chairs as agents
of the majority party constrained to the point of triviality and chairs’ ability to ensure that their personal
priorities are prioritized by their committees. I suggest that this is because prior studies have examined
alternative specification (i.e., which bills to allow onto the agenda) rather than problem selection (i.e.,
which problems to address through policy change). This dissertation provides a preliminary examination
of the latter, finding that the institutional privileges granted to committee chairs afford them the ability
to bring institutional attention to the problems that matter most to them personally. However, there are
doubtless many other influences on problem selection in Congress. Given the importance of prioritizing
problems before legislation can be offered to address those priorities, there is much work to be done in
understanding not only how problems get selected, but which and, perhaps most importantly, whose.
Second, while this dissertation provides evidence that interest diversity matters in the first stage of
the legislative process – i.e., whether a bill receives committee consideration in its chamber of origin –
that does not necessarily mean that interest diversity makes bills more likely to pass or fail. Future studies
might investigate whether or under what conditions bills with higher interest diversity are more likely to
pass. It is possible that interest diversity provides benefits only at initial stages of the legislative process,
while other sources of interest group influence, such as numbers or contributions, play a bigger role later
in the legislative process.
On the other hand, this dissertation shows that interest groups bring something other than resources
to bear in influencing legislation. It shows that interest diversity is associated with the decision to grant
bills committee consideration, and provides a theoretical rationale for why legislators – both committee
chairs and the rank-and-file – should respond to diverse interests lobbying in favor of a bill. It also
finds that committee consideration of legislation is more strongly and more consistently associated with
groups’ interest diversity than their PAC contributions. But interest diversity is hardly exclusive in the
advantages it grants to organizations and coalitions that benefit from it. Indeed, interest groups engage
in many strategies to gain influence in Washington, and these in turn rely on many potential sources of
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interest group support. Future accounts of interest group influence might try to think beyond resources,
and even beyond diversity, in assessing the factors underlying that influence. Indeed, the normative
implications of interest group activity, and the justifications for reforms to that activity, vary dramatically
based on what one thinks makes lobbying influential.
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